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What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain
place, that it is a certain time, and that you are a certain individual? What
happens if you get lost, or lose track of the time? Can you ever be unsure of
your own identity? These are the kind of questions considered in my thesis.
Beliefs about where, when and who you are are what are called in the literature
de se, or self-locating beliefs. This thesis examines how we can represent de se
beliefs, and how we can reason about de se uncertainty.
In the first part of the thesis, I present and motivate a specific account of the
content of de se belief, based on the one given by David Lewis. On this account,
the content of de se beliefs are centred propositions. I defend this view against
a rival account, put forward by Robert Stalnaker, according to whom the con-
tent of de se beliefs are ordinary (non-centred) propositions.
In the second part of the thesis, I explore how we can reason probabilistically
about de se uncertainty. I start by defining probabilities over centred proposi-
tions, and investigate what probabilities mean in this context. As it turns out,
all the main interpretations of probability can be extended to centred propo-
sitions. The only trouble seems to arise for the Bayesian principle of updating
via conditionalization. After giving a diagnosis of the problem, I offer a solu-
tion by formulating a natural extension of conditionalization, which I argue
preserves the essential features of Bayesian reasoning.
In the final chapter, I apply my view and show that it leads to a natural resolu-
tion of a puzzle (known as the Sleeping Beauty problem) that is generally taken
to be a test case for any account of centred updating.
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‘But if I’m not the same, the next question is, Who in the
world am I? Ah, that’s the great puzzle!’ And she began
thinking over all the children she knew that were of the same
age as herself, to see if she could have been changed for any
of them.
– L. Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
10
1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
If you have ever been lost, unsure of where you are or what time it is, then
you know what it is like to lack some piece of self-locating, or de se informa-
tion. This is information about where, when and who you are in the world. I
am fairly certain that this kind of situation is common (and occasionally trou-
bling) enough that it will be obvious why, intuitively, one should care about
self-locating information. But why should philosophers, and specifically epis-
temologists, be interested in de se beliefs and de se uncertainty? What is special
about them?
First of all, de se beliefs are extremely pervasive. Chances are that as you are
reading this text, you will most definitely have many such beliefs of your own,
as I do myself. For example, I’m aware of who I am (Silvia), I know that I’m in
London, that it is a Monday night in December and that as I type, it is already
dark outside. I’m not exactly sure of the time, but I believe that if I wanted to
check it right now, I could turn on the screen of my phone.
Moreover, it seems to me that all these beliefs about one’s identity, spatial and
temporal location play an important role in shaping one’s experience, and the
way one reasons about the world. Some philosophers, following John Perry
(1979), have argued that de se beliefs are essential to explain our very sense of
11
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agency (see Chapter 3 below). If I stop writing to make myself a cup of tea, for
instance, at least part of the explanation for this action is that I believe that I
myself would like a cup of tea now, and that I also believe that it is in my power
to make one.
What’s more, as I will argue in Chapter 6 de se information is essential to under-
standing the link between observations and evidence, which is a fundamental
component of Bayesian reasoning. A careful study of the content of de se be-
liefs will lead us to reflect on some key features of Bayesian rationality, solving
some quirky probability puzzles along the way (see Chapter 7).
The overall plan of my thesis will be the following. In the first part of the thesis,
I will present and motivate a specific account of the content of de se belief,
based on the one given by David Lewis. On this account, the content of de se
beliefs are centred propositions. I defend this view against a rival account, put
forward by Robert Stalnaker, according to whom the content of de se beliefs are
ordinary (non-centred) propositions. In the second part of the thesis, I explore
how we can reason probabilistically about de se uncertainty, and advance a
solution to a diachronic puzzle that de se beliefs appear to raise for Bayesian
reasoning.
1.1 G E N E R A L P L A N
Despite their pervasiveness and relevance, de se beliefs do not fit very well with
a standard account of the content of beliefs that many philosophers, including
epistemologists, subscribe to. On this view, the content of beliefs are propo-
sitions, understood as sets of possible worlds. For example, suppose that I
believe that London is a city of eight million: the proposition that I believe
contains all the possible worlds where London is a city of eight million, and
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does not contain all the possible worlds where London has fewer or more than
eight million inhabitants. Here, a possible world is intuitively just a specific
way in which the world could objectively be. The most famous proponent of
this view, David Lewis (1986), thought that all possible worlds exist – not just
the actual world. But we don’t really need to take a stand regarding the meta-
physical status of possible worlds here, and in the rest of this thesis I will just
assume that we can use them to provide a semantic framework for the content
of beliefs, without settling whether they do in fact exist in a metaphysical sense.
However, possible worlds are too coarse grained to capture the content of de se
beliefs, such as for example my current de se belief that it is now Monday. We
will need some extra machinery to pick out a location, time, an agent within a
possible world.
The extra machinery that is needed to perform this task are centres. In Chapter
2, I present and discuss some examples of de se beliefs and introduce centred
worlds as a formal device to model de se information. Intuitively, a centred
world is just a pair of a possible world and a centre within it. I then review
several applications of the centred worlds framework, and consider interpreta-
tions of the framework that have been proposed in the literature, concluding
that, even though which interpretation we choose may depend on the specific
application, centred worlds provide the right sort of formal framework to study
de se uncertainty.
Following on this discussion, Chapter 3 gives an analysis of a famous exam-
ple originally introduced by Perry, arguing that two intuitively plausible read-
ings of this example correspond to two modes of reasoning about de se infor-
mation, which I call the cartographer and the pathfinder modes. I argue that
while these two modes of reasoning can often appear mixed together in prac-
tice, they correspond to opposite ‘directions’ of inference: on the cartographer
mode, one uses de se information to reconstruct what the world is objectively
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like. On the pathfinder mode, on the other hand, one tries to use objective
information about the world to figure out one’s own location. I then present
two rival accounts of de se uncertainty that are formulated within the centred
worlds framework, due to Robert Stalnaker (2008) and to David Lewis (1979),
and show that only the latter is compatible with both modes of reasoning.
As I will argue in Chapter 4, Lewis’s account presents several advantages. Be-
sides being compatible with both modes of reasoning about de se beliefs that
I identify in Chapter 3, it permits a natural application of probabilities. On
Lewis’s account, which is the one that I subscribe to, the contents of de se
beliefs are simply centred propositions, i.e. sets of centred worlds. This rep-
resents a natural refinement of the possible worlds framework, and allows a
straightforward identification of belief states with their contents. Stalnaker’s
alternative account, on the other hand, divorces de se beliefs from their con-
tent. According to Stalnaker, de se beliefs should be modelled as sets of centred
worlds, but the content of de se beliefs always correspond to ordinary, non-
centred propositions. I present and criticise Stalnaker’s account in Chapter 4.
We have seen that de se beliefs are both pervasive and relevant. Can we as-
sign probabilities to the contents of uncertain de se beliefs? I consider this in
Chapter 5, where I start by defining probabilities over centred propositions,
and investigate what probabilities mean in this context. I find that defining
probabilities over sets of centred worlds requires no specific technical modi-
fications to the theory of probability, and that all the main interpretations of
probability can be extended to centred propositions. The only trouble seems
to arise for the Bayesian principle of updating via conditionalisation.
In light of this, in Chapter 6 I focus on the diachronic puzzle that centred prob-
abilities raise for Bayesian reasoning. It is now generally accepted in the litera-
ture that de se beliefs are not compatible with the standard Bayesian principle
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of updating via conditionalisation (see Titelbaum, 2016b). I review the current
literature on the topic, focussing in particular on the account of updating as
communication put forward by Sarah Moss (2012), discussing the theoretical
assumptions about rationality that underpin Moss’s account. I then present
an alternative account, which allows a natural extension of conditionalisation
to centred events, and argue that it is compatible with the essential features of
Bayesian reasoning.
Finally, Chapter 7 applies my view to the Sleeping Beauty problem. This prob-
lem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic ex-
ample of how self-locating uncertainty ‘creates havoc’ for standard Bayesian
principles of conditionalisation and reflection, and it is also thought to raise
serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. I show that, contrary to
the consensus view, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem
within a standard Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly repre-
sented, the solution satisfies all the standard Bayesian principles, including
conditionalisation and reflection, and is immune from Dutch Book arguments.
Moreover, the solution does not make any appeal to the Restricted Principle of
Indifference that is generally accepted in the literature on self-locating uncer-
tainty, which, I argue, is incompatible with the principles of Bayesian reason-
ing.
1.2 L O O K I N G F O R W A R D
As I have outlined in this introduction, de se beliefs are an interesting research
subject for epistemologist. They are pervasive, relevant and raise interesting
puzzles for one of the most widely accepted interpretations of probability. As
I take it, the main achievement of this thesis is to show that reasoning about
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de se beliefs is in fact compatible with the fundamental principles of Bayesian
reasoning. This surprising conclusion opens up interesting further questions,
some of which will be outlined in Chapter 6.
2
C E N T R E D W O R L D S
In this chapter, I introduce centred worlds and motivate their use to represent
self-locating uncertainty. I first present some examples of self-locating uncer-
tainty in §2.1, explaining some of the reasons why we should be concerned
with this type of uncertainty. In §2.2, I motivate the choice of centred worlds
as the means to represent self-locating uncertainty. §2.3 reviews the key ap-
plications of centred worlds in philosophy and some other related disciplines.
Finally, §2.4 presents the accounts of centred worlds that are currently present
in the literature. These accounts differ from each other in how they individuate
centres.
2.1 S E L F - L O C AT I N G U N C E R TA I N T Y
Limited agents like us are often ignorant or uncertain about various features
of the world and our place within it. On the one hand, we often lack complete
information about what the world is like. For example, imagine that Emma
has inadvertently spilled some wine on her dress, and is trying to use water to
remove the stain, seemingly unaware of the fact that water does not remove
17
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wine stains. Or, to take a different example, imagine that a coin is about to be
tossed, and you don’t know yet what the result is going to be.
In both cases, the relevant uncertainty seems to be about some objective fea-
tures of the world – ‘what the world is like’ – that are independent of the par-
ticular perspective or location from which they are entertained as possibilities.
Either water removes wine stains, or it does not, and this fact is independent of
whether Emma is aware of it or not. Similarly, either the coin lands Heads, or
it lands Tails (assuming that it is tossed under normal conditions). Which out-
come actually occurs is a feature of the world that is independent of whether
and by whom it is observed.
Typically, we can express possibilities of the kinds illustrated by the two exam-
ples above in terms of possible worlds. A possible world corresponds – roughly
– to a maximally detailed description of the world, specifying all the facts that
hold true within it. For example, whether wine stains can be removed with wa-
ter will be one of the facts that are true at some worlds, but false at others. So
this possibility divides possible worlds in two classes, the ones where it is true
that water removes wine stains, and the ones where it is false. Accordingly, the
actual world must fall in either one of these two classes.
Similarly, either the coin toss comes up Heads, or it comes up Tails. Each out-
come corresponds to a different way that the world might turn out to be like.
Either the actual world is a Heads-world, or it is a Tails-world, and it is so inde-
pendently of who might be able to observe the result of the toss. Perhaps, if the
coin is yet to be tossed, it may be yet indeterminate or impossible to know in
advance which outcome takes place, until the toss has taken place.1 But once
the toss is performed and that bit of information is settled, only one of the two
1 This will depend on the interpretation of probability that one accepts. See Chapter 5 for a dis-
cussion.
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possibilities can be true, independently of the method, timing or perspective
of an observation.
The two examples that I just presented illustrate cases of uncertainty about
what the world is like. At times, however, agents could also lack information
about their own position within the world, their own identity or the role that
they occupy. Following a standard usage, I will call uncertainty that loosely
falls under any of these types self-locating uncertainty.
Self-locating uncertainty does not seem to be straightforwardly tied to lack of
information or ignorance about what the world is like. Even in cases where
agents possess all the relevant information about the objective features of the
world, they may still be unable to identify the position that they occupy, as the
following examples will help to illustrate.
Example 1. Missing coordinates After a violent storm, Tom’s ship is lost at
sea. Luckily, he has a detailed digital map of the region where he is sailing, but
the GPS system is damaged and does not display Tom’s current location. High
at sea, around noon, the surroundings lack any specific element that would
enable Tom to pin down exactly where he is.
Example 2. Hidden display Ann forgot to take out her watch before going into
the shower, and as a result the screen is now completely fogged. The watch
itself is not damaged, but she won’t be able to read the time until the fog clears
away, which will probably take a few hours. In the meantime, Ann can’t be sure
of what time exactly is being displayed.
The next example is due to John Perry (1979):
Example 3. The messy shopper ‘I once followed a trail of sugar on a super-
market floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and
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back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him
he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became
thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the
shopper I was trying to catch.’ (Perry (1979), p. 3.)
In the first example, Tom is uncertain of his current spatial location, as he does
not know his coordinates. Let us suppose now that he considers the possibility
‘I am at point (x, y , z)’. Clearly, as he considers it, this possibility might be true
or false. But it is not true or false eternally, because Tom’s position could (and
likely will) change over time, so Tom could be located at (x, y , z) at some times,
but not at others.
Similarly, in the second example Ann is uncertain about the time currently dis-
played on her watch. She already knows what times the display is going to
show and in which order, but as she’s lost the ability to look at the display she
does not know what it is showing right now. Suppose that she considers the
possibility that the time displayed now is 7:05 a.m. This possibility is clearly
going to be either true or false at any time that Ann entertains it. But, again, it
is not true or false eternally,2 because the time displayed by the watch changes
regularly.
The third example has received much attention in the literature on self-locating
uncertainty, and it is the one with which John Perry is often credited to have in-
troduced what is known as the problem of the essential indexical. An essential
indexical is so called because it expresses some information about who a cer-
tain individual is, which it would not be possible to express by making recourse
only to non-indexical terms. At his final moment of realisation, the protagonist
in the messy shopper example appears to learn something new, namely that he
is the messy shopper. Moreover, this seems also to be reflected in the way that
2 At least on a first thoughts – but I will return to this issue later on, and I will discuss this point in
more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
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his behaviour is likely to change – for instance, we might now expect that he
will stop and check his cart for a torn sack of sugar. However, Perry argues that
it is very difficult to pin down what the content of this new piece of informa-
tion exactly is. Perry’s point is that this content cannot be expressed simply in
terms of new objective information about what the world is like. Instead, he
claims that the first personal pronoun I in the sentence ‘I am the messy shop-
per’, which expresses what the protagonist realises, is an essential indexical.
According to Perry (1979)3 the messy shopper does not learn any new infor-
mation about what the world is like when he realises who he is. For instance,
Perry was aware from the start that a messy shopper was leaving a sugar tray,
and that he himself was walking around the counter just as the messy shopper
was, and so on. What he did not know, however, is which possible individual he
was. Consider again the sentence ‘I am the messy shopper’, which is what Perry
comes to believe in the example. Given that Perry already knew that there was
a messy shopper around, he knew from the start that ‘I am the messy shopper’
would be a true sentence, when evaluated from the perspective of the correct
individual (the one who happened to be the messy shopper). As it turns out,
Perry himself is the messy shopper, so ‘I am the messy shopper’ is true for him.
But this sentence is not true or false absolutely. It is true from Perry’s perspec-
tive, but false from the perspective of Sally, another shopper in the same store.
Whereas the missing coordinates and the hidden display examples highlight
how some sentences can take different truth values depending on the spatial
or temporal location from which they are evaluated, Perry’s messy shopper ex-
ample illustrates a case where a sentence can take different truth values de-
pending on the identity or the role occupied by the agent from whose perspec-
3 See also Liao (2012) and Lewis (1979). I will return on the example of the messy shopper in
Chapter 3, where I will also use it to motivate a more detailed discussion of different modes of
reasoning with self-locating uncertainty.
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tive the sentence is evaluated. All three are examples of self-locating or de se
uncertainty.
2.2 C E N T R E D W O R L D S
As the three examples presented in the previous section suggest, sentences like
‘I am at point (x, y , z)’, ‘the display shows 7:05 a.m.’ or ‘I am the messy shopper’
are not true or false absolutely, but only with respect to the specific location (in
space or time), or the role occupied by the relevant individual.
Assuming that the map is an adequate representation of the objective geo-
graphical features of the world, Tom knows exactly what the world is like. How-
ever, he is still unable to locate himself within it. Given Tom’s circumstances,
the sentence ‘I am at point (x, y , z)’ could be either true or false, but its truth
value seems subject to change. If Tom’s ship moves, then the sentence might
become true, if it was previously false, or vice versa.
Similarly, Ann knows exactly the sequence of symbols that the fogged display
of her watch is going to produce. However, she is unable to say precisely which
time the screen is indicating right now. Assuming that Ann knows that at some
point the watch is going to display 7:05 a.m., Ann knows that the sentence ‘the
display shows 7:05 a.m.’ has been, is, or will eventually be true. However, like in
the previous case, the truth value of this sentence seems to change as different
times are successively displayed on the screen.
In both examples, there are some pieces of information – which, following a
standard practice I will called uncentred information – that correspond to fea-
tures of the world that do not change with respect to the agent’s location. In the
missing coordinates example, this corresponds to the information contained
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in Tom’s map, while in the hidden display example the uncentred information
corresponds to what Ann knows about the functioning of the watch and the
sequence of times that it is going to display.
Alongside the uncentred information, the agents in both examples also have
some centred information, that is information relative to the location that they
currently occupy. In the missing coordinates example, Tom’s centred informa-
tion includes all the points on the map that appear compatible with his sur-
roundings. In the hidden display example, the centred information includes
all the time points compatible with what the watch might be displaying. Since
Ann cannot see the display and she has no other way of synchronising her
present beliefs with the time time shown by the watch, her centred informa-
tion contains all the time points that are compatible with her current rough
estimation of what time it is.
It is a bit less straightforward to distinguish the centred and uncentred compo-
nents of the information held by the agent in the messy shopper example. Prior
to the realisation that he is the messy shopper, John Perry has access to uncen-
tred information about his surroundings, including the fact of being aware of
the presence of a messy shopper who is leaving a trail of sugar on the floor, and
of a shopper who is trying to catch the messy shopper in order to stop him. He
also has some centred information. He knows, for instance, that he himself is
the shopper who is trying to catch the messy shopper, whose identity is, for all
that Perry knows, uncertain.
As the previous examples highlight, the truth value of self-locating sentences
can change with respect to the context at which they are uttered. There are two
different morals that we could draw from this observation. On the one hand,
we could say that sentences like ‘I am at point (x, y , z)’ or ‘the display shows
7:05 a.m.’ have a fixed meaning, but the truth value of self-locating sentences
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like these is determined by the context of utterance and therefore is subject to
change. On the other hand, we could maintain instead that sentences like ‘I am
at point (x, y , z)’ or ‘the display shows 7:05 a.m.’ do not have a fixed meaning,
but rather that the meaning is fixed by the context at which they are uttered.
In other words, if we choose this route, self-locating sentences are in a sense
incomplete, as in order to fix their meaning it is necessary to add in the context
of utterance. On the resulting contextualist picture, the truth value of any self-
locating utterance is fixed.
I have written so far as though the truth value of an utterance or thought can
change over time. This may not be accurate, and there are many complex is-
sues here concerning utterances, truth and indexicals. Here I have skated over
these issues for the purposes of this introduction, but I will return to an inves-
tigation of these issues in chapters 3 and 4, where I will analyse more closely
different proposals to capture the semantic content of de se expressions.
Following a substantial literature originating from Lewis (1979), we can repre-
sent predicaments such as the ones illustrated by these three examples using
centred worlds. Intuitively, a centred world (w ,c) is a pair of a possible world
w and a centre c within it. The possible world component w corresponds to a
specific way that the world could be like, encoding all the uncentred informa-
tion about that world, while the centre c picks out a specific location or individ-
ual within w , encoding all the centred information relative to that perspective
on w .
Possible worlds can be used to represent objective (or non-self-locating) possi-
bilities, but they are not fine-grained enough to express self-locating possibili-
ties. In order to extend our account of propositions to centred worlds, we will
need to introduce a few distinctions. Firstly, we should amend the general def-
inition of a proposition. On this revised account, a proposition p (centred or
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uncentred) is just a set of centred worlds. Similarly as before, we will say that a
proposition p is true at a centred world (w ,c) if and only if (w ,c) belongs to p.
Secondly, we should make a distinction between centred and uncentred propo-
sitions. I will take an uncentred proposition p to be a set of centred worlds sat-
isfying the following condition: for any pair of centred worlds (w ,c) and (w ,c ′)
that differ only with respect to the centre, p contains (w ,c) if and only if it also
contains (w ,c ′). Conversely, any proposition p that does not satisfy this condi-
tion will be called centred.
For example, let us take p to be the proposition ‘Easter Island is 3.700km far
from Lima’. As he is lost at sea, Tom might believe that p is true, based on
the information on his map. His belief in p does not depend on where he be-
lieves is actual location to be. Believing p does not give Tom any information
regarding his own location. Since p is true at all possible locations that Tom
could occupy, it contains all centred worlds (w ,c) such that w is the actual
world (corresponding to the information on the map) and c is a centre within
w . Conversely, let q be the proposition ‘I am at location (x,y,z)’. q is true at
some, but not all the locations within w that Tom could occupy, so there are
some pairs of centred worlds (w ,c) and (w ,c ′) such that q is true at (w ,c), but
false at (w ,c ′).
2.2.1 Some preliminary objections and replies
Before moving forward in the discussion, in this section I consider some pre-
liminary objections to the introduction of a centred worlds framework to rea-
son about self-locating uncertainty.
Specifically, I can anticipate the following two main objections:
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1. We don’t need centres: Possible worlds are sufficient to capture all rele-
vant possibilities. We don’t need self-locating possibilities: they are re-
ducible to standard, non-self-locating possibilities.
2. We don’t need centred worlds: Instead, we should look at alternative
accounts of propositions that are not formulated in terms of possible
worlds, and which would be able to handle the cases of self-locating un-
certainty.
If correct, the first objection, which is a version of the reductionist or defla-
tionist thesis about self-locating uncertainty, represents a serious challenge to
centred worlds. If all cases of self-locating uncertainty, such as the examples
illustrated in the previous section, can ultimately be reduced to instances of
regular, uncentred and non self-locating uncertainty, this would seem to imply
that the whole exercise of introducing centred worlds is not only pointless, but
also wrong-headed. Introducing centred worlds would be pointless because
since there are not really different kinds of uncertainty demanding a different
treatment, regular possible worlds are all we need. It would also be wrong-
headed, because it would introduce distinctions where no distinctions ought
to be made. This is an issue in so far as it might sanction incorrect ways of
reasoning about uncertainty, depending on the framing of the problem.
I don’t believe that this objection is ultimately successful, because not all cen-
tred propositions might be reducible to uncentred ones, and therefore self-
locating uncertainty really presents some special issues that could not be solved
without the introduction of centres. I will discuss this point in more detail
in Chapters 3 and 4. But independently of whether the deflationist thesis is
ultimately true, we also have some independent reason to introduce centred
worlds. This is because even if it were always possible to reduce self-locating
possibilities to non-self-locating ones, it will often be the case that the reduc-
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tion comes at the cost of significantly increasing the complexity of the repre-
sentation. This is not at all an unusual problem for reductivist theories. For ex-
ample, one could make an analogy with reductionist thesis that are sometimes
discussed with respect to natural or social sciences. It is sometimes argued, for
instance, that psychology can in principle be entirely reduced to the physical
processes going on inside the brain. Without entering in the merit of this dis-
cussion, it is – I think – reasonable to expect that even if the reductionist thesis
were true, the simpler and most effective way to investigate psychological facts
might still be to use the tools offered by psychology.
The second objection is motivated by the observation that there are a class
of well-known puzzles about reference that have proved very difficult to solve
for many of the more popular theories of proposition, and self-locating beliefs
seem to share a lot of features with the puzzles in this category. Building on this
point, some authors including Magidor (2015) and Cappelen and Dever (2013)
have argued that all the motivations generally invoked for introducing centred
worlds are actually simply versions of well-known puzzles about reference in-
volving possible worlds, where the issue is not necessarily that of self-location
or essentially indexical terms. They do not deny (as the deflationist does) that
there might be essential indexicals or self-locating uncertainty that are impos-
sible to express on the possible world account of propositions. However the
conclusion that they would draw from this is not that we should refine the pos-
sible world account of propositions by introducing centres, but rather that we
should abandon it altogether in favour of a different account (I will return on
this point again briefly in Chapter 4, §4.1 and §4.1.1).
Centred worlds indeed may inherit some metaphysical issues from possible
worlds. However, these issues should be considered separately, and the ac-
count that I will develop in further chapters does not presuppose a specific
metaphysical view regarding what centred worlds really are. Moreover, as will
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become clearer in the discussion (see in particular Chapter 5), centred worlds
provide an ideal framework to reason about self-locating uncertainty, since
probabilities can naturally be defined over them. Other accounts of proposi-
tions, on the other hand, do not allow for the same natural algebraic struc-
ture. For example, the accounts considered in Magidor (2015), do not allow the
same straightforward extension of probabilities to self-locating possibilities.
2.3 A P P L I C AT I O N S
In this section, I review some key applications of centred worlds in philosophy
and some neighbouring disciplines. Centred worlds are generally introduced
as a modelling device to represent centred or self-locating possibilities. In cer-
tain areas, such as for example in the philosophy of action or in decision theory,
centred worlds frameworks have become almost the norm.
One of the main reasons for having centred worlds is that they are useful to
explain actions. In Perry’s messy shopper case, for example, the new centred
belief acquired by Perry (‘I am the messy shopper!’) explains why he stops
to check his cart, instead of continuing to walk around the counter. Similarly,
in the Hidden Display example, Ann’s centred belief that it might be 7:05am
can explain why she starts to prepare some coffee. Another main reason to
introduce centred worlds is to give a better account of the content of mental
attitudes such as beliefs and desires, or aesthetic and moral judgements that
appear to be sensitive to the perspective from which they are formulated. In
all these cases, centred worlds allow for a more fine-grained representation of
the content of attitudes. In the Missing Coordinates case, for example, the con-
tent of Tom’s belief state can be represented as the set of all the centred worlds
that he takes to be compatible with his current surroundings. Since all these
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alternative locations coincide with respect to the uncentred component, a sim-
ple possible worlds representation of Tom’s belief state would not be enough
to express his uncertainty regarding his own location. Centred worlds can also
be used to model the contents of desires. For instance, in the Hidden Display
example Ann might hope that it is now 7:05am, so that she still has the time to
make some coffee before she leaves for work.
Centred worlds also received some applications in computer science. For ex-
ample, in a series of articles Joseph Halpern and other collaborators have used
centred worlds to model the local states of asynchronous distributed systems
Halpern (2004). In these application, possible worlds correspond to the possi-
ble runs of an ‘experiment’, while centred worlds are used to model the ‘infor-
mation state’ of agents that receive limited information about the experiment,
concerning the state of the system at a given (but not always known) point in
time. In linguistics and the philosophy of language, centred worlds are used
as a foundational object to study the semantics of indexicals, to capture con-
textual information, or to model self-centred talk (see Stojanovic (2016)). Dilip
Ninan uses a multi-centred version of a centred worlds framework to model
the semantics of counterfactual attitudes and linguistic expressions. In the phi-
losophy of mind, centred worlds figure in the two-dimensional semantics put
forward by David Chalmers (see Chalmers (2006)).
Berit Brogaard’s perspectivalism, a theory that she applied to solve problems
in ethics Brogaard (2012), aesthetics and epistemology, takes centred worlds
as a foundational entity:
Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the con-
tents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind)
have a truth value only relative to a particular perspective (or stan-
dard) determined by the context of the speaker, assessor, or bearer
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of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms,
moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere. (Brogaard,
2010)
A competing relativist approach, which also uses centred worlds as founda-
tional entities, has been developed by Andy Egan. His relativist theory has re-
ceived various applications in ethics (Egan, 2012), philosophy of language and
aesthetics (Egan et al., 2005; Egan, 2010). In all these cases, Egan argues that
centred worlds allow us to better understand both the sense in which aesthetic
and moral properties can be objective, and how different individuals might
rationally disagree about aesthetic and moral judgements. Egan has also ap-
plied his theory to metaphysics, where he has argued that centred worlds can
shed light on the nature of secondary properties (such as colour, for instance),
which – unlike the primary properties – seem to be observer-dependent (see
Egan, 2006a,b).
As the last application mentioned indicates, on Egan’s brand of relativism cen-
tred worlds can be taken to correspond to metaphysical possibilities. Not all
applications, however, can be plausibly interpreted in this way. Most of the ap-
plications mentioned above in decision theory, philosophy of action and phi-
losophy of language simply use centred worlds as a tool to model behaviour,
beliefs and other mental attitudes.
Based on this observation, Liao (2012) identifies two families of approaches to
centred worlds in the philosophical literature. On the one hand, the epistemo-
logical approaches take centred worlds as a way to model and reason about
self-locating uncertainty. These approaches take centred worlds to represent
epistemic possibilities, the objects of beliefs, desires or other mental attitudes,
without necessarily endorsing specific claims about the metaphysics. On the
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other hand, metaphysical approaches view centred worlds as fundamental en-
tities.
As Liao notes, these two different approaches might generate different, possi-
bly incompatible applications. For example, it seems plausible that the theo-
retical entities that play the role of centred worlds in Egan’s treatment of sec-
ondary qualities would not be the right candidates to represent local states of
distributed system in Halpern and Fagin’s framework. In other words, even if
the applications mentioned in the previous section all use a similar formal no-
tion of centred worlds, we cannot assume that the precise interpretation of this
notion will be consistent across all applications.
This brings me to another observation. As evidenced by the overview in this
section, centred worlds provide a useful formal tool across several applications.
But we should not mistake the formalism for something more substantive. Per-
haps different interpretations of the formalism can be appropriate, depending
on the intended applications for which it is introduced.
2.4 W H AT A R E C E N T R E S ?
In this section, I move on to review the main accounts of centred worlds that
are currently present in the literature. The presentation follows closely the one
in Liao (2012), who identifies the four accounts discussed below.
In his paper, Liao is primarily interested in the question of what centres are,
which can naturally be interpreted as a metaphysical question. The way he ap-
proaches answering this question, however, sees him analysing how different
accounts ‘pick out’ or identify centres. On Liao’s view, the centres are therefore
whatever theoretical entities are ‘picked out’ or identified by the right account.
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A problem for Liao’s strategy, however, is that (as I pointed out in the previ-
ous section) different accounts might be suitable for different intended appli-
cations, and yet be incompatible among each other. If this is the case, then
there might be no metaphysical entities underpinning the role of centres in
each account. Moreover, it might be difficult to decide on which account is
‘correct’, independently of the intended applications, unless one has a prior
understanding of the metaphysical notion of what a centre actually ‘is’, which
could not be delivered by Liao’s strategy.
A possible way around this first worry is given by Liao’s proposed identification
of centres with ‘possible individuals’, corresponding to the primitive identifica-
tion account discussed in §2.4.4. This offers a direct way to access what centres
are, insofar as we have some understanding of what possible individuals are.
Unfortunately, the question of what possible individuals are is also a difficult
one, as the criteria for personal identity are far from being uncontroversial. As
a result, for Liao, ‘[t]he question of what centres are is intimately related to the
question of how possible individuals are individuated’ (Liao (2012), p. 7).
In light of this problem, Liao’s choice to equate possible individuals and cen-
tres does not help directly to answer his central question (‘what are centres?’).
But it may still deliver some other results. For example, our intuitive under-
standing of what possible individuals are might possibly place restrictions on
how centres should be individuated.
As will be discussed below, my view is that requiring the identification of indi-
viduals and centres may be both unnecessary and unhelpful. It seems to add
complications to the problem of identifying centres (which now must also ac-
commodate common intuitions about personal identity), without bringing a
definite advantage in terms of answering Liao’s central question of what cen-
tres are.
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Moreover, the identification of centres with possible individuals appears to
severely restrict the possible applications of the framework. For example, we
might want to use centred worlds to model fictional scenarios, or to imagine
how things would look from a perspective that no-one occupies, when reason-
ing counterfactually. A possible example might be Einstein’s famous thought
experiments in his exposition of general relativity theory. The ideal observer
who travels at the speed of light might not be a metaphysically possible indi-
vidual, for instance, but this does not make Einstein’s examples intuitively un-
intelligible. We could represent the perspective of Einstein’s ideal observer as a
set of centred worlds, and yet identifying each centre with a possible individual
would be incorrect.
So, to summarise: I agree with Liao on the functionalist maxim, or, as we might
put it in a slogan, that ‘a centre is what a centre does’. However, this maxim
does not automatically place constraints on what entities might play the role
of centres in the context of different applications. Unlike Liao, I am not too in-
terested in the metaphysical question of what centres really are, across all ap-
plications, as I believe it may be more fruitful to concentrate on what centred
worlds frameworks can achieve in different intended applications. Moreover, I
don’t find it convincing that we can take the functionalist maxim to provide an
answer to the metaphysical question of what centres are. This question might
not even be meaningful, if the intended applications of centres worlds are suf-
ficiently far apart as not to allow for a unified treatment.
While Liao is mainly concerned with the metaphysical question of what cen-
tres are, the question that I am more interested in is epistemological: how can
one know the centre that one occupies? A review of the accounts of centred
worlds that are present in the current literature will help me to map out the
conceptual space within which the centred worlds framework is situated, its
canonical interpretations, and limitations.
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2.4.1 The Quinean account
According to what is known as the Quinean account, centred worlds are a pair
(w ,c) of a possible world (w) and a centre (c), where c is identified as follows:
Given a system of coordinates R, a centre c is a point in R.
Quine is often credited as the first philosopher to have introduced centred
worlds as a refinement of possible worlds to express self-locating features. In
Quine (1968), he proposed centred worlds as a device to represent the content
of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires.
To introduce centred worlds, Quine uses a famous example of a cat (who I will
name Oscar):
‘We like to say for instance that the cat wants to get on the roof, or
is afraid the dog will hurt him. In so saying we purport to relate the
cat perhaps to a state of affairs. The cat wants, or fears, the state of
affairs.’ (Quine (1968), p. 10).
But what is the state of affairs desired, or feared by Oscar? One possible candi-
date would be that Oscar desires a state of affairs, or a possible world, where
there is a cat on the roof, and fears a state of affairs where a cat is in the clutches
of a dog. However, Quine argues, this simple answer is not at all satisfactory.
Consider, for example, a state of affairs that contains both a cat on the roof,
and another cat in the clutches of a dog. Then according to the simple answer
just given, Oscar would both want and fear this state of affairs at the same time.
But this is clearly wrong: what Oscar apparently wants is not just a state where
there is a cat on the roof, but he wants to be that cat.
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Quine’s proposal to capture this self-locating component of the attitudes we
ascribe to Oscar involves the introduction of centred worlds (or, as Quine calls
them, centred states of affairs). When we say that Oscar wants to be on the
roof, according to Quine, we are ascribing to Oscar a desire whose content is a
set of centred worlds, all of them centred on a cat on the roof (and not on a cat
in the clutches of a dog).
If we accept Quine’s proposal, the possible world component (the w) of a cen-
tred world corresponds to the uncentred features of a state of affairs, while c
corresponds to a location within w . This location corresponds to a point, in-
dividuated by a set of coordinates, relative to a coordinate system that is de-
fined on w . For instance, if w encodes how matter is physically distributed
and space-time is Newtonian, a centre can be identified as a point determined
by its spatio-temporal coordinates. Individuals, like cats, dogs or people can
also be identified by the coordinates of the spatio-temporal region that they
occupy. Going back to the example, according to Quine the content of Oscar’s
desire corresponds to the set of centred worlds that are centred on the region
corresponding to the cat on the roof, and excludes all those that are centred on
the region corresponding to a cat in a dog’s clutches.
The Quinean account can also be used to represent self-locating possibilities
in the examples that I presented in the previous section. For instance, the
Quinean account can handle the missing coordinates example quite straight-
forwardly. Suppose that after sailing towards the East for some time, Tom sees
a profile on the horizon, that could only correspond to a certain island on the
map. From this observation, he comes to believe that he is located at a specific
coordinate point x with respect to his map, in other words he locates himself
at a centred world that is centred on x.
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In more general terms, we can summarise Quine’s proposal as follows. On the
Quinean account, centres are locations within possible worlds that are individ-
uated by their coordinates. The system of coordinates that is used to identify
centres, in turn, is defined on a possible world w .
Quine argues that the choice of coordinate system is to some degree arbitrary.
For example, it seems that we could vary the unit of measurement, or the ori-
gin, without changing the nature of what is measured. Moreover, in princi-
ple there seems to be no requirement that the coordinates defined on differ-
ent possible worlds should be similar in some relevant respects. For example,
world w might be a bi-dimensional world, whereas w ′ might contain four di-
mensions. However, in practice, we might be interested in cases of centred
uncertainty where the centred worlds that are considered possible belong to
worlds with similar systems of coordinates. This is the case in all the preceding
examples: in the Missing Coordinates case, all the centred worlds have cen-
tres that are identified by a triple of spatial coordinates. In the Hidden Display
case, the relevant centres are identified by different time points. And finally, in
the Messy Shopper case, centres could be identified by spatio-temporal coor-
dinates defined on a similar space.
An important thing to note is that the Quinean account does not explicitly
identify centres with possible individuals. Instead, the possible individuals are
picked out relative to their coordinates, or the possible centres that they might
happen to occupy. To illustrate this point, we can look at how the Quinean
account treats Perry’s messy shopper example. What Perry comes to believe
in that case, upon realising that he is the messy shopper, is that he and the
messy shopper are in fact the same person. The Quinean account can han-
dle this case by saying that what Perry comes to believe is that he himself and
the messy shopper are co-located. In other words, after the realisation, Perry
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comes to believe that for any possible centred world (w ,c), Perry is located at
(w ,c) if an only if the messy shopper is located at (w ,c).
It might be debatable whether the Quinean treatment of the messy shopper
case is satisfactory. In one way, it might seem to just miss the point: learn-
ing that he is co-located with the messy shopper does not automatically seem
to imply that Perry is the messy shopper. For starters, if the coordinates used
to individuate centres are coarse grained enough, we might generally expect
several individuals to be co-located. For example, if the coordinates used to
identify the centre are coarse-grained enough to pick out regions of space cor-
responding to, say, the area of an entire neighbourhood, then we would nor-
mally expect different agents to be co-located at the same centre. The Quinean
account could try to circumvent this issue by drawing on the modal content of
what Perry learns. Saying that Perry is located at a centred world (w ,c) if and
only if the messy shopper is also located at (w ,c), whatever the level of grain
of the system of coordinates used to identify the centre would, I think, fix the
issue. In other words, if we allow the coordinates to vary arbitrarily (including
sufficiently fine-grained coordinates), we should normally reach a point where
the sets of centred worlds at which different agents are located are different.
Liao, however, following Lewis (1979), raises a further objection against this
strategy. To illustrate this objection, Liao describes a scenario where the exact
same region of space that is occupied by John Perry (and the messy shopper),
is also occupied by a conscious Ghost. Ghost is distinct from Perry (and is not
a messy shopper!), and yet the content of the belief that Perry comes to believe,
namely that he is co-located with the messy shopper, is the same as the content
that he is co-located with Ghost.
The case of the Ghost raises a problem for the Quinean account, but only de-
pending on the underlining assumptions that we are willing to make about the
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possibility of co-located individuals. There might be some less metaphysically
complicated cases that have this feature. For example, we might perhaps con-
struct a virtual reality where multiple individuals are located at the same coor-
dinates. The case I have in mind here could be similar to a computer simula-
tion where some set of characters always occupy the same location. Arguably,
the relevant coordinate system to individuate each character is the virtual co-
ordinate system in which they live.
In any case, even if Liao’s objection weren’t successful, it reveals that the Quinean
account has some difficulty to accommodate cases, such as the Messy Shop-
per case (and possibly the virtual reality example), where the uncertainty is
primarily about one’s own identity. This is because the Quinean account does
not have the resources to express essential indexicals (such as the content of ‘I
am the messy shopper’) directly. Instead, it must rely on some background as-
sumptions about the possibility of co-location of individuals. For this reason,
while still possible, the Quinean account might be less suitable if our primary
aim for introducing centred worlds is to handle this kind of cases.
2.4.2 The Lewisian account
On what is known as the Lewisian account, centres are identified as follows:
A centre c is a pair (i , t ) of an individual i and a time t .
The so-called Lewisian account of centres solves the Quinean account’s prob-
lem with co-location of different individuals by stipulating that centres are
identified on the basis of the individuals that occupy them. This solves the
problem of co-location, because two different agents (such as Perry and the
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Ghost) who might share the same spatio-temporal coordinates would nonethe-
less be located at different centres.
The individual i is usually taken to be a persisting person or agent, such as
John Perry in the messy shopper example, or the cat Oscar in the example from
Quine (perhaps stretching the definition of a person a little bit!), while a natural
way to specify t is to fix it relative to an external or objective time dimension.
For instance, in the hidden display example Ann was uncertain which time her
watch is currently displaying. Since she also believes that the watch is accurate,
on this version of the Lewisian account we can identify each centre that she
considers possible as an ordered pair c = (ti , a) where a stands for Ann, and ti
is the objective time.
An issue that Liao raises for the Lewisian account is that, just as the Quinean ac-
count seems unable to distinguish between co-located individuals, the Lewisian
account is unable to distinguish between distinct stages of the same continu-
ing person in cases of time travel. To illustrate, we can again follow Liao to
present a modification of the missing coordinates example. Imagine again that
at time t Tom sees a profile on the horizon and realises what his present loca-
tion is. The Lewisian account would express this by saying that the content
of Tom’s newly acquired belief is a centred world (w , (t ,Tom)), where t is the
present time, and Tom is the continuing person on which the world is cen-
tred. But imagine now that in the future, Tom learns to time travel and travels
back to the same time at which he was lost at sea after a violent storm. In this
scenario, both older-Tom and younger-Tom are present at t , but at different lo-
cations. Clearly, the contents of the beliefs of younger- and older-Tom should
be different, but on the Lewisian account both correspond to the same set of
centred worlds, namely all the worlds (w ,c) where the centre is identified by
Tom and a time t . This is because both younger- and older-Tom are present at
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t and they are both parts of the same continuing person, so both are located at
the same centre, namely (t ,Tom).
The moral that Liao draws from the time travel example is that the Lewisian
account does not specify an adequate way to identify centres. However, time
travel is notoriously a source of paradoxes, and it is highly doubtful if we can
at all make sense of its notion, given that it is incompatible with our most ad-
vanced physical theories. So, a different moral that we could draw from the ex-
ample recounted by Liao is that it is simply an illustration of the incoherence
of the possibility of time travel.
Another potential issue for the Lewisian account, which might make it unsuit-
able for some applications, is that it may be unable to identify some possible
centres. On the Lewisian account, each centre has to correspond to a possible
individual. However, there are cases where we might want to identify some
centres at which no individual is located. An example of such a case is how
we sometimes reason counterfactually about how things would appear from a
different perspective than the one that we actually occupy. The Missing Coor-
dinates example helps to illustrate this point. As Tom is lost at sea, he might
reason about his surroundings in the following way. He knows from the map
that, if his current location was closer to the coast, he would be able to see
something on the horizon. Since he does not see anything on the horizon, he
concludes that his current location is not close to the coast. For this intuitive
way of reasoning to work, we do not need to assume that the alternative loca-
tions considered by Tom are all picked out by different individuals, nor do we
need to assume that an individual is located at all of them.
Moreover, using individuals to identify centres may be impractical. In Tom’s
case, for example, we might think that the coordinate system identifies un-
countably many points, which intuitively correspond to centres at which Tom
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might be located. However, since the temporal coordinate t is the same for all
these, according to the Lewisian account they must correspond to different in-
dividuals. This means that we need uncountably many individuals to identify
all the possible locations for Tom in the Missing Coordinates example. This
poses some obvious problem: we wouldn’t be able to name all these individ-
uals in any natural language, for instance, and indexing them by their spatial
coordinates would just seem to bring us back to the Quinean account.
An advantage of the Lewisian account over the Quinean account is that it gives
a more intuitive account of essential indexicals. The content of a statement like
‘I am the messy shopper’ (believed by John Perry), for example, is represented
on the Lewisian account as the set of centred worlds (w ,c) such that John Perry
is the messy shopper at w , and c corresponds to John Perry and the current
time t .
This relative advantage with respect tot he Quinean account is, however, paid
for on other accounts. Firstly, it makes the Lewisian account vulnerable to
problems about reference, such as Frege’s puzzle. If John Perry initially believes
that he and the messy shopper are distinct individuals, the worlds centred on
John Perry and those centred on the messy shopper are two disjoint sets. But
then it is difficult for the Lewisian account to explain how it is that John Perry
might come to believe that the two sets of centred words do, in fact, coincide.
This change cannot be modelled as a simple case of updating. I will say more
about this case in chapter 3.
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2.4.3 The exhaustive set account
A third account, which Liao calls the exhaustive set account, identifies centres
through an exhaustive ordered set of properties.4 In Liao’s words:
The ordered set of [properties] being exhaustive guarantees that
there cannot be a possible scenario where two individuals share
all of the mentioned [properties] but differ on an unmentioned
[property]. Since the ordered set is exhaustive, there cannot be
any other [property] to differ on. [. . . ] On the exhaustive set ac-
count, possible individuals [and, hence, centres] are individuated
by all the [properties] they could have. If two possible individuals
differ on any [property], they are distinct. (Liao, 2012, p. 311)
To flesh out what an exhaustive set of properties is, we need to provide a list of
properties that an individual could (in principle) have. This might already be a
difficult task: to do this we may need to say something more about what class
of individuals we are looking to, or what properties are. But as it turns out, we
can give the following as a general definition that captures the exhaustive set
account:
A centre c is identified by a maximally consistent set of properties.
A set of properties P is said to be consistent if there is a set of individuals that
satisfy all the properties in P . Moreover, P is said to be maximally consistent
if there is no other property p such that p or its negation could be added to
P and P would still be consistent. In other words, all the individuals that sat-
isfy a maximally consistent set of properties could not, by the way this set is
constructed, differ on any other property p which is not in the set P .
4 Instead of properties, Liao uses the word features to refer to the items used to pick out centres.
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As this discussion clearly shows, the fact that P is maximally consistent does
not in itself guarantee that it will pick out a unique individual. One way to
guarantee that this is the case is by having among the possible properties the
identity properties of each object. Since any individual can only be identical
with itself, this ensures that each set of maximally consistent properties corre-
sponds to a unique individual.5
A drawback, however, is that adding the identity properties makes it difficult
to square the exhaustive set account with either of two views of properties.
If properties are understood extensionally, i.e. if a property is just the set of
all the individuals that have it, then each maximally consistent set of proper-
ties is just formally equivalent to an identity property. But this is a problem,
if we wanted to use the properties to identify the possible centres, in accor-
dance with Liao’s reason for introducing exhaustive sets of properties as a way
to pick centres. If, on the other hand, properties are understood intensionally,
then it seems unclear that having identity properties could be helpful to pick
out centres. In other words, for any individual i , the corresponding identity
property of ‘being identical to i ’ seems particularly uninformative: to use the
intensionally-understood identity property ‘being identical to i ’ to actually in-
dividuate i seems just to reverse the order of things.
2.4.4 The primitive identification account
The fourth (and final) account of centred worlds identified by Liao differs from
the previous three, because it does not specify any way of identifying centres.
5 Liao (see pp. 312-3) discusses identity properties in the primitive identification account, and
not the exhaustive set account, but – in light of the definition of a maximally consistent set
given above – I think this is wrong.
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Instead, it takes centres to be primitives. So, on the primitive identification
account, the definition of a centred world is simply the following:
A centred world (w ,c) is an ordered pair of a possible world w and
a centre c.
The primitive identification account is the one favoured by Liao, and he also
convincingly argues that it might be closer to the account that Lewis origi-
nally had in mind.6 However, adopting the primitive identification account
also comes at a price: namely, it makes the individuation of centres somewhat
mysterious. Since centres are identified with possible individuals, and the lat-
ter are taken to be primitive, this account tells us nothing about how we can
individuate centres unless we are also provided with some background infor-
mation about possible individuals.
Like the Lewisian account, the primitive identification account is committed
to the existence of individuals. However, unlike for the Lewisian account, in-
dividuals should not be taken to be persisting persons. In almost every other
respect, the primitive identification account shares the advantages (and some
disadvantages) of the Lewisian account, but presents some additional prob-
lems.
The primitive identification account is good at explaining essentially indexical
statements, for the same reasons as discussed for the Lewisian account. How-
ever, compared to the Lewisian account, the primitive identification account
seems to make it more difficult to explain an agent’s actions on the basis of her
attitudes towards centred possibilities. Let’s say, for example that Oscar the
cat (O) ‘believes’ his current situation to be the set S = {(w , (O, t0)), (w ′, (O, t0))},
where w corresponds to a possible world where Oscar is on the roof at t1, and
w ′ is a possible world where Oscar is by the dog at t1. Since at t0 Oscar is in
6 Liao (2012), p. 313-4. See also Lewis (1986, 1983).
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all cases in the same situation and far from the dog, he has no reason to prefer
one centred world over the other. But we might say that Oscar ‘desires’ it to be
the case that, at t1, the centred world at which he is located is (w , (O, t1)). This
would explain why Oscar takes the action to jump on the roof. On the primitive
identification account, however, Oscar at t0 and Oscar at t1 are counted as two
distinct individuals,7 seemingly making it more difficult to see in what sense
Oscar could be said to ‘desire’ a certain state of affairs, or how this could give
him a reason to act.
Like the Lewisian account, the primitive identification account has some trou-
ble accommodating identity statements, for roughly the same reasons discussed
in the previous section. I will also have more to say on this in Chapter 4, §4.1.1.
2.5 C O N C L U S I O N
In this chapter, I have reviewed four different accounts of centred worlds that
are present in the literature. As noted in the opening section, different ac-
counts of centred worlds might be suited to different intended application.
Something that can be drawn from my discussion is that if the purpose of in-
troducing centred worlds is primarily to express the content of essentially in-
dexical statements, then the Lewisian account, or the primitive identification
account, might be the most suitable. Both these accounts, however, make it
impossible for distinct individuals to agree on centred contents and have some
problems to accommodate identity statements.
The Quinean account, on the other hand, gives an intuitive treatment of agree-
ment (different individuals can agree on centred content, if they share the
7 The same is also true for the two centred worlds corresponding to Oscar at t0: on the primitive
account, each is associated with a distinct individual.
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same location relative to the relevant system of coordinates). It also gives a
more natural way to express the content of centred counterfactual statements,
and, if taken in conjunction with some background assumptions about the
possibility of co-location of individuals, it is able to accommodate identity
statements. However, the Quinean account does not seem to deliver an in-
tuitively satisfactory account of essential indexicals.
3
T W O M O D E S O F R E A S O N I N G
In this chapter, I discuss a famous example due to Perry (1979), and argue that
two intuitively plausible readings of this example correspond to two ways in
which we naturally reason about de se possibilities (in what I call the cartogra-
pher and in the pathfinder modes).
I then present the two currently most widely accepted semantic frameworks to
model de se expressions and beliefs – namely the one due to Stalnaker (2008)
and the so-called ‘Lewisian’ framework (based on Lewis (1979)) – and show
that only the latter is compatible with both modes of reasoning for de se uncer-
tainty.
In conclusion, I outline the advantages and disadvantages of both frameworks,
noting that if the contextualist account that is at the basis of Stalnaker’s frame-
work is correct, then this would rule out the possibility of the pathfinder mode.
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3.1 T H E C A S E O F T H E M E S S Y S H O P P E R
The case of the messy shopper is an example, initially introduced by Perry
(1979), that is often used to explain why we need centred worlds to express
what Perry calls ‘essentially indexical’ facts, which possible worlds are not fine
grained enough to capture.
Here is Perry’s original example:
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing
my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the
aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell
him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the
trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it
dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. (Perry,
1979, p. 3)
The problem is: what is it that Perry learns when he realises that he is the messy
shopper? There seem to be two plausible answers:
• He learns something about the world: namely, which individual is the
one who is making a mess.
• He learns something about himself: namely, which individual he himself
is.
In the next sections, I will consider each answer in turn. I will look at the
problem in the context of the possible (centred) worlds view of propositions.
Other accounts of propositions possible (see Magidor (2015), and Perry him-
self adopts a different account of propositions), but centred worlds have the
advantage of allowing a straightforward extension of probabilistic reasoning
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to de se uncertainty (as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5). As
standard, I take possible worlds to represent different ways the world might
be (see Chapter 2). For the purpose of analysing Perry’s messy shopper case,
we can take centres to correspond to different individual agents within a pos-
sible world. Let W = {w1, . . . , wn} be the set of all worlds that Perry considers
possible, given the information he possesses, and C = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of
possible centres. A centred world (wi , a j ) is an ordered pair of a possible world
wi and a centre, a j , which specifies an individual agent within wi . The possi-
ble world wi expresses facts about what the world is like, whereas a j picks out
a specific location, or individual perspective, within w .
3.1.1 About the world
Let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} be a set of possible worlds compatible with Perry’s
evidence. For definiteness, we will assume that each wi specifies who, among
a set of possible individuals who exist at that world, is the one causing a mess.
To illustrate, suppose that there are three individuals in each world, who go by
the names of Jones (a J ), Smith (aS) and Perry (aP ), respectively. As he notices
the trail of sugar on the floor, Perry comes to believe that someone is making a
mess, but he does not know the identity of this individual. His evidence at this
point is therefore compatible with the following three possible worlds:
• w1 = ‘a J is making a mess’;
• w2 = ‘aS is making a mess’;
• w3 = ‘aP is making a mess’.
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All the while, Perry is not uncertain about his own identity, so he knows that
the actual world must in any case be centred on aP . Perry does not know
whether he is or is not making a mess, because he does not know which of
w1-w3 is the actual world. We can represent Perry’s total belief state before
he realises that he is the messy shopper as the set of centred possibilities B =
{(w1, aP ), (w2, aP ), (w3, aP )}. All the centred worlds contained in this set are
centred on the same individual, namely aP , and differ only with respect to
the possible world component. In our scenario, Perry is certain that one of
these possibilities corresponds to his present circumstances, but he does not
yet know which.
At the point in which he finally realises that he is the messy shopper, we can
think that Perry acquires some information that enables him to single out w3
as the actual world. For example, he might have realised that Perry is the only
one who has been walking around the counter in a way that is consistent with
the sugar trail left on the floor. And he might, at this point, stop to check his cart
for a torn bag of sugar, thereby testing the hypothesis that the messy shopper
is indeed John Perry. This way of representing the problem makes Perry’s un-
certainty to be entirely about the world, so a natural question to ask is whether
the centred component is really needed to capture Perry’s beliefs in this case.
In other words, since we are assuming that Perry is certain about his own iden-
tity throughout, why don’t we represent Perry’s total belief state simply using
the set of possible worlds {w1, w2, w3}?
A standard response to this observation is that specifying a centre might still be
necessary if the goal is to explain how beliefs can motivate action. If I have a
belief that Silvia will be late for dinner unless she leaves immediately, I will not
be motivated to leave, unless I also identify myself as Silvia. Similarly, believing
that aP is making a mess would not in itself explain why Perry stops and checks
his cart, unless we add the further premise that Perry identifies himself with aP .
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In other words, upon realising that w3 is the actual world, Perry is motivated
to act in a certain way (e.g., check his cart for a torn bag of sugar) because he
believes of himself that he is Perry. Without this background belief, which is
expressed by the centred component of (w3, aP ) there seems to be no reason
for Perry to act in this particular way.8
The sort of background belief that is needed to motivate action (e.g. the belief
that I am Silvia, or Perry’s belief that he is Perry) is a belief about which indi-
vidual agent one is. Perry (1979) calls this kind of beliefs essentially indexical,
because they are usually expressed using sentences containing indexical terms
such as ‘I’, or demonstratives such as ‘this’ or ‘that’. For example, the essentially
indexical belief that motivates Perry to check his cart can be expressed using
the sentences ‘I am the messy shopper’ and ‘This is the messy shopper’s cart’.
Following an established convention in the literature,9 I refer to these as de se
expressions and beliefs. De se beliefs are necessary to explain action, but de se
truths could not be deduced from a purely objective description of the world.
For this reason, the specification of centres is needed to express the essentially
indexical component of an agent’s beliefs.
In this section I’ve been assuming that in the Perry example what is learnt is
just something about the world. Nonetheless, even under this assumption, we
can see that there may still be a role for de se beliefs. For it seems that Perry
must have a background de se belief (that he himself is Perry) to explain why
what he learns motivates him to check his cart.10
8 See also Stalnaker (2016). I will have more to say on this in Chapter 4.
9 See e.g. Ninan (2016), Paul (2017) among others.
10 This observation is also relevant to Stalnaker’s account of de se beliefs, and I will return on this
point in chapter 4.
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3.1.2 About the centre
Suppose that Perry has been able to work out that w3 (‘aP is making a mess’)
is the actual world. In other words, based on his observations, he now knows
that aP – out of the three possible agents, aP , a J , and aS – is the agent who is
making a mess. However, aP , a J , and aS name three distinct individuals within
the world, but Perry does not know which one he himself is.
We can represent Perry’s uncertainty using the centred worlds framework, only
this time Perry’s uncertainty is not about which possible world corresponds to
his present circumstances, but rather he is uncertain about which centre he oc-
cupies within that world. On this way of reading the messy shopper example,
then, Perry’s belief state before he realises that he is the messy shopper cor-
responds to a set of centred possibilities B = {(w3, a J ), (w3, aS), (w3, aP )}. The
centred possibilities contained in B coincide with respect to the possible world
component (w3), but differ with respect to the centred component, to reflect
the fact that Perry believes it possible that he himself actually identifies with
any one of the three agents who are present at w3. When he finally realises
that he himself is the messy shopper, on this reading of the example, Perry is
able to eliminate some possible centres. As a result, he identifies (w3, aP ) as
the actual centred world at which he is currently located.
3.2 T W O M O D E S O F R E A S O N I N G
The exploration of the two intuitive readings of the messy shopper case reveals
that two distinct modes of reasoning may be at play in each. In this section, I
will outline these two modes of reasoning, explaining how they relate to each
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of the two readings of the messy shopper example, and how they could be gen-
eralised to other cases.
3.2.1 The cartographer mode
On the first reading of the messy shopper case that I have identified, Perry is
seen as inferring something about the world from the observation of his own
surroundings. I will refer to this way of reasoning as the cartographer mode. To
illustrate how this mode operates, we can make an analogy with the job of a
cartographer. The cartographer sets out to map the geographical features of
a territory about which she does not yet have detailed information. We can
imagine she is dropped by helicopter in some unknown location, and to map
the territory, she starts making observations from different points. The map
that she produces in this process reproduces the features she observed, record-
ing their relative positions, within a specified system of coordinates. The idea
here is that the agent, at any given point, is making observations that give her
some more information about the world. For example, if from the point where
she is dropped, on a hill top, she can see a gorge and a river streaming through
it to the North, she now knows that there is a river and a gorge – and not, for
example, a field – to the north of the hill where she is standing.
Now the cartographer knows that there is a gorge and a river, but how far are
they from the hill? In order to answer this question and record that informa-
tion on the map, she needs to measure the distance. Taking her current loca-
tion to be at the origin of the initial observation, she could use some appropri-
ate instruments or move towards the river while keeping track of the distance
walked. In this way, as the cartographer moves around exploring the territory,
she is able to make more observations. One of the observation points (the
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initial one, in this case) is kept fixed as the origin, and the other observation
points are identified by their spatial coordinates with respect to the origin.
In this example, there is nothing special about the origin point: in this case, it
makes sense for the cartographer to fix it as the initial point at which she starts
making her measurements, keeping track of the relative distances from there.
But the important information is contained in the objects observed (rivers,
gorges, hills) and the relative distances between them. The coordinate points
could be re-labelled at a later time, or the origin fixed at a different point, with-
out altering the essential features of the map (Quine, 1968).
The resulting map represents the territory, not just as viewed from a particular
point, but in an abstract way. This makes it possible to communicate the map –
for example, when the cartographer sends it back to the expedition headquar-
ters – and makes the information it contains useful to other agents. For ex-
ample, we can imagine the head of the expedition, back at the headquarters,
receiving the map and studying its features. Noticing that the map indicates a
river streaming through a narrow gorge, he might conclude that if the expedi-
tion had to cross that gorge, they would have to bring waterproof equipment.
We can generalise this insight about the cartographer, by noting that whenever
we infer something about the world from some local observations, we must be
able to place the observations within a system of coordinates that links them
together. For example, if I toss a coin, observe that it lands Tails, and note down
the outcome of the toss, I have made an observation which tells me something
about what the world is like: namely, that it is a world in which the outcome of
the coin toss is Tails.11
11 I will return to this point in Chapter 6, where I will give a more detailed discussion of the indexi-
cal element of empirical observations.
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Similarly, Perry in cartographer mode uses the information he has collected
about his own surroundings (‘someone spilled sugar around the counter, I
have been following this trail of sugar, but did not see whoever is producing
it’, etc.) to reconstruct the salient features of the world. Combined with his
background knowledge of his own identity, this leads him to identify (w3, aP )
as the actual centred world.
To sum up, the example of the cartographer tasked with producing a map of
a territory illustrates how reasoning in the cartographer mode works. A sub-
ject reasoning in this mode infers some information about the world from the
observation of her own circumstances. Moreover, she can use a system of co-
ordinates to link successive observations (for example, spatial or temporal co-
ordinates), pooling together the information from different observations.
3.2.2 The pathfinder mode
On the second reading of the messy shopper case, on the contrary, Perry is not
seen as inferring something about the world from observations drawn from his
surroundings. Instead, the inference goes in the opposite direction: from the
information that he has about the world, he infers something about his own
circumstances, which leads him to rule out some possible centres.
I will call the mode of reasoning that operates on this alternative reading of the
messy shopper example the pathfinder mode. Again, an analogy may help to
illustrate the operation of this mode. In this case, we can imagine a hiker who
sets out on a walk, armed with a detailed map of the territory. Approaching a
fork in the deep of a forest, his immediate surroundings do not tell the hiker
where each path leads to. This information about the properties of his imme-
3.2 T W O M O D E S O F R E A S O N I N G 56
diate surroundings can, however, be inferred from the map, if the hiker is able
to locate his own position with respect to it.
If the hiker has a reliable method to ascertain his own coordinates and identify
them with points on the map, then the task of locating his own position with re-
spect to the map will be an easy one. If, on the contrary, he is uncertain or has
no reliable method to identify his coordinates, he may still try to reconstruct
which is his position by comparing his present surroundings to what the map
specifies for each point. If there is some unique feature that identifies his sur-
roundings (for example, a landmark, or a particular sight, which is also marked
on the map), then again he will be able to identify his position with respect to
the map.
In this example, the map stands for the hiker’s objective information about
the world. When he sees the fork, he does not learn anything about the world
that he did not already know from the map – the presence of a fork with those
characteristics is recorded by the map. Rather, from comparing the map to his
present circumstances, he can infer the details of his own current location and,
in particular, its position relative to other objects.
We can generalise the analogy of the hiker, noting that when we have some
prior knowledge about what the world is like, we can use it to locate ourselves
with respect to other things in the world. In order to do this, we generally must
rely on some identifying feature of our present circumstances. Imagine, for
example, that Aron knows his friend Bella arrives exactly at 2pm. If Aron knows
it is 2pm, he is able to infer that Bella arrives now; if, on the contrary, he sees
Bella arriving he is able to infer that his current time is 2pm. In each case,
either his background information about the time coordinate, or an identifying
feature of his present circumstances, enables Aron to locate himself within the
world.
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The second intuitive interpretation of the messy shopper example corresponds
to reasoning in pathfinder mode. In this case, Perry infers something about his
own circumstances from what he knows about the world, together (presum-
ably) with some identifying features of his own present circumstances. His
immediate surroundings do not immediately reveal whether he is the messy
shopper or not, but he knows that a particular agent has been walking around
the counter, spilling sugar, following a path that coincides with his own. From
this information about the world, Perry finally infers that he must be the messy
shopper, and the actual centred world is (w3, aP ).
3.2.3 Learning and inferring from context
To summarise, the main difference between the two modes of reasoning that
are behind the two intuitive readings of the messy shopper case that I have
identified is that on the cartographer mode, information about the properties
of one’s own circumstances is used to infer something about the world, whereas
in the pathfinder mode, information about the world is used to infer something
about one’s own identity or location.
As the examples introduced in the last two sections illustrate, both modes of
reasoning seem intuitively natural, in different circumstances. Sometimes, as
in the case of the explorer tasked with producing a map of a territory, the car-
tographer mode describes the natural way in which the explorer would con-
duct her observations. Other times, as in the case of the hiker approaching
a fork, the relevant information about the world is already known (as repre-
sented by the map), the pathfinder mode describes the natural way in which a
subject would reason to identify the correct path to take. Both modes of reason-
ing therefore seem to occur quite naturally in our reasoning. This is perhaps
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not surprising, given the fact that we are limited agents, whose interactions
with our surroundings typically take place within a context, or are associated
with a specific point of view, corresponding to our current position or identity.
Thus our uncertainty can span two different dimensions: it can be about the
world, reflecting our limited information about its objective features, or about
ourselves, reflecting our limited information about the relative positioning of
different locations, identities or perspectives on the world that we might oc-
cupy.
Sometimes, the two modes can also mix together, as illustrated by the follow-
ing example. John has plans to go for dinner with Simon. The plan is that
they will either meet at the local pub at 6:30pm, or they will meet at the Indian
restaurant at 7pm. At some point in the late afternoon John receives a text
from Simon that says ‘meet me there in an hour!’ What, if anything, can John
infer from Simon’s message? Let wp be the possible world where John and Si-
mon plan to meet at the pub at 6:30pm, and wr the possible world where they
plan to meet at the restaurant at 7pm. Suppose that John is not aware of what
time it is at the moment he sees Simon’s message. Since the plan is to meet
either at 6:30pm or at 7pm, the message tells him that the present time is an
hour before the planned meeting time, and so must be either 5:30pm (if they
are meeting at the pub) or 6pm (if they are meeting at the restaurant). Tak-
ing these two times to be two possible centres at which John might currently
be located, (wp ,5 : 30pm) and (wr ,6pm) are the two centred worlds that are
compatible with John’s current circumstances.
John’s uncertainty in this example comprises both uncertainty about the world
(he does not know whether the plan it to meet at the pub or at the restaurant)
and about the centre (John does not know what time it is at the moment he
receives the message). Moreover, in this specific example, it is clear that if John
was able to independently learn either the current time or the plan, in other
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words if he could access information about the centre or about the world, he
would be able to infer which centred possibility corresponds to his actual cir-
cumstances. For example, if he could look at a clock and see that it is actually
5:30pm, the information about the centre that he would thereby acquire would
enable him to infer that the plan is to meet at the pub. Conversely, if Simon
sent an additional message to say ‘oh, by the way: meet at the pub!’, he would
be able to infer that the current time is 5:30pm.
For another example to illustrate the mixing of the two modes of reasoning,
imagine a cartographer who, during her explorations, loses track of her posi-
tion. We can imagine that after being dropped on the hill top and conducting
a series of measurements on the surrounding terrain, her instruments start to
malfunction and as a result she can’t say with any certainty how far her current
position is with respect to the previous measurement. The cartographer now
finds herself in a situation where both her current coordinates and the objec-
tive features of her environment are, to some extent, uncertain. As in Simon’s
dinner case, if she were able to learn either her current position, or some identi-
fying features of the world, the cartographer would be able to infer the missing
information (about the world, or about her current position, respectively) by
applying either one of the two modes of reasoning.
As these two examples show, the two modes of reasoning are often interrelated
in practical applications. There are, however, reasons to keep them distinct, be-
cause they capture two ways in which we can learn new information, or infer
it from the context we are placed in. If we didn’t have both modes of reasoning,
it would be necessary to explain how these different modes essentially share a
same underlying mechanism. Moreover, as the two examples highlight, both
modes of reasoning correspond to the way we reason naturally when dealing
with de se uncertainty. For this reason, I take it as a methodological desider-
atum that any semantic framework designed to explain the content of de se
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expressions should be able to accommodate both modes of reasoning – or, if it
fails to do so, it should give a good explanation for why one of the two modes
of reasoning should be discarded.
3.3 T H E S E M A N T I C C O N T E N T O F D E S E E X P R E S S I O N S
In the previous sections, I have introduced – using Perry’s example of the messy
shopper – the notion of de se expressions and beliefs, and explained how they
can figure in two different modes of reasoning, that I called the cartographer
and the pathfinder modes. In this section, I turn to the question of what it is
that we learn, when we learn some de se information. To answer this question,
it is necessary to provide a semantic framework to analyse de se expressions
and beliefs. I focus on two semantic frameworks that are prominent in the
literature on de se beliefs, namely what I will call the Stalnakerian12 and the
Lewisian13 accounts.
Since our purpose for giving a semantic framework here is to analyse de se
expressions and beliefs, the exposition of each framework will be organised
around three points:14
• What, according to the proposed framework, is the content or meaning
of de se expressions;
12 See Stalnaker (1981, 2008, 2016).
13 See Lewis (1979) and Liao (2012). While both of these are closely inspired by the work of Robert
Stalnaker and David Lewis, respectively, the present reconstruction does not aim at giving a
faithful interpretation of the views expressed by these two philosophers.
14 This list does not aim to be exhaustive: there are certainly many other functions that a semantic
framework for de se expressions and beliefs might perform, including explaining action, com-
munication, and agreement. See Chapter 2, §2.3, and Ninan (2016) and Moss (2012), among
others, for applications of semantic frameworks for de se expressions in these areas.
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• How, on the proposed framework, we should represent the content of a
subject’s beliefs, including de se beliefs;
• In what ways the proposed framework explains how we reason about de
se uncertainty. In particular, I will be interested in whether and how the
proposed framework is able to accommodate the two modes of reason-
ing that I have identified in the previous section.
Moreover I will take the following to be two methodological desiderata. Firstly,
a semantic framework should preferably give a unified account of the content
of de se expressions and beliefs. Secondly, a semantic framework should ac-
count for both modes of reasoning about de se that were identified in the pre-
vious section, for the reasons expressed above.
3.3.1 The Stalnakerian account
Stalnaker argues that sentences containing indexical or demonstrative terms
(or de se sentences) do not automatically correspond to fully-fledged propo-
sitions. Instead, for Stalnaker, a de se sentence may correspond to different
propositions depending on the context at which it is uttered. As a consequence,
the content of a de se sentence changes with respect to the context, which
serves to fix the reference of indexical and demonstrative terms. Once the
references are fixed, the resulting proposition corresponds to a set of (uncen-
tred) possible worlds (see also Stalnaker (2014), ch. 5, and Moss (2012)). For
instance, the content of the sentence ‘I am the messy shopper’, as believed
by Perry at the time he stops to check his cart, corresponds on Stalnaker’s ac-
count to the uncentred proposition containing all the possible worlds in which
the individual designated as John Perry is the messy shopper. In our earlier for-
malisation, this corresponds to the unique possible world {w3}. In this way, the
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Stalnakerian account matches the traditional account of the semantic content
of propositions, extending it to cover the content of de se propositions. On this
account, the content of a belief is a set of uncentred possible worlds, or – in
other words – an uncentred proposition.
The Stalnakerian account fits very naturally with the first reading of the messy
shopper example, where the new information that Perry learns as he realises
that he himself is the messy shopper is taken to be something about the world.
What happens to Perry, according to this reading of the example, is that he
finds out some uncentred information about the world, leading him to rule
out some possibilities on the basis of the fact that their uncentred component
does not match what he knows the actual world to be like.
On a traditional picture, the content of a subject’s belief state is usually taken
to correspond to the set of propositions that the subject believes. For exam-
ple, Perry’s belief state before he realises that he is the messy shopper, on the
traditional picture, might contain all the propositions that Perry believes at
the time, such as – for instance – that ‘someone is making a mess’, that ‘the
messy shopper has been walking around the counter’, and ‘there is sugar on
the floor’. Stalnaker’s position, however, is not completely reductionistic. On
the Stalnakerian account, de se information has a role in explaining the nature
of the relationship between a subject and the content of his or her beliefs. On
this point, Stalnaker appears to agree with Perry and Lewis that de se informa-
tion (essentially indexical information, for Perry) can not be deduced from a
complete objective description of the world, and thus is not reducible to it.15
The Stalnakerian account uses centred worlds to model belief states. Formally,
a belief state B is modeled as a set of centred worlds, where the w compo-
15 See e.g. (Stalnaker, 2008, p. 54): ‘The role of the centers is to link the believer, and time of belief,
to the possible worlds that are the way that the believer takes the world to be at that time, and
to represent where, in those worlds, he takes himself to be.’
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nent represents different ways in which the world might be, and the centred
component c represents the identity and/or spatio-temporal location that the
believer could, for all he or she knows, occupy.
What determines which proposition corresponds to the sentence ‘I am the
messy shopper’ on the Stalnakerian account, as we have seen, is the context
at which the sentence is uttered. Thus, on this account, the same sentence
(‘I am the messy shopper’) corresponds to two different propositions when it
is uttered by Perry and from that of Smith. Conversely, the same proposition
(for example, that ‘Perry is the messy shopper’) can be believed by both agents,
who could nonetheless express it using different sentences (for example ‘I am
the messy shopper’ might be acceptable for Perry, while ‘he is the messy shop-
per’, uttered indicating Perry, might be acceptable for Smith).
Even though Smith and Perry believe the same proposition (namely, that Perry
is the messy shopper, or w3, it seems intuitively that they are nevertheless in
two distinct belief states. On the Stalnakerian account, this intuition is cashed
out in the following way. A belief state B is modeled as a set of centred worlds
{(wi ,c j )} where each wi specifies the objective features of the world, and c j
links this objective description to a specific perspective that is compatible with
the current circumstances of the subject of the belief state B . In Stalnaker’s
words, this reflects the idea that ‘the job of the center [is] to link the believer
as he is in the world in which he has the beliefs to the person he takes himself
to be in the world as he takes it to be’ (Stalnaker, 2014, p. 115). So, on the
Stalnakerian account, centres are not introduced to represent a dimension of a
subject’s uncertainty, but rather act as a link between the contents of a subject’s
beliefs (which, according to Stalnaker, are uncentred propositions), and their
contextual circumstances.
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I now turn to discuss a reading of the messy shopper example that appears to
cause some problems for Stalnaker’s account. As we saw earlier, the first read-
ing of the example relies on the idea that Perry is never unsure about his own
identity, so all the centred worlds compatible with Perry’s circumstances are
centred on the agent who is identified as Perry. However, as the second reading
of the messy shopper example indicates, there can be cases where an agent’s
uncertainty is not so much about the world, but concerns their present loca-
tion or identity – that is, there seem to be cases of genuinely de se uncertainty.
What characterises this second type of uncertainty is that learning the missing
de se information does not also automatically entail learning something about
the world. In the second reading of the case of the messy shopper, for example,
when Perry realises that he himself is the messy shopper he does not also con-
textually learn anything new about the world (since all the centred possibilities
he entertained prior to the realisation coincided on w3).
Since Stalnaker’s account takes standard propositions (i.e. sets of uncentred
possible worlds) to be the content of de se sentences, it prima facie faces a
problem to account for this second type of uncertainty, which is not strictly
speaking about the world, but about which of the possible centres matches a
subject’s current circumstances. On the Stalnakerian account, we can’t explain
this type of de se uncertainty by saying that the agent entertains two centred
possibilities that coincide with respect to the possible world w , but differ with
respect to the centre c, because these two possibilities correspond to the same
proposition. In other words, an agent could not be uncertain about these two
possibilities because, on the Stalnakerian account, they have exactly the same
content. In light of the second reading of the messy shopper example, and the
discussion under the pathfinder mode of reasoning, this is naturally a puzzling
result for the Stalnakerian account. There seem to be cases where agents are
uncertain about their own location or identity, but the Stalnakerian account
seems to rule out this possibility.
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Stalnaker proposes the following condition for belief sets, which he calls propo-
sitionality:
Definition 1 (Propositionality). For any belief state B , and centred worlds (w ,c),
(w ,c ′) that coincide with respect to their uncentred component w , (w ,c), (w ,c ′) ∈
B if and only if c = c ′.
In other words, propositionality says that any uncertainty about the centre is
always also uncertainty about which uncentred possible world is actual. If
propositionality holds, this implies that even when an agent has de se uncer-
tainty, this uncertainty can ultimately be reduced to uncertainty about the
world. Moreover, the way in which agents learn de se information is by acquir-
ing new information about the world.
We can go back to the example of the hiker to illustrate how the Stalnakerian
account works with de se uncertainty in this case. As in the previous example,
we can imagine that Ted is hiking through a forest. He has a very detailed map
of the area he is crossing, which he uses to guide his way. Arriving at a fork,
he is unsure about whether he should keep to the left, continuing on the same
trail, or whether he should turn right into a smaller path. He pulls out the map,
but finds that there are two points that, for all he knows, are compatible with
what he sees around himself.
A natural way to represent Ted’s belief state would be to let w correspond to
the objective information about the territory that is contained in the map, and
let c and c ′ correspond to the two possible locations that are compatible with
Ted’s surroundings. The resulting belief set B = {(w ,c), (w ,c ′)} violates propo-
sitionality, because c and c ′ are two distinct centres, but both are associated to
the same possible world w within B . This way of representing Ted’s belief state
would therefore be rejected by the Stalnakerian account. Instead, a proponent
3.3 T H E S E M A N T I C C O N T E N T O F D E S E E X P R E S S I O N S 66
of this account should argue that if Ted is uncertain about these two locations,
then c and c ′ must be associated with two distinct uncentred worlds, giving
the revised belief set B∗ = {(w ,c), (w ′,c ′)}, where w 6= w ′. In other words, if de
se uncertainty is present, the map is not detailed enough to uniquely pin down
the actual world w .
Stalnaker can justify this move by pointing out that if Ted is uncertain about
which position he occupies within the world, then there is in fact something
about the world which he does not know: namely, where the individual cor-
responding to himself is located. In this example, although we have assumed
that the map is accurate, it does not contain all the information about the po-
sition of individual hikers walking through the territory. But this information
should be part of a complete objective description of the world. Therefore, sup-
posing for simplicity that Ted is the only hiker around, when he stops to con-
sider his own position the two possible worlds that he considers differ both
with respect to the location that he occupies within them (c, or c ′), and with
respect to whether the ‘completed’ map specifies the position of the hiker as
being at c or at c ′. Since there are two ways for the map to be completed, they
correspond to two different uncentred worlds in Ted’s belief set.
As this example shows, the Stalnakerian strategy to deal with cases of de se
uncertainty involves turning de se statements (such as ‘I am located at point
c’) into de dicto ones (which do not include indexical or demonstrative terms,
such as ‘the hiker is at point c’). This strategy entails that it is impossible for a
subject to learn anything de se about his or her own location or identity, with-
out at the same time also learning something about the world. In other words,
new information is always uncentred information about the world.
Showing that the Stalnakerian account can be applied to the second reading
of the messy shopper example is a bit more tricky. On that reading, Perry does
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not learn anything new about the world, apart from the fact that he is the agent
who is making a mess. The formalisation of this reading of the example that I
gave in §3.1.2 is not immediately compatible with the Stalnakerian account,
because it violates propositionality. So, we will need to find another way to
capture the same intuition. Stalnaker could respond by saying that, on a fun-
damental level, Perry is not uncertain about his own identity, but he might
still not know which properties apply to him in the actual world, including the
names by which he happens to be known. For example, Perry might be for
some reason oblivious to the fact that ‘Perry’ is a name that refers to himself,
and so even if he believes that Perry is the messy shopper in the actual world,
he does not know whether he himself is the messy shopper. For all that he
knows, he wouldn’t know any difference if he were either Jones, Smith or Perry.
He does, however, know that the very token thought that he is having at the
moment when he considers these possibilities is unique, in the sense that he
is the only one who has it in the actual world. Call this thought token θ. Since
he knows he has θ in the actual world, the question about which agent he is
can now be reformulated in the following slightly different way, as which agent
has the token thought θ in the actual world. There are three possibilities: ei-
ther Jones has token thought θ, or Smith has it, or Perry has it. Therefore, we
need to refine the description of the possible world w3, which is now split into
three further possibilities:
• w J3 : Perry is the messy shopper and Jones has token thought θ;
• wS3 : Perry is the messy shopper and Smith has token thought θ;
• wP3 : Perry is the messy shopper and has token thought θ.
Given that Perry knows that he himself has the thought θ in the actual world,
let ‘ME’ be the person who has token thought θ. His belief set will be equal to
the set B = {(w J3 ,ME),(wS3 ,ME),(wP3 ,ME)}. When he finally realises that he in
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fact is the messy shopper, what Perry learns is effectively something about the
world: namely, that w J3 is the case, i.e. that it is the agent named Perry that has
token thought θ.
To summarise, here are the basic ingredients of the Stalnakerian account:
• The contents of expressions or sentences (including de se expressions or
sentences) are propositions, which on the Stalnakerian account corre-
spond to sets of uncentred possible worlds;
• The content of a de se sentence or expression can vary with respect to
the context at which it is uttered;
• A belief state is modeled as a set of centred worlds B , whose elements are
all the centred worlds at which the agent, for all he or she knows, could
be located;
• Belief sets satisfy the condition of Propositionality. This entails that un-
certainty about where one is in the world is also always uncertainty about
which world is actual. In other words, a belief set can never contain pairs
of centred world that coincide on the w component, but differ with re-
spect to c.
And a summary of the recipe:
In order to reason about de se uncertainty, we do not need to posit
the existence of other types of contents in addition to standard
propositions. Contrary to standard propositions, that are true or
false absolutely, de se sentences appear to be true in some con-
texts, but false at other contexts. This is because their proposi-
tional content varies, and is fixed by the context at which they are
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evaluated. But once their content is fixed, they are equivalent to
standard propositions, and can be treated in just the same way.
3.3.2 The Lewisian account
In contrast to the Stalnakerian account, the framework originally put forward
by Lewis (1979) does not attempt to analyse the content of de se expressions by
fixing their meaning relative to a context. Instead, Lewis argues that de se ex-
pressions, such as ‘I am the messy shopper’, or ‘It is 4pm right now’, correspond
to what he calls centred propositions.
The issue with de se expressions, as we have seen, is that their truth value can
change with respect to the context at which they are evaluated. For example,
the truth value of ‘It is 4pm right now’ differs, depending on the actual time
at which it is evaluated. On the Stalnakerian account, this is explained by the
fact that the content of the de se expression varies with the context. On the
Lewisian account, on the other hand, the content is kept fixed, and it is only
the truth value which changes. It is a fairly standard view that the truth value
of a proposition can vary across possible words – so we talk about a proposition
being true at some worlds but not others. With Lewis, we have centred possible
worlds, and the truth value of a proposition can vary across these. Of course, as
time passes we are moving between centred possible worlds, and so the truth
value of some propositions will change. More precisely, the idea which is at
the basis of the Lewisian account is that the content of de se expressions is not
essentially different from that of de dicto expressions. According to a standard
picture, the proposition expressed by a de dicto sentence is just a function of
the meaning of its constituent terms, and is fixed independently from a context
of utterance. The truth value of a proposition, on the other hand, depends on
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what the world is like – or, within a possible worlds framework, what possible
world is the actual one at which the proposition is evaluated. For example,
the sentence ‘snow is white’ corresponds, on a standard account, to the set of
possible worlds S = {w : snow is white at w}. Conversely, the proposition ‘snow
is white’ is true, when evaluated from the perspective of the actual world w@,
just in case w@ is a member of S.
If we take a sentence like ‘I am the messy shopper’, however, this doesn’t seem
to express a proposition that automatically correspond to a set of possible
worlds in the standard, uncentred sense. Nor does it seem possible to evalu-
ate its truth value relative to an uncentred possible world: if a world w con-
tains a messy shopper, it doesn’t seem to follow that ‘I am the messy shopper’
is true at w . Lewis (1979) however argues that the content of a de se sentence
can be expressed as a centred proposition, and the standard account of propo-
sitions can be extended to the centred case. According to Lewis, when Perry
realises that he is the messy shopper, what he comes to believe is that he him-
self has a certain property. In other words, learning the de se proposition ‘I am
the messy shopper’ means that Perry self-attributes the property of being the
messy shopper.
Lewis introduces centred worlds to capture the content of such self-attributions
of properties. On the Lewisian account, the de se sentence ‘I am the messy
shopper’ (P ) has a content that is independent from the context or the current
circumstances of a subject that happens to utter it, and corresponds to the set
of all the centred worlds (wi ,c j ) that are centred on an individual c j who is the
messy shopper in wi . When Perry comes to believe that he is the messy shop-
per, therefore, he comes to believe that the centred world he currently inhabits
is centred on an individual (himself) who is a messy shopper; in other words,
that his actual centred world is a member of P .
3.3 T H E S E M A N T I C C O N T E N T O F D E S E E X P R E S S I O N S 71
The Lewisian account is able to accommodate naturally both modes of reason-
ing identified in the previous section. If we take Perry’s background beliefs to
include information about his own identity, as in the first intuitive reading of
the messy shopper case presented in Section 2, learning the centred proposi-
tion ‘I am the messy shopper’ enables Perry to rule out from his belief set all
the centred worlds that are not centred on a messy shopper (namely, (w1, aP )
and (w2, aP )). This, in turn, enable him to single out (w3, aP ) as the centred
world corresponding to his circumstances.
If, on the other hand, Perry’s background knowledge does not include an ef-
fective way to identify himself with a possible centre, but does include suffi-
cient information about what the world is like, then learning the same centred
proposition (‘I am the messy shopper’) enables him to rule out the centred
worlds which are not centred on Perry himself (namely, (w3, a J ) and (w3, aS)),
again leaving the single actual centred world (w3, aP ).
In the first case, we can see Perry as reasoning in the cartographer mode: learn-
ing something about his own circumstances leads him to update his beliefs
about what the world is like. In the second case, on the other hand, we can see
Perry as reasoning in the pathfinder mode: learning something the world leads
him to update his beliefs regarding his own position, or who he takes himself
to be within the world.
To summarise, the main ingredients of the Lewisian framework are the follow-
ing:
• The contents of sentences and beliefs (including de se sentences and be-
liefs) are centred propositions, or sets of centred worlds;
• The belief state of an agent corresponds to the set of all the centred propo-
sitions believed by the agent;
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And the recipe to reason about de se uncertainty is very simple: centred worlds
should play the same role, within the Lewisian framework, as uncentred possi-
ble worlds play in the standard possible worlds semantics for propositions.
Based on my discussion, the Lewisian account of de se propositions seems to
offer a much simpler explanation of the modes of reasoning involving de se
uncertainty, while the Stalnakerian account appears to be incompatible with
reasoning in the pathfinder mode. This, on a first blush, is a disadvantage for
Stalnaker’s account, as it does not satisfy the desiderata in §3.3. The Lewisian
account, however, comes at the expense of modifying the standard account
of the content of beliefs, admitting a refinement of possible worlds, in a way
that has far reaching implications (as will be discussed in more detail in the
following Chapters). 16
3.4 C O N C L U S I O N
In this chapter I have used a famous example, the case of the messy shopper
first discussed by Perry (1979), to illustrate what de se uncertainty is. Building
on two intuitively plausible readings of Perry’s example, I identified two modes
of reasoning that can come into play when a subject is uncertain about what
the world is like (the cartographer mode), or when he or she is uncertain about
the current perspective or location within the world (the pathfinder mode).
The two most successful accounts of de se sentences currently available, namely
Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s account of centred contents, are not equally able to ac-
commodate both modes of reasoning. While Lewis’s account of centred propo-
sitions is compatible with both the cartographer and the pathfinder mode, Stal-
16 See Cappelen and Dever (2013) and Magidor (2015) for an extended analysis and critical discus-
sion of the Lewisian framework on related points.
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naker’s account is only compatible with the cartographer mode, reducing all
instances of self-locating uncertainty to uncertainty about the world.
To adjudicate between the two accounts, therefore, we need a further assess-
ment. If Stalnaker’s account is correct, and the condition that he calls Propo-
sitionality is true, then this would knock down the possibility of pathfinder
mode.
In the next chapter, therefore, I turn to considering whether Stalnaker offers
convincing reasons to accept propositionality, and whether his broader strat-
egy to reduce the content of de se sentences to standard propositions is suc-
cessful. In chapter 4 I will argue that Stalnaker’s strategy fails, because it either
makes it impossible for distinct agents to share a same context, or it is unable
to explain how different agents who share the same context may assign a dif-
ferent truth value to the same de se expression. Therefore, we should look to
the Lewisian account to provide a semantic framework for reasoning about de
se uncertainty.
4
D E S E B E L I E F S
In the previous chapters, I have discussed why we need de se beliefs and exam-
ined a particular way to model de se beliefs within a centred worlds framework.
The discussion of Perry’s messy shopper example highlighted how de se beliefs
are essential to explain action. Moreover, as agents we seem to have a basic in-
tuition that our experiences of the world are always given within a perspective.
As agents, we situate ourselves within the world, and de se beliefs encode this
individual perspective.
However, recognising the importance of de se beliefs raises a host of questions.
In particular, it is unclear what exactly accounts for the special status of de se
beliefs. If de se beliefs are special, it is also prima facie unclear how we should
reason about de se information. Building on the discussion of the previous
chapters, in this chapter I turn to consider more closely one particular answer
to the problem of de se beliefs, according to which de se beliefs have similar
propositional content as other types of beliefs, but have the special property
of linking the agent with the content of his or her beliefs.
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4.1 T W O Q U E S T I O N S A B O U T D E S E B E L I E F S
Perry’s example of the messy shopper and other examples of cases involving
self-identification or self-location are often used to illustrate how de se beliefs
are special, and cannot be reduced to de dicto beliefs that are strictly about the
world. As we saw through examples in the previous chapters, a belief is de se if
it has the following characteristics: it is a belief about oneself, concerning one’s
identity or temporal or spatial location; it is typically expressed using an indexi-
cal sentence, such as ‘I am the messy shopper’ or ‘The meeting starts now’; and
finally it is not deducible from purely objective beliefs about the world. For ex-
ample, Perry (1979) convincingly argues that ‘I am the messy shopper’ cannot
be deduced from ‘John Perry is the messy shopper’, at least unless some other
linking de se belief – such as ‘I am John Perry’ – is already in place.
Accepting that de se beliefs are in some way special and different from other
types of beliefs, however, does leave open many further questions.17 In this
chapter I restrict my attention to two specific epistemological questions relat-
ing to the problem of de se beliefs, namely:
1. If de se beliefs are different from de dicto beliefs, what are the features
that make them special?
2. Can there ever be genuinely de se uncertainty, or uncertainty that is purely
concerning one’s own identity or location?
17 For example, given the essential role they seem to play in explaining action (see e.g. Perry (1979),
Ninan (2012)), one may ask whether non-human or group agents can have de se beliefs (List
and Pettit, 2011). Moreover, de se beliefs play an essential role also in the way agents engage in
communication, raising important questions in the philosophy of language (Stalnaker (2014),
Ninan (2016), Stojanovic (2016)).
4.1 T W O Q U E S T I O N S A B O U T D E S E B E L I E F S 76
I am going to present and critically discuss a particular line of answer to these
two questions. I will call this position Weak Acceptance, to distinguish it from
two other positions which I will call Denial and Strong Acceptance.
4.1.1 Three responses
The problem of de se beliefs, as I have suggested in the previous section, has
invited three main types of responses. The essential features of each response
are summarised in table 1.
Proponents of Denial generally argue that the problem of de se beliefs is only
a product of the possible worlds account of propositions (see Magidor, 2015;
Cappelen and Dever, 2013). According to them, puzzling cases of de se beliefs
can be adequately handled by any semantic framework that has the concep-
tual resources to solve puzzles about reference (more on this below). So, De-
nial would require a departure from the possible worlds framework that I have
adopted and motivated in Chapter 2. This, however, comes at a significant cost:
as will be discussed in Chapter 5, centred worlds provide a very natural frame-
work to model uncertainty over de se possibilities, but the same is not true of
other accounts of propositions.
The positions that I will call Strong and Weak Acceptance, on the other hand,
are both compatible with a semantic framework that views propositions as sets
of (centred or uncentred) possible worlds. The formulations of both positions
that I will analyse in this chapter take de se beliefs to be represented as sets
of centred worlds. The main difference between these two positions, however,
is with respect to what they take the content of de se beliefs to be. For Strong
Acceptance, the content of de se beliefs are simply centred propositions. So, on
the Strong Acceptance account a belief and its content are formally the same































Table 1: Three positions on de se beliefs
thing, i.e. both correspond to a set of centred worlds. For Weak Acceptance,
instead, the content of de se beliefs are uncentred (i.e. de dicto) propositions,
and a belief and its content are formally distinct objects. On the one hand,
a belief is modelled as a set of centred worlds that satisfies the condition of
Propositionality (more on this below). On the other hand, the content of a
belief corresponds to an uncentred proposition, i.e. to a set of ordinary (non-
centred) possible worlds.
Now, let us consider more closely how each position can answer the two ques-
tions I have formulated above. According to Denial, the answer to the first
question – about what if anything makes de se beliefs special – is that nothing
makes them special. According to this position, de se beliefs, or beliefs con-
cerning facts about oneself including one’s identity and location, do not differ
in any relevant respect from other types of beliefs that are simply about the
world. Proponents of this position (including Magidor (2015) and Cappelen
and Dever (2013)) generally argue that the problem cases, including the messy
shopper and other examples of de se beliefs raised by Perry, should just be
viewed as instances of a more general type of puzzles about reference, known
4.1 T W O Q U E S T I O N S A B O U T D E S E B E L I E F S 78
in the literature as ‘Frege cases’. A famous example of such a puzzle is due to
Frege (1892). Hesperus and Phosphorus are two names for the same object, a
star that is visible in the sky both in the evening (hence the name Hesperus,
or ‘the evening star’) and in the morning (hence its other name, Phosphorus,
or ‘the morning star’). Each name is associated with a different mode of pre-
sentation, and it is possible – indeed plausible – that someone observing Phos-
phorus in the morning sky might not know of the fact that it is the same star
they observed in the evening, and which they then called Hesperus. Hence,
the observer would be ignorant that the proposition ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’
is true, even though it expresses a necessary truth because both names refer
to the same object. Proponents of Denial argue that in cases involving de se
beliefs, the indexical terms used to express these beliefs – such as ‘I’, ‘now’, or
‘here’ – refer to objects in the same way as a proper name such as ‘Hesperus’.
When I assert ‘I am the messy shopper’, I am asserting that ‘I’ and ‘the messy
shopper’ refer to the same individual.
The answer to the second question – whether there can be genuine de se uncer-
tainty – is less clear cut. On the one hand, since de se beliefs are not different
from other types of beliefs, Denial has no difficulty in admitting that there can
be uncertainty. On the other hand, the uncertainty involved is not specifically,
or genuinely de se. For example, if I am uncertain about whether or not ‘I am
the messy shopper’ is true, then, according to Denialists, this is simply because
I lack the knowledge that ‘I’ (as uttered by me) and ‘the messy shopper’ in fact
co-refer to the same individual.
Ultimately, I am not convinced that Denial is a satisfactory position with re-
spect to the problem of de se beliefs. Since the primary focus of this chapter
is the position of Weak Acceptance, I will not delve much deeper into a discus-
sion of Denial, but I will just mention here a few main reasons why I do not
think it can provide a satisfactory account of de se beliefs. First of all, in order
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to be made workable, Denial must specify more precisely how indexical terms
refer, and why the reference of these terms should be treated in a similar way
as other referring expressions, such as proper names and definite descriptions.
Without such an explanation, it is plausible to assume that indexical terms be-
have very differently from other referring expressions. Secondly, Denial does
not explain the main issue raised by Perry, that is the irreducibility of de se be-
liefs. Analysing cases of de se uncertainty as instances of Frege cases hides the
fact that de se beliefs appear to contain additional information, that is not pos-
sible to express using other means of presentation.
Moving on to the next position on de se beliefs, according to Strong Accep-
tance, the answer to the first question – what makes de se beliefs special –
is that de se beliefs are different from other types of beliefs in virtue of their
content. According to this position, ordinary, non-de se beliefs represent facts
about the world and their contents are ordinary (de dicto) propositions. De
se beliefs, however, represent a fine-graining of ordinary beliefs, and have as
content de se propositions. In addition to accepting that de se beliefs are spe-
cial in virtue of their content, Strong Acceptance also accepts the possibility of
genuinely de se uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is different from ordinary
uncertainty, because it concerns more finer grained possibilities than ordinary
propositions. Strong Acceptance is my favoured position. It is also the posi-
tion advocated by David Lewis18, and the default underlying position in many
accounts of puzzles of self-location.19
A significant alternative to Strong Acceptance is the position that I have called
Weak Acceptance, which will be the main focus of the rest of this chapter. Weak
Acceptance agrees with Strong Acceptance that de se beliefs are special, but dis-
agrees on what features make them so. While according to Strong Acceptance
18 Lewis (1979, 1986, 2001)
19 See, e.g., Elga (2000) and Lewis (2001). See also Titelbaum (2016b) for an overview of the debate
in this area.
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de se beliefs are special in virtue of their content, according to Weak Accep-
tance the content of de se beliefs is no different from the content of any other
types of beliefs, and is just ordinary propositions. I will say more on the details
of this position in the following sections, but the main point of this position
is that de se beliefs are different in the way that they represent this content.
While de dicto beliefs represent propositions in an objective, third-personal
way, de se beliefs can represent the same contents from a first-personal, subjec-
tive perspective. In other words, according to Weak Acceptance the contents
of any type of beliefs are ordinary propositions, but the total cognitive state of
an agent is not exhausted by the set of all the propositions that they believe – it
also includes a ‘perspective’ from which these beliefs are held, represented by
the agent’s de se beliefs.
With respect to question 2, while Strong Acceptance agrees with the possibil-
ity of genuine de se uncertainty, Weak Acceptance denies this. According to
this position, all uncertainty is ultimately about some content, and since the
contents of de se beliefs are ordinary propositions, the uncertainty must cor-
respondingly be just uncertainty about the ordinary propositions. In other
words, Weak Acceptance maintains that that even when de se uncertainty seems
to be present, it is always ultimately reducible to uncertainty about what the
world is objectively like.
The aim of this chapter is to give a detailed analysis of Weak Acceptance, and
ultimately argue that – despite its initial attractions – this is not a tenable posi-
tion. For definiteness, my discussion will draw more specifically on the frame-
work put forward by Robert Stalnaker, which I take to be the most compelling
version of Weak Acceptance in the recent literature. The rest of the chapter is
organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the answer that Weak Acceptance
gives to the problem of de se beliefs and explains why it is a prima facie attrac-
tive position. Section 4.3 presents the two core assumptions that characterise
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the position of Weak Acceptance, with a particular focus on the version pro-
posed by Stalnaker. Section 4.4 presents the formal framework introduced by
Stalnaker to represent de se beliefs and shows how the two core assumptions
of Weak Acceptance can be articulated in this framework. Section 4.5 raises
some objections to Stalnaker’s framework. Section 4.6 considers whether these
objections could be met by Weak Acceptance by changing the framework in
appropriate ways, but shows that the problems with the formal framework ul-
timately derive from a deeper tension between the two core assumptions. Fi-
nally, Section 4.7 concludes that, based on the issues discussed in this chapter,
Weak Acceptance is not an adequate account of de se beliefs.
4.2 R E A S O N S F O R W E A K A C C E P TA N C E
At least prima facie, Weak Acceptance has several attractive features. First of
all, it accommodates the apparent irreducibility of de se beliefs, thus answering
the issues about essential indexicality originally raised by Perry. Weak Accep-
tance maintains that de se beliefs are not reducible to beliefs about what the
world is objectively like, because they also encode some further facts concern-
ing the particular perspective on the world that agents occupy. These further
perspectival facts function as a link between a subject and the content of his
or her own beliefs, and are essential to explaining reasoning and action. Weak
Acceptance does not deny the presence of de se uncertainty, but argues that all
its instances are ultimately reducible to ordinary objective uncertainty. Appar-
ent de se uncertainty intuitively arises in all the cases in which the perceived
features of an agent’s own perspective on the world are compatible with dif-
ferent spatial locations, times, or identities that the agent – for all he or she
knows – might occupy. As will be discussed in more detail below, this feature
allows Weak Acceptance to give an account of cases in which agents intuitively
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have some de se uncertainty, such as the ones illustrated by the examples in
the previous chapters.
Unlike a proponent of Denial, a proponent of Weak Acceptance is not com-
mitted to denying the intuitively plausible view that the particular perspective
that each agent occupies within the world is relevant to the way agents act and
reason based on their beliefs. In the case of the messy shopper, for example,
Perry’s realisation that he himself is the messy shopper is what induces him to
pause and check his cart. Similarly, Weak Acceptance seems to vindicate the
basic intuition that each individual experiences the world from their unique
individual perspective.
Another feature that makes Weak Acceptance an attractive answer to the prob-
lem of de se beliefs is that it is compatible with standard accounts of proposi-
tions and updating. Unlike Strong Acceptance, Weak Acceptance is compatible
with the view that the contents of beliefs correspond to ordinary propositions,
understood as sets of possible worlds. This can be regarded as an advantage, as
it means that Weak Acceptance is still compatible with standard accounts of be-
lief change, in particular it is compatible with a Bayesian account of updating.
By contrast, Strong Acceptance is usually taken to be incompatible with stan-
dard versions of Bayesian conditioning (see Chapters 5 and 6), and therefore
proponents of Strong Acceptance may need to provide alternative accounts
of belief updating (see Titelbaum (2008, 2016b) for a discussion of recent at-
tempts). Contrary to this general opinion, I think that Strong Acceptance is
consistent with standard norms of Bayesian reasoning, and in Chapter 6 I will
present my own solution to the problem.
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In this section, I present the two core assumptions that characterise the posi-
tion of Weak Acceptance. I will focus in particular on the work of Stalnaker.
The two core assumptions that I identify, namely the Non-deducibility of de se
beliefs and the condition of Propositionality that is assumed to provide a link
between de se beliefs and propositional contents, spell out more clearly the de-
tails of the answers given by Weak Acceptance to the two questions about de se
beliefs that I raised in Section 4.1.
4.3.1 The Non-deducibility of de se beliefs
Weak Acceptance agrees that there is something special about de se beliefs.
Stalnaker agrees with Perry that de se beliefs are not reducible to beliefs about
the world. For Perry, as we have seen, de se beliefs are needed to fill the moti-
vation gap. For Stalnaker, the role of de se beliefs is to link a subject with the
content of his or her own beliefs. On Stalnaker’s account, as we will see in a mo-
ment, an agent’s cognitive state is not fully exhausted by the objective facts that
he or she believes. An additional feature of belief states is that they represent
propositional contents from a specific perspective, that is the one occupied by
the agent who has the beliefs. In this framework, de se beliefs are what is used
to represent ordinary propositional contents from a specific perspective.
De se beliefs, according to Stalnaker, have the role of linking a subject to the
content of his or her own beliefs. To illustrate this point, Stalnaker (2016) uses
the following example involving two people, a shared context and no de se un-
certainty.
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Albert is in the kitchen and Boris is in the basement. Each knows
who and where he is, and who and where the other is, so there is
no self-locating ignorance. They each know all the same objective
facts about their respective locations in the house, but there is still
a difference in their epistemic states, a difference in their perspec-
tives on the world.
The example of Boris and Albert serves to illustrate an intuitively common
predicament: several people can share a common context, have all the same
beliefs about the circumstances surrounding them, and yet all of them have a
different perspective on the world. Although Albert and Boris have access to all
the same information about the house and their respective locations, each of
them has a different perspective on the same facts. To further drive this point
home, Stalnaker continues:
Suppose [that] a representation [of the contents of Boris and Al-
bert’s common state of belief] contained all the information about
the beliefs of any person who is in the cognitive state that Boris
and Albert are both in. Let x be any person in that state. Where
does x believe himself or herself to be? It is clear enough from the
description of the scenario that Boris believes he is in the base-
ment and Albert believes he is in the kitchen, but these are further
facts that are not reflected in the common set of propositions that
is what each of them believes.
The example with Boris and Albert is supposed to illustrate how de se informa-
tion is essentially different from objective information about what the world
is like. It is possible to have complete information about the world, including
the cognitive states of all the agents that are in it, without being able to deduce
from this any de se information about who or where one is. In other words, de
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se beliefs are not deducible from objective beliefs. For this reason, Stalnaker
accepts the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Non-Deducibility). De se information cannot be deduced from
a purely objective representation of the world. In particular, de se beliefs can-
not be deduced from a set of objective propositions (in the absence of any fur-
ther premises).
4.3.2 Propositionality
Weak Acceptance need not rule out that agents can, sometimes, be uncertain
about some de se information. This would be prima facie implausible, as agents
are often uncertain about where, when or – sometimes – who they are. For
example, in the case of the messy shopper, Perry is initially uncertain about
whether he himself is the messy shopper.
So, if the content of de se beliefs can be expressed using a first-personal in-
dexical sentence by the agent who holds that belief, it is plausible that agents
are sometimes uncertain about whether the sentences ‘I am happy’ and ‘I am
the messy shopper’ are true. Weak acceptance does not have to deny that un-
certainty is present in these cases. Instead, what it argues is that the relevant
uncertainty is about what the world is like, and does not genuinely involve de
se beliefs. According to Stalnaker, although sentences like ‘I am happy’ and ‘I
am the messy shopper’ can be used to express de se beliefs, their content is in
any case a proposition corresponding to a particular way in which the world
might objectively be. Which particular proposition is the content of a specific
utterance of ‘I am the messy shopper’ depends on the context. If it is Perry that
utters it – and here let us assume (for now) that Perry knows that ’John Perry’
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designates himself, then the content of ‘I am the messy shopper’ corresponds
to the set of all the possible worlds in which John Perry is the messy shopper.
When Perry is uncertain about whether he is the messy shopper, this is because
there are two ways that the world could be that he takes to be possible. In one
possibility, the individual who is the messy shopper coincides with the indi-
vidual that Perry take himself to be; while in the other possibilities, a different
individual is the messy shopper. So, while Perry is uncertain about whether
he himself actually is the messy shopper, this is not because he does not know
who he is – he does not doubt at any point his own identity. Rather, the uncer-
tainty comes from the fact that he lacks a crucial piece of information about
the world, namely that the individual who is named John Perry is the messy
shopper. If he had that additional information, given that he already knows
that he is John Perry, it would also resolve his uncertainty about his de se be-
liefs.
This idea about de se uncertainty always being reducible to uncertainty about
the world is captured by Stalnaker with the following condition, that he calls
Propositionality:
Assumption 2 (Propositionality). Uncertainty about de se information is al-
ways also uncertainty about the world.
In line with Weak Acceptance, Stalnaker’s Propositionality condition ensures
that the content of an agent’s de se beliefs can always be mapped to standard
propositions, expressing what the world is objectively like. Propositionality
applies to de se uncertainty about time, and this allows Stalnaker to retain a fa-
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miliar account of belief updating over time for agents who are uncertain about
their de se beliefs, as the following example illustrates:
Example 1. Waking up in the middle of the night, Emily is unsure about what
time it is. She remembers that her neighbour said he was leaving for a flight
very early in the morning, but she doesn’t recall if he told her that he would
leave at 4am or 5am. She listens for a moment and notices that some birds are
already singing. From this, she concludes that it must indeed already be 5am.
In this example, Emily has some de se uncertainty, as she does not know when
she wakes up whether it is 4am or 5am. She believes that the noise which
caused her to wake up was made by the neighbour as he was leaving, but since
she forgot the exact time he told her, both possibilities are compatible with her
present circumstances, as far as she knows now. So, both ‘It’s now 4am’ and ‘It’s
now 5am’ represent live de se possibilities for Emily as she wakes up. Both also
correspond to two different possible worlds.
According to Weak Acceptance, Emily’s uncertainty in this example is de se in
the sense that ‘It’s now 4am’ and ‘It’s now 5am’ correspond to two different
time points at which Emily may locate herself in the world. However, this un-
certainty is not genuinely, or irreducibly de se, because the two possibilities
also correspond to two different ways that world might be objectively like. In
one possibility, which corresponds to ‘It’s now 4am’, Emily’s neighbour leaves
the house making some noise at 4am in the morning. In the other possibil-
ity, corresponding to ‘It’s now 5am’, the neighbour leaves at 5am. These two
possibilities differ not just in de se respects, about where Emily takes herself
to be located at present (4am or 5am, respectively), they also correspond to
two different ways that the world might be. If she could remember that the
neighbour told her that he would in fact leave at 5am, Emily would no longer
be uncertain about her de se beliefs. Therefore, Emily’s uncertainty, although
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it involves some de se beliefs, is in fact reducible to uncertainty that is strictly
speaking about the world. As she wakes up, therefore, her beliefs are compat-
ible with two different possible worlds, one where the neighbour’s departure
(and her own awakening) take place at 4am, and a different one in which the
same events take place an hour later. Hearing the birds singing gives Emily
an additional piece of evidence. Since she believes that these birds do not nor-
mally sing too long before dawn, she concludes by conditionalising on this new
piece of evidence that the second possibility must be correct, and it must now
be 5am.
4.4 S TA L N A K E R ’ S F R A M E W O R K
As seen in the last two sections, Non-Deducibility and Propositionality are
the two core assumptions of Stalnaker’s version of Weak Acceptance. Non-
Deducibility affirms that de se beliefs are not reducible to beliefs about what
the world is objectively like. Propositionality, on the other hand, is a condition
meant to establish a correspondence between an agent’s de se beliefs and the
objective content of those beliefs.
In this section I present the formal framework that Stalnaker introduces to rep-
resent the belief states of agents. The presentation in this section is based on
the Appendix to ch. 3 of Stalnaker (2008), where Stalnaker sketches a formal
statement of the semantic framework he proposes. This will provide a useful
background to articulate more precisely the essential features of Stalnaker’s
proposal.
Stalnaker takes as a starting point a standard possible world framework to rep-
resent the content of propositions. In this framework, propositions are taken
to be sets of possible worlds. For example, the proposition P : ‘Water freezes
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at 0oC ’ corresponds to the set of all possible worlds in which P is true. To this
standard account of propositions, Stalnaker adds a further element to repre-
sent de se beliefs. Following Lewis (1979), he uses centred worlds to model de
se beliefs.
Let W be a set of possible worlds and C be a set of possible centres. The el-
ements of C can be specified in various ways, but should generally be taken
to be n-tuples of an agent, a time, and a spatial location, identifying a partic-
ular perspective. Centred worlds are simply ordered couples (w ,c) of a possi-
ble world w ∈W and a centre c ∈C . Let Ω be the set of all the centred worlds
(wi ,c j ) that are logically possible, that is that satisfy the minimal condition that
the centre c j exists within wi .
The centred worlds in Ω represent all the possible predicaments in which an
agent could be. For example, if wp is a possible world where proposition P is
true, and cx is a centre within wp , then (wp ,cx ) represents the predicament of
an agent within wp , who is located at cx .
Wherever they might be located, agents have beliefs about the world that typi-
cally depend in some measure on the evidence that is available to them. This
is captured in Stalnaker’s framework by an epistemic accessibility relation R,
defined over the centred worlds in Ω. For example, an agent located at (w ,c)
might consider his or her own evidence to be compatible with some other pos-
sibilities, say (w ′,c ′) and (w ′,c ′), which are said to be R-accessible from (w ,c).
The epistemic accessibility relation R has the following properties:
Property 1 (Transitivity). For any three centred worlds (w ,c), (w ′,c ′), (w ′′,c ′′)
inΩ, (w ,c)R(w ′,c ′) and (w ′,c ′)R(w ′′,c ′′) imply (w ,c)R(w ′′,c ′′).
Property 2 (Seriality). For any (w ,c) ∈ Ω, there is some (w ′,c ′) ∈ Ω such that
(w ,c)R(w ′,c ′).
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In other words, seriality means that every centred world (w ,c) ∈Ω is R-related
to something else. There is no logically possible centred world which is epis-
temically cut off from everything. In other words, there is no logically possible
centred world (w ,c) that is a ‘blind spot’, in the sense that an agent located at
(w ,c) would not consider any centred world (including also (w ,c)) as possible.
Property 3 (Left-Euclidean). For any three centred worlds (w ,c), (w ′,c ′), (w ′′,c ′′)
inΩ, (w ,c)R(w ′,c ′) and (w ,c)R(w ′′,c ′′) imply (w ′,c ′)R(w ′′,c ′′).
The property of being left-Euclidean means that if two different centred worlds
are epistemically accessible from a third centred world, then they must also be
mutually epistemically accessible between themselves. For example, suppose
that it is actually 4:30am and Emily is awake, but she believes that it must be
either 4am or 5am. The centred world corresponding to Emily’s actual circum-
stances is (w ,ce,4:30am). The epistemic alternatives accessible from this cen-
tred world are (w ,c(e, 4am)) and (w ,c(e, 5am)). Since (w ,c(e, 4:30am))R(w ,c(e, 4am))
and (w ,c(e, 4:30am))R(w ,c(e, 5am)) both hold, the left-Euclidean property requires
that (w ,c(e, 4am))R(w ,c(e, 5am)) also holds.
The three above properties imposed on the epistemic accessibility relation R
induce the modal logic known as D45. To these, Stalnaker adds a further con-
dition to capture the requirement of Propositionality:
Definition 2 (R-Propositionality). For any three centred worlds (w ,c), (w ′,c ′),
(w ′′,c ′′) in Ω, if both (w ,c)R(w ′,c ′) and (w ,c)R(w ′′,c ′′) and w ′ =w ′′, then c ′ =
c ′′.
We have seen previously that Propositionality asserts that uncertainty about
the centre is always also uncertainty about which possible world is actual. R-
propositionality translates this condition at the level of the epistemic accessi-
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bility relation R, constraining it in the following way: any two distinct centred
worlds that are R-related between themselves must differ with respect to their
uncentred component w . In other words, definition 2 requires that any two
centred worlds y and z that are epistemically accessible from some other cen-
tred world x can only differ with respect to their centre if they also differ with
respect to their possible world component. This ensures that in no case the
epistemic possibilities accessible from a centred world x differ only with re-
spect to the centre. Each epistemic possibility that is accessible from x must
be characterised by a different possible world component.
Finally, building on the relation R Stalnaker introduces the concept of a belief
state, denoted Bel :
Definition 3 (Belief state). Given a centred world (w ,c) ∈Ω, Bel(w ,c) is the set
of all the centred worlds (w ′,c ′) ∈Ω such that (w ,c)R(w ′,c ′).
In other words, if (w ,c) is the centred world corresponding to an agent a’s cur-
rent circumstances, then Bel(w ,c) is the set of all the centred worlds that are
epistemically accessible from (w ,c), and which represent all the possibilities
that are compatible with a’s present evidence.
I will conclude this section with a few remarks on the framework presented
so far, before we move on. Within Stalnaker’s framework, the belief state of
an agent depends both on the centred world at which the agent is currently
located (which is called the base centred world) and on the epistemic acces-
sibility relation R, which determines the set of centred worlds that the agent
considers to be ‘live possibilities’ given his or her evidence. R is defined as an
exogenous feature in this framework and is not agent-specific. It should be in-
terpreted as specifying which centred worlds are compatible with the evidence
that is available to an agent occupying any given centred world.
4.4 S TA L N A K E R ’ S F R A M E W O R K 92
While belief states in this framework are represented by sets of centred pos-
sible worlds, the condition of Propositionality ensures that they can always
be mapped to ordinary propositions. The content of a belief state Bel is de-
fined as the ordinary proposition to which Bel is mapped. As evidenced by the
example of Boris and Albert, two different belief states Bel and Bel ′ may be
mapped to the same set of ordinary possible worlds, i.e. to the same ordinary
proposition. In such cases, Bel and Bel ′ have the same content, but differ in
the perspective from which they represent it.
A consequence of Stalnaker’s framework is that any two belief sets Bel and Bel ′
are either identical or disjoint. More formally, Stalnaker’s framework implies
the following:
Proposition 1. For all (w ,c) and (w ′,c ′) ∈Ω, either Bel(w ,c)∩Bel(w ′,c ′) =;, or
Bel(w ,c) =Bel(w ′,c ′).
In other words, given any two centred worlds (w ,c) and (w ′,c ′), the intersec-
tion of the belief sets generated by each is either empty or coincides with the
union of both belief sets (that is, (w ,c) and (w ′,c ′) generate the same belief
set). What is ruled out is that two belief sets with non-empty intersection do
not coincide.
Proof. Suppose that Bel(w ,c)∩Bel(w ′,c ′) is non-empty. Then there exists (w∗,c∗)
such that (w ,c)R(w∗,c∗) and (w ′,c ′)R(w∗,c∗). Now take any (w†,c†) such that
(w ,c)R(w†,c†). We need to show that we also have (w ′,c ′)R(w†,c†). Since
(w ,c)R(w∗,c∗) and (w ,c)R(w†,c†), the left-Euclidean property implies that
(w∗,c∗)R(w†,c†). Since (w ′,c ′)R(w∗,c∗), Transitivity implies that (w ′,c ′)R(w†,c†),
as required. For symmetry reasons, the argument that (w ′,c ′)R(w†,c†) implies
(w ,c)R(w†,c†) is perfectly analogous, completing the proof.
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In this section I discuss some problems that arise when we use Stalnaker’s
framework to model de se beliefs.
4.5.1 Intra-world ignorance
One of the standard objections moved towards Weak Acceptance focuses on
the condition of Propositionality.20 Weber (2015) argues that cases where Propo-
sitionality is violated are possible and, in fact, quite common. He describes
several counterexamples to Propositionality, calling them cases of Intra-World
Ignorance (IWI for short). All cases of IWI share two characteristic features.
Firstly, the agent has some de se uncertainty about his or her own current cir-
cumstances. In the previous example, for instance, Emily is woken up by some
noise, which she was expecting, but is presently unsure about whether it is 4am
or 5am. This uncertainty corresponds to two different time locations that she
thinks would be compatible with her current circumstances. Secondly, in all
cases of IWI, there is some pair of centred worlds (w∗,c) and (w∗,c ′) which the
agent considers compatible with her own current circumstances, and which
coincide on w but not on the centre that the agent occupies in each possibil-
ity. For example, in Emily’s case, w∗ could be a possible world in which Emily
is woken up twice during the night by some similar noises, and in each case
when she awakes she is uncertain about the time and does not remember any
past awakenings. Since each of the two awakenings in this scenario would be
indistinguishable to Emily, it seems that if her belief set contains one, it should
20 See Ninan (2012, 2016), Weber (2015).
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also contain the other possibility. This, however, would be a straightforward
violation of Propositionality.
Note that for Weber’s objection to Propositionality to go through, it is not re-
quired that the pair of indistinguishable centres satisfying IWI are located in
the actual world. All that is necessary is that there are some possibilities within
the agent’s belief set that satisfy IWI, even if these possibilities are not, in fact,
actual. Excluding this possibility might be difficult within Stalnaker’s frame-
work, as the discussion under 4.5.3 below will suggest.
Responding to Weber’s objection, Stalnaker (2016) argues that Propositional-
ity should be taken as a starting assumption for his position, rather than as a
proposition in need of being proved. According to Stalnaker, Propositionality
is intuitively plausible and, in addition, is consistent with his own other views
on metaphysics and the theory of reference. I will return on some of the deeper
issues underpinning Propositionality in section 4.6, but for the moment enter-
ing a detailed discussion of the latter would take us well beyond the scope of
this chapter. It is nevertheless worth noting that Stalnaker’s reply does little to
directly answer Weber’s point.
4.5.2 Radically mistaken de se beliefs
Another difficulty for Stalnaker’s framework that I wish to raise relates more
closely to the nature of the epistemic accessibility relation R. The way in which
Stalnaker defines it, R is not a reflexive relation, that is it does not generally
satisfy the following property:
Property 4 (Reflexivity). For any (w ,c) ∈Ω, (w ,c)R(w ,c).
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If reflexivity holds, any logically possible centred world is epistemically accessi-
ble to itself. This in turn entails that for any (w ,c), the belief set Bel(w ,c) always
contains (w ,c). In other words, reflexivity entails that an agent a could not be
fundamentally mistaken in their own beliefs, in the following sense: it could
not be the case that the actual world and the centre that corresponds to a’s
current circumstances are not included in a’s belief set.
Conversely, non-reflexivity entails that an agent’s belief states could contain
what I will call some radical mistakes. Assuming that (w ,c) corresponds to
the agent’s current circumstances, these radical mistakes can be of two sorts.
An agent’s belief set could not contain any possibility corresponding to the ac-
tual world w . This would be the case if all the epistemically accessible centred
worlds from (w ,c) do not contain w . In this case, the agent’s beliefs would
be mistaken in the sense that he or she would believe that the actual world
was impossible (that is, incompatible with her evidence). To give an example,
we can imagine an agent who, for some reason, believes that the Sun actually
orbits the Earth. None of the centred worlds in his or her belief set are com-
patible with the proposition ‘The Earth orbits the Sun’. Since the latter is a
true proposition, none of the possibilities in the agent’s belief set contains the
actual world.
However, there is also a second sense in which an agent’s beliefs can be mis-
taken, if R is not required to be reflexive. An agent’s belief set could contain
the actual world w , but the agent might fail to locate themselves accurately
within w . To illustrate this possibility, we could again use Perry’s messy shop-
per example. Suppose that Perry correctly believes that two possible worlds, w
and w ′, are compatible with his current circumstances. Furthermore, within
the possible world w the individual corresponding to John Perry is the messy
shopper, while within a different possible world w ′ some other individual, say
Jones, is the messy shopper. As a matter of fact, w is the actual world, and Perry
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is indeed occupying the centre identified by the individual called John Perry,
denoted cp , but – here is the catch – he is mistaken in his own identification.
We can represent this by saying that Perry’s belief set at (w ,cp ) is Bel(w ,cp ) =
{(w ,cx ), (w ′,cx )}, where cx 6= cp . This belief set is rationalised by an epistemic
accessibility relation that specifies that (w ,cp ), (w ,cx ) and (w ′,cx ) stand in
the following relations between themselves: (w ,cp )R(w ,cx ), (w ,cp )R(w ′,cx ),
(w ,cx )R(w ′,cx ) and (w ′,cx )R(w ,cx ). Under this specification, R satisfies tran-
sitivity, seriality (each of the three centred worlds concerned is R-related to at
least one centred world) and the left-Euclidean property. Moreover, this spec-
ification of R satisfies Propositionality, since the centred worlds that are con-
tained in Bel all differ with respect to their possible world component. This
kind of belief set is therefore supported by Stalnaker’s framework. Neverthe-
less, this seems problematic for at least two reasons.
To see the problem, first consider that Perry seems to believe something that is
false – namely, that if w is the actual world, then he is not the messy shopper.
This would suggest that the content of Perry’s beliefs is some false proposition.
However, the problem is that the Weak Acceptance view is unable to account
for what is wrong in Perry’s beliefs, because it cannot pinpoint what proposi-
tion he is ignorant of. On the Weak Acceptance view, it is not the case that Perry
believes a false proposition, since his belief set contains the actual world. And
Non-deducibility rules out that the objective features of the world fix which
are the right de se beliefs, since these are considered to be some further facts
independent as illustrated by the example of Boris and Albert.
How could Stalnaker respond? One way to handle this problem would be to im-
pose reflexivity on the epistemic accessibility relation R. This, however, would
be undesirable, because it would also preclude us from modelling the beliefs
of agents that are simply mistaken about some objective features of the world,
such as the beliefs of an agent who mistakenly believes that the proposition
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expressed by ‘the Earth does not orbit the Sun’ is true. Since this proposition
is false in the actual world, requiring the reflexivity of the epistemic accessibil-
ity relation means that at least one possibility that is consistent with ‘the Earth
does not orbit the Sun’ being false must be contained in the agent’s belief set,
thus effectively ruling out that the agent could fully believe a false proposition.
In other words, requiring the reflexivity of the epistemic accessibility relation
would only solve the problem of mistaken de se beliefs by removing altogether
the possibility of having mistaken beliefs.
Another way to solve the problem of mistaken de se beliefs, while getting around
the issues posed by reflexivity, would be to modify the condition of Proposi-
tionality. A possible amendment of this condition, which would exclude the
problematic cases discussed in this section, would be the following:
Definition 4 (R-Propositionality (2)). For any two centred worlds (w ,c), (w ,c ′) ∈
Ω, if (w ,c)R(w ,c ′) then c = c ′.
Definition 4 is a considerable strengthening of definition 2, as definition 4 re-
quires that all the centred worlds that are in Bel(w ,c) differ among themselves
with respect to their possible world component. Assuming that (w ,c) is the
centred world at which the agent is currently located, 4 also entails that one of
two conditions holds: either a) (w ,c) ∈ Bel(w ,c), so the actual centred world is
a ‘live possibility’ and is the only one contained in the agent’s belief state that
contains the actual world w ; or b) if (w ,c) ∉ Bel(w ,c), then every centred world
(w ′,c ′) that is contained in Bel(w ,c) does not have the actual world w as a com-
ponent. In other words, 4 ensures that the centred world at which the agent is
currently located is the only one that corresponds to the actual world w within
the agent’s current belief set.
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Like the requirement of reflexivity, this strengthened version of Propositional-
ity seems unwarranted for two main reasons. Firstly, it is hard not to see it as an
ad hoc adjustment, as the only motivation for requiring this stronger condition
would seem to be in order to avoid the problem of mistaken de se beliefs.
Even if this were not the case, though, the proposed modification of Proposi-
tionality would still be problematic, because it would entail that an agent who
has mistaken de se beliefs must always be mistaken about the objective fea-
tures of the world. In other words, it means that it is impossible for an agent
to mis-locate themselves within the actual world. Again, it is unclear why this
should be required, since by Non-deducibility it is assumed that de se beliefs
are further facts that are independent from an objective representation of what
the world is like.
4.5.3 Overlapping belief sets
Another problem that I wish to raise for Stalnaker’s framework concerns the
way in which it deals with the interaction between objective and de se uncer-
tainty. The worry here is that Propositionality, together with the way in which
the epistemic accessibility relation R is constructed, rule out the possibility
that the belief sets of two distinct individuals might contain a common ele-
ment. If this happens, then by Proposition 1, the two belief sets would have to
be identical. However, cases where two agents have belief sets that overlap –
but do not coincide – are both plausible and widespread. Moreover, Stalnaker’s
own framework and his analysis of examples of de se uncertainty seems to eas-
ily allow the construction of such cases.
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To illustrate this problem, I will use a modification of an example initially pro-
posed by Lewis (1979) and reprised several times by Stalnaker.21 Imagine that
there are two gods, inhabiting the same world, but one of the gods is located
on the highest mountain, while the other god is located on the coldest moun-
tain. Lewis (1979) originally argued that the two gods could both be omniscient
with respect to all the objective features of the world that they inhabit (thus
narrowing down the possibilities to the actual world w@) and at the same time
be ignorant about some de se information, so that despite their objective de
dicto omniscience, each god could be ignorant of their own location within
the world.
Lewis’s example of the two gods squarely contradicts Propositionality, and Stal-
naker’s reply has been to argue that the two gods cannot, in fact, be omniscient
if they lack some de se information. On Stalnaker’s analysis of the example,
each god is uncertain about which of two possible worlds is actual: one where
he himself is on the coldest mountain, or one where he himself is on the high-
est mountain. Contrary to what Lewis argued, according to Stalnaker these
must be understood as two distinct de dicto possibilities.
To support this conclusion, Stalnaker argues that the gods could identify the
god on each mountain by giving him a proper name – e.g., naming ‘Castor’
the god on the highest mountain, and ‘Pollux’ the god on the coldest moun-
tain. Suppose now that you are one of the gods, and you are uncertain about
whether you are on the highest mountain or on the coldest mountain. If you
were to learn that you are Castor, this would imply that you are on the high-
est mountain. So, on Stalnaker’s account your belief set can be represented as
Bel(w1,c) = {(w1,c), (w2, p)}, where w1 is the possible world where you are Cas-
tor and Castor is located on the highest mountain, and w2 is the possible world
where you are Pollux and Castor is located on the highest mountain. w1 and
21 See Stalnaker (2008, 2014, 2016)
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w2 count for Stalnaker as two distinct de dicto possibilities, because he thinks
‘I am Castor’ (or ‘I am Pollux’) also have de dicto content: they pick out the pos-
sible worlds where Castor (respectively, Pollux) is the god who has the same
token thoughts as you do at the time you utter the sentence.22
Your counterpart god, in both Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s versions of the example,
suffers from exactly the same uncertainty as you. What will his belief set be
like? Intuitively, the content of his belief set should be the same as the content
of your belief set, since both of you – by assumption – share the same proposi-
tional knowledge about the world23. As we assumed that you are Castor in the
actual world w1, this means that the other god must be Pollux and his belief
set will be Bel(w1,p) = {(w1, p), (w2,c)}. Note that the belief sets of the two gods,
as described, are mapped to the same ordinary proposition (the union of w1
and w2), but are disjoint. Both you and your godly counterpart are ignorant
of who you are, and also ignorant of which possible world is actual. This way
of analysing the example of the two gods satisfies Propositionality, since the
de se uncertainty about each god’s identity and location is mapped to ordinary
uncertainty between two possible world alternatives.
Stalnaker’s analysis of the two gods example, however, turns on the possibility
of performing two related things: first, it must be possible for the gods to intro-
duce proper names to designate objects in the world (including themselves).
Second, the assigned names must be part of the objective features of the world,
so that ‘Castor is the god on the highest mountain’ is an ordinary proposition
that is true at the actual world w1. However, these two things can come apart.
To see this, again suppose that you are one of the two gods, and you are uncer-
tain about whether you are the god on the highest mountain or the one on the
22 I will come back to this point later on in the discussion under §4.6.
23 Similarly to the Boris and Albert example, here we are assuming that the belief states of both
gods have the same ordinary propositional content, although they might differ with respect to
the de se information that they encode.
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coldest mountain. You name the god on the highest mountain ‘Castor’, and the
god on the coldest mountain ‘Pollux’. Your belief set, as before, can be repre-
sented as Bel(w1,c) = {(w1,c), (w2, p)}. In other words, as before, there is some
de se information that you lack (who you are and where you are located) that
can be mapped to your uncertainty about which of w1, w2 is the actual world.
But suppose now that your counterpart god takes a slightly different approach
to tackle his own uncertainty. He names himself ‘Pollux’, so the piece of de se in-
formation that concerns his own identity is fixed – he has no uncertainty about
his own identity, he just is ‘Pollux’. He is still ignorant about two objective possi-
bilities, namely whether Pollux is on the coldest mountain (w1), or Pollux is on
the highest mountain (w2). His belief set is Bel(w1,p) = {(w1, p), (w2, p)}. This
belief set satisfies Propositionality, and is consistent with Stalnaker’s treatment
of other examples.24
As can be seen in this case, both you and your counterpart god suffer from
some ordinary uncertainty – you are both ignorant about which of w1 and w2
is the actual world. However, in addition to this, only you lack the de se in-
formation regarding your own identity, because you do not know whether you
are Castor or Pollux. Both your belief sets are plausible and compatible with
Stalnaker’s account of de se uncertainty. However, they happen to be mutually
incompatible. This is because, under this analysis, Bel(w1,c) (your belief set)
and Bel(w1,p) (your counterpart’s belief set) have a common element, namely
(w2, p). By Proposition 1, however, if Bel(w1,c)∩Bel(w1,p) is not empty, the two
belief sets should be identical – which is not the case here, as they do not coin-
cide on the other elements.
The problem I have just raised appears to originate from the fact that the proper
names ‘Castor’ and ‘Pollux’ are introduced differently by you and by the other
24 See e.g. the discussion of the parking lot case in Stalnaker (2016). Moss (2012) also makes a
similar move in her treatment of de se uncertainty.
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god. On this version of the story, you have introduced a name via a definite
description (e.g. by saying ‘the god on the coldest mountain in named Pol-
lux’), while the other god has introduced his own name demonstratively (e.g.
by saying ‘let myself be named Pollux’, where ‘myself’ contextually picks out
the god who utters that sentence). Since the names are introduced differently,
we should not expect them to refer necessarily to the same individual. In other
words, to correctly pick out the referent of a proper name without ambiguities,
we must have an account of how it was introduced. This, however, is a problem
for Stalnaker’s account. The framework I have presented does not explicitly
mention linguistic notions (such as proper names or definite descriptions), but
is built around possible worlds and centres. The resulting extensional frame-
work is quite flexible, as in principle it is able to accommodate different ways
of individuating objects. This means that both ways of assigning proper names
that I have discussed in this section (demonstratively, or through a definite de-
scription) can be accommodated within Stalnaker’s framework. The problem
is that, in cases similar to the example of the two gods, different ways of as-
signing names can give rise to ambiguities. When that happens it is not clear
what proposition is the content of a given utterance. The name ‘Pollux’, for in-
stance, as we have seen is ambiguous: its referent could either be fixed by a def-
inite description (‘the god on the coldest mountain’) or demonstratively. The
extension of the de se belief ‘I am Pollux’ is a different set of centred worlds de-
pending on how the name Pollux is introduced – it contains the centred world
(w2, p) for one god (the one who fixes the name via a definite description), and
the centred worlds (w1, p) and (w2, p) for the other god (who demonstratively
names himself Pollux). This, as we have seen, leads to a violation of Propo-
sition 1. So, the very flexibility of Stalnaker’s framework – the fact that it can
formally accommodate different ways of fixing the referent of proper names –
leads to inconsistency.
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A possible response to the problem I have just raised may be to admit only one
way of fixing the reference of proper names – for instance, only allowing proper
names to be introduced demonstratively. There are several reasons why, in
my opinion, this would not be a satisfactory solution. In particular, as I have
noted above, the fact that Stalnaker’s framework is formulated in extensional
terms makes it in principle very flexible. However, allowing only one way of
introducing proper names would preemptively limit the applicability of the
framework. Moreover, alternative accounts of the content of de se beliefs do
not give rise to similar inconsistencies. The Lewisian account, in particular,
does not require us to define an epistemic accessibility relation over the set
of centred worlds, and it allows overlapping belief sets. This makes it more
suitable to accommodate examples such as that of the two gods that I have
discussed in this section.
4.5.4 Updating
The upshot of the discussion of maximal uncertainty in the previous section
brings up another issue for Stalnaker’s framework, concerning the way in which
it can be used to model how agents update their beliefs over time. As recalled in
section 4.2, compatibility with standard accounts of Bayesian updating is com-
monly regarded as a positive feature of the Weak Acceptance view.25 However,
if what I argued in the previous section is correct, this raises some problems
for the applicability of conditionalisation to belief sets.
In order to see where the problem lies, it will be useful to recall briefly how
belief updating is standardly formulated in a possible worlds framework, and
then examine how this extends to the centred worlds framework put forward
25 Moss (2012). I will have more to say on this topic in Chapter 6.
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by Stalnaker. So let’s begin by defining the basic terms in a standard possible
worlds framework to represent belief. Let W be a set of possible worlds, and
X ⊆ P (W ) be a set of propositions over which an agent a distributes her be-
liefs. Within this framework, propositions are simply viewed as sets of possible
worlds. A proposition x ∈ X is true if and only if the actual world w@ is one of
its elements.
Now let B0 be the set of all the ordinary possible worlds that are elements of
some proposition that a believes at stage t = 0. When a learns some new evi-
dence, in the form of some proposition x ∈ X that she now believes to be true,
she eliminates all the possibilities that are not consistent with x from her prior
belief set, thus making her new belief set at stage t = 1 equal to B1 ⊂ B0. A sim-
ilar process takes place when probabilities are involved, which is called con-
ditionalisation. The only difference is that in addition to eliminating the pos-
sibilities that are ruled out by the newly acquired evidence, probabilities are
redistributed among the surviving possibilities in a way that preserves the ra-
tios among them. But setting probabilities aside for the moment (we will come
back to them in Chapter 5), the key feature of the standard account of condi-
tionalisation is that this is an updating strategy which works in the following
way: given an initial belief set B0 and a new piece of evidence, in the form of a
learnt proposition x ∈ X , it returns a new belief set B1 ⊆B0, that is the subset of
the original belief set which includes all the possible worlds that are compati-
ble with x. In other words, on the standard picture, updating on new evidence
means refining the set of worlds considered possible, by excluding those that
are inconsistent with the evidence.
This feature of the standard account cannot be reproduced entirely under the
Weak Acceptance view of de se beliefs, at least without some further qualifica-
tions. This is because de se beliefs typically change over time in a way that is
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not compatible with conditionalisation.26 For example, while I presently hold
the de se belief that ‘I am now in London’, I did not hold this belief one month
ago, as I was traveling to Paris. The change in my de se beliefs between the time
when I was in Paris, and the present time when I am in London, is incompat-
ible with conditionalisation because the beliefs I hold now are not a subset of
the beliefs I held a month ago. Rather, some of my beliefs simply have been
replaced: namely, the belief ‘I am in Paris’ was replaced by the belief ‘I am in
London’.
The proponents of Weak Acceptance, however, argue that there is a way to re-
cover the standard notion of conditionalisation, to make it applicable to de se
beliefs. The idea is that at any given stage, the contents of an agent’s beliefs (in-
cluding all of his or her de se beliefs) are always equivalent to standard proposi-
tions. For example, my current de se belief that ‘I am in London’ is equivalent,
according to this view, to some standard proposition such as ‘Silvia is in Lon-
don on the 10th of May’. At the time I was in Paris, I may not have been sure
that the proposition ‘Silvia is in London on the 10th of May’ is, in fact true. But
I did regard it as a possibility, so my belief set at the time included possibili-
ties consistent with ‘Silvia is in London on the 10th of May’ being true. Come
the 10th of May, I acquire the evidence to conclude that ‘Silvia is in London
on the 10th of May’ is indeed true, eliminating all other possibilities from my
belief set. When viewed in terms of the equivalent standard propositions that
are believed by the agent at each time, the change in de se beliefs is therefore
analogous to updating based on conditionalisation.
On Stalnaker’s account, the idea I just described is cashed out more precisely
by specifying a procedure to associate de se beliefs with standard propositions,
or sets of possible worlds. As we have seen, within Stalnaker’s framework an
agent a’s belief set, encoding both the objective and de se beliefs held by the
26 I will have more to say on this topic in chapter 6.
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agent at any given point, is represented by a set of centred worlds Bel(w@,c),
where w@ is the actual world and c corresponds to a’s perspective on w@. The
definition of Propositionality (2) entails that each element of Bel(w@,c) is uniquely
associated with a possible world w . This, in turn, ensures that any subset s of
Bel(w@,c) can be mapped to a standard proposition x, that is the set of all the
possible worlds w that are associated to some element in s. Call any subsets s
of the agent’s belief set Bel(w@,c) a de se belief, and let S be the set of all possible
de se beliefs. Propositionality therefore entails that every de se belief has as a
content an ordinary proposition, or that there is a function f : S →P (W ) that
given any de se belief s ∈ S, outputs an ordinary proposition x ⊆W , which is
the content of s.
This gives us a precise way to state how belief sets can change according to con-
ditionalisation on Stalnaker’s framework. Let w1 be the possible world where
‘Silvia is in London on the 10th of May’ is true, and w2 be the possible world
where the same proposition is false. Suppose now that at t0, as I am in Paris,
my belief set is Bel(w1,t0) = {(w1, t0), (w2, t0)}. Bel(w1,t0) is equivalent to the stan-
dard proposition y = {w1, w2} (‘Either Silvia is in London on the 10th of May, or
she is not’). As I progress to t1, my belief set changes to Bel(w1,t1) = {(w1, t1)},
which is equivalent to the proposition x = {w1} (‘Silvia is in London on the 10th
of May’). The change in my beliefs, with respect to the standard propositions
that are mapped to my de se beliefs at t0 and t1, appears compatible with condi-
tionalisation. If we only look at the propositions that are mapped to my beliefs,
at t0 I believe the equivalent of proposition y , and at t1 I believe the equiva-
lent of propositions x, which is a subset of y . The additional evidence I have
learned between t0 and t1 allowed me to rule out the possibility that w2 is the
actual world.
Based on the discussion in the previous paragraphs, it therefore seems that
Stalnaker’s framework can successfully reproduce conditionalisation in the con-
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text of de se beliefs. In the remainder of this section, however, I will challenge
this solution. In a nutshell, the problem that I wish to raise is that Stalnaker’s
framework does not explain how agents come to have de se beliefs.
Consider again my earlier example, about my current de se belief that ‘I am
in London’ (s). Stalnaker’s account makes the content of this belief equivalent
to a standard proposition, such as ‘Silvia is in London on the 10th of May’ (x).
Stalnaker’s argument for saying that I come to believe s by applying condition-
alisation rests on the idea that the proposition I come to believe is x, and that
–for me– x at t1 implies s.
But how, exactly, does x imply s? We have seen that by the definition of Propo-
sitionality, s entails x, because x is the content of s. The converse, however,
does not hold in general, because the de se information expressed by s is not
reducible to ordinary propositional content. First of all, Non-deducibility (1)
explicitly excludes that x alone can entail s. And secondly, this can be eas-
ily checked by noting how other de se beliefs also entail x. For instance, let
s′ = {(w1, t0)} also entails x, even though s 6= s′. So if the only information that
is available amounts to x, this is compatible with (at least) two de se possibili-
ties, s and s′.
This leads us to the following dilemma. On the one hand, on Stalnaker’s ac-
count, the content of any de se belief is equivalent to a standard proposition,
given the agent’s current belief state. Propositionality ensures that, given any
belief state Bel(w ,c), every de se possibility within Bel(w ,c) is associated with a
unique possible world w . This makes it possible to view the change in beliefs
as new information is learned through the process of conditionalising on stan-
dard propositions. On the other hand, however, Propositionality (that is the
very same condition that enables the recovery of standard conditionalisation
for de se beliefs) undermines the possibility of learning de se beliefs. Moreover,
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it also undermines the very reasons that are often cited in favour of updating
beliefs by conditionalisation, as I will explain in a moment.
First, let us consider how the framework undermines the very possibility of
learning de se information. Consider again my earlier example concerning my
de se belief that ‘I am in London’, or s = {(w1, t1)}. As we have seen, the con-
tent of this de se belief corresponds, given my belief set at t1, to the proposition
‘Silvia is in London on the 10th of May’, or x = {w1}. At time t0, the same propo-
sition x corresponded to a different de se belief, namely s′ = {(w1, t0)}, about
which I was uncertain, given my belief state at t0. What changed between t0
and t1? I certainly haven’t learned that s′ is true, because by t1, s′ is simply no
longer part of my belief set. What I seem to have acquired is a new de se belief,
s.
This highlights a troubling feature of the framework proposed by Stalnaker: it
makes de se information unlearnable. And this is not just a feature of the ex-
ample I chose, but a systematic feature of the framework. To see why, consider
that in order for an agent to acquire any new beliefs via conditionalisation, it
is necessary that they receive some new piece of evidence. Call this new piece
of evidence E . The simple fact of receiving E alters the agent’s circumstances,
and is reflected in a change in the agent’s belief set. By Proposition 1, any two
belief sets Bel and Bel ′ must be either identical or disjoint. What this means
is that when I am uncertain about some de se information, Stalnaker’s frame-
work tells me that I cannot learn that de se information, because any piece of
evidence that I receive would simply change my belief set. All that can happen
is that my current belief set is replaced by a different one as I learn an addi-
tional piece of evidence about the world, and this leads me to form a different
set of de se beliefs.
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This, however, leads us to a second, more serious worry, which is that Proposi-
tionality might actually undermine the standard case for updating beliefs via
conditionalisation. Stalnaker’s framework has nothing to say about how an
agent’s belief state Bel changes over time. The way in which the epistemic ac-
cessibility relation R is defined induces belief sets corresponding to any of the
centred worlds that might correspond to an agent’s circumstances. The frame-
work, however, does not say where R comes from.
A standard defence of conditionalisation is that it is a conservative way to up-
date one’s beliefs upon learning some new information. What happens in Stal-
naker’s framework, however, is that belief sets are not merely updated, but are
completely replaced as the agent’s circumstances evolve. The way in which
this replacement takes place, moreover, does not appear to be guided by any
set of principles, as the definition of R is, as we have seen, exogenous to the
framework. This undermines the standard reasons given for conditionalisa-
tion, because it weakens the connection between an agent’s beliefs at different
times.
4.6 A T E N S I O N B E T W E E N N O N - D E D U C I B I L I T Y A N D P R O P O S I T I O N A L I T Y
The objections I raised in the previous section are primarily directed at the
details of the framework that Stalnaker proposes to model de se beliefs. This
raises the question of whether these issues can be fixed by modifying the de-
tails of the framework, or if they are instead symptomatic of deeper issues with
the Weak Acceptance position on de se beliefs. In this section, I argue that the
latter is the case. My argument aims to show that the two core assumptions
of Weak Acceptance generate a tension that is difficult to resolve without mak-
ing the position empirically meaningless. The argument that I present in this
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section uses only the informal version of the two core assumptions of Weak
Acceptance, discussed in Section 4.3:
Assumption 1 (Non-deducibility). De se information cannot be deduced from
a purely objective representation of the world. In particular, de se beliefs can-
not be deduced from a set of objective propositions (in the absence of any fur-
ther premises).
Assumption 2 (Propositionality). Uncertainty about de se information is al-
ways also uncertainty about the world.
A natural reading of 2 is as a conditional statement: if there is de se uncertainty
at all, then there is also objective uncertainty. In other words, Propositionality
entails that de se uncertainty implies objective uncertainty.
The converse of Propositionality, on the other hand, entails that whenever
there is no objective uncertainty about the world, there cannot be any de se un-
certainty, either. It is easy to check that the converse of Propositionality must
hold if Propositionality does. If it didn’t, there would be some cases where de se
uncertainty coexists with perfect information about the world, but this is ruled
out by 2.
The reason why proponents of Weak Acceptance introduce Propositionality is
that it ensures that de se uncertainty can always be reduced to objective un-
certainty. Whenever there is uncertainty about some de se information, by
Propositionality, the uncertain piece of de se information is always equivalent
to some piece of objective information. But this creates – at least prima facie
– a tension with Non-deducibility. By Assumption 1, de se information cannot
be deduced from objective information. So, on the one hand, Propositionality
implies that if an agent has all the objective information, they must also have
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all the de se information. But, on the other hand, Non-deducibility implies that
it is left open, when the objective information is known, which de se beliefs the
agent should have.
While this clearly indicates that there is a tension between the two core as-
sumptions of Weak Acceptance, this does not yet give rise to a contradiction be-
tween Propositionality and Non-deducibility. To see why, consider Stalnaker’s
own example of Boris and Albert. In that example, Stalnaker argues that both
agents are certain about the objective facts and, because they share the same
context, they both believe all the same propositions. Moreover, neither of them
experiences de se uncertainty – thus satisfying the condition of Propositional-
ity. However, the de se beliefs held by Boris are different from those held by
Albert and this, according to Stalnaker, shows that – in accordance with Non-
deducibility – their de se beliefs are not fixed by objective facts about the world.
However, even if (as Stalnaker’s example indicates) Propositionality and Non-
deducibility do not outright contradict each other, there are only two possible
ways to specify how de se and objective information can be related on the Weak
Acceptance view, and the first way leads to contradiction, while the second way
leads to an unsatisfactory explanation of de se beliefs. In the rest of this section,
I will now outline both horns of the dilemma.
Consider Boris’s de se belief that he himself is in the kitchen. Could Boris have
been uncertain about this de se piece of information? Intuitively, the answer to
this question seems to be yes. If Boris was uncertain about whether he was in
the kitchen or in the living room, for example, then by Propositionality there
would also be some objective information which Boris did not know for certain
– for instance, he might not have had the objective information that the indi-
vidual named Boris is in the kitchen. Call this missing objective information
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x, and call Boris’s de se belief that he is in the kitchen s. The question now is:
does x imply s for Boris?
Intuitively, again, the answer to whether x implies s for Boris appears to be
yes. If Boris didn’t know s, but was informed that x, he would presumably also
come to believe s. However, by Non-deducibility, we already know that x alone
does not entail s (and indeed, if the same information x was given to Albert,
we would not intuitively expect Albert to come to believe s). So, x entails s only
when taken together with some other prior belief that Boris already has (for
example, we may think that x together with the prior belief that ‘I am Boris’
entails s). Call this prior belief (that is necessary to entail s) ξ.
4.6.1 The first item of de se belief
Is ξ a belief about the world, or is it a de se belief? If ξ is a belief about the
world, then if x and ξ together entail s, it means that s can in fact be deduced
from a set of purely objective information (since both x and ξ are objective).
This would violate Non-deducibility. Therefore, ξ cannot be an objective belief
about the world. But if ξ is not objective, then – presumably, unless some fur-
ther category of beliefs should be presupposed – it must be a de se belief. This
reasoning highlights the fact that, on the Weak Acceptance view, the equiva-
lence between objective and de se information is necessarily mediated by the
presence of some background de se belief ξ, the presence of which ensures
that other de se beliefs are always entailed by objective beliefs, and vice versa.
The background belief ξ itself, however, could not be entailed by any objective
beliefs. If ξ was entailed by some objective belief y , this would again violate
Non-deducibility. And if ξ could be deduced from y together with some other
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de se belief, χ, then we could ask the same question about χ: is it or is it not
entailed by other facts? and so on indefinitely.
The problem, if ξ is not equivalent to any objective fact y , is that Propositional-
ity entails that ξ must be certain. In other words, there can be no uncertainty
about ξ, otherwise Propositionality would require that there must be some ob-
jective belief y that would entail ξ, because – by Stalnaker’s own lights – de
se uncertainty always entails de dicto uncertainty. If ξ must be certain, how-
ever, it is unclear that any de se belief with informational content (such as ‘I
am Boris’, or any piece of background de se information in the examples that
I have used in this chapter) could play the role of ξ. As soon as we specify an
informational content for ξ, it seems clear that an agent could plausibly not
know this informational content.27 For Stalnaker’s account to work, ξ needs to
be both indubitable and have a propositional content, so that it can be used
in inferences. However, there are instances where an agent could be uncertain
of every piece of de se information that could play this role. For example, if ξ
is equal to ‘I am Boris’ (in the case of our earlier example involving Boris’s de
se belief ‘I am in the kitchen’), it is plausible that Boris could, for some reason,
doubt that he himself is the individual who is named that way (for instance, he
could have forgotten his own name, or be unaware of the name others use to
refer to himself).
In order to find a suitable candidate for ξ, Stalnaker (2008, 2016) proposes that
we use a token reflexive belief, such as ‘I am thinking this thought’ (ξ∗), where
‘this thought’ is taken to refer to the token thought that the agent in question
has at the moment he or she reflects on his or her beliefs. According to Stal-
naker, anyone entertaining ξ∗ cannot doubt its truth, and must therefore be
certain of ξ∗. Moreover, he argues that ξ∗ has some informational content,
namely it conveys the information that ‘This thought occurs’. So, ξ∗ can be
27 This, I take it, is the same conclusion also reached by Perry (1979).
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used to make inferences; for example from ξ∗ and ‘This thought is thought by
Boris in the kitchen’, one can infer that ‘I am Boris and I am in the kitchen’.
The appeal to token reflexive beliefs to give a foundation to his account of de se
beliefs raises some metaphysical issues for Stalnaker. In particular, the appeal
to this kind of beliefs commits him to haecceitism, which is the view that the
world could differ non-qualitatively without differing qualitatively. For exam-
ple, two possible worlds w , w ′ could be identical in all qualitative respects, but
still be numerically distinct. While Stalnaker would accept this consequence,28
haecceitism is far from being an uncontroversial view. But even leaving these
issues aside – as a proper discussion of the metaphysical commitments of Stal-
naker’s view would go beyond the scope of this chapter – token-reflexive beliefs
such as ξ∗ still do not provide a solid foundation for Weak Acceptance, due to
another set of problems. In a nutshell, the issue is that such beliefs are indu-
bitable only in so far as their content is context-dependent, but in order to be
used in inferences they need to have content that is context-independent.
To illustrate, let ξ∗ be ‘I am thinking this thought’. Intuitively, as Stalnaker
points out, ξ∗ is certain, as any agent entertaining ξ∗ could not doubt that it
is true, of themselves at that time, that they are thinking the thought they are
thinking. The specific content of ξ∗ seems to depend on the context in which
it is entertained, as ‘this thought’ refers to different token-thoughts depending
on the specific circumstances – for example, ‘this thought’ will pick out a differ-
ent token depending on the identity of the agent thinking the thought, but also
the time and place at which the thought is entertained. However, if the content
of ξ∗ depends on the context, then it cannot be generally used in inferences in
the way that is necessary for the Weak Acceptance account to work. To see why,
consider again the example of the two gods. Suppose that Castor is uncertain
about whether he is the god on the highest mountain, or the god on the cold-
28 Stalnaker defends a version of haecceitism in Stalnaker (2008).
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est mountain. Now, following Stalnaker’s strategy, we can be sure that Castor
has the de se belief ‘I am thinking this thought’ (ξ∗). Is it possible for him to
now learn that ‘this thought’ is located on the highest mountain? If he were
to learn any new information, the thought he would be then thinking would
be a different thought from the one he was thinking at the time he originally
entertained the belief ξ∗. Therefore, if the content of ξ∗ is partially determined
by the context, it does not offer a base for inferences, because while the belief
ξ∗ is indubitable at the time it is entertained, its content isn’t fixed across the
inference.
To contrast this issue, Stalnaker can require that the content of ξ∗ is fixed and
does not change with the context. What this means is that once the thought
is entertained, ‘this thought’ picks out a specific token thought – and the ref-
erence is fixed for the future, so that ‘this thought’ always refers to the same
token, and thus the content of ξ∗ is mapped to an ordinary proposition, which
is context-independent. However, this second strategy also runs into prob-
lems. While the belief ‘I am thinking this thought’ is indeed indubitable for
any thinker entertaining it, once we map it to a proposition that is not formu-
lated in the present tense – as Stalnaker’s solution would require29 – it loses
this aura of indubitability. In other words, as the context changes, the original
content of ξ∗ is no longer indubitable – Castor could mis-remember what he
had thought, or be forgetful, or mistake his own past thoughts for those of the
other god. Therefore, even if the content of ξ∗ is context-independent – as is
required in order to be used in inferences – it cannot provide the link between
propositional and de se belief because it is not always indubitable.
29 See also Moss (2012).
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4.6.2 Discussion
In this section, I have raised a general problem for Weak Acceptance. The prob-
lem, I argued, stems from the fact that the two core assumptions of Weak Ac-
ceptance, namely Non-deducibility of de se beliefs, and Propositionality, stand
at odds with each other. The only way in which they can be made consistent,
is by positing that agents always have some background belief, ξ, which makes
it possible to establish a link between the agent’s other de se beliefs and ob-
jective beliefs about the world. The difficulty is that ξ cannot be an objective
belief (on pain of contradicting Non-deducibility), but if it is a de se belief, then
it must be certain. However, this also seems to imply that ξ cannot have infor-
mational content, which begs the question of how it can be used to underpin
the equivalence of de se and objective beliefs. So, if Weak Acceptance is to be
rescued, it would be necessary to find a candidate for ξ that is both certain and
has informational content. Stalnaker’s strategy of using token-reflexive beliefs,
such as ‘I am thinking this thought’ – did not ultimately work.
If Stalnaker’s proposal does not succeed in solving the problem I raised in the
previous section, then we should consider that Weak Acceptance does not give
an adequate account of de se beliefs. What are the alternatives? As recalled in
Section 4.1, there are two other alternatives to Weak Acceptance. As I already
argued against Denial, Strong Acceptance survives as a plausible remaining
option. Strong Acceptance endorses Non-deducibility, but it does not endorse
Propositionality. This means that there is no requirement, under Strong Accep-
tance, that de se information must always be mapped to some objective infor-
mation. In particular, there is no requirement that if an agent is certain about
his or her own objective beliefs, he or she must not have any de se uncertainty.
Thus, Strong Acceptance sidesteps the tension I have described between the
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two core assumptions of Weak Acceptance, by endorsing the first, bur reject-
ing the second.
4.7 C O N C L U S I O N
In this chapter, I have considered the Weak Acceptance view of de se beliefs.
First, in Section 4.1 I presented three possible alternative views about de se
beliefs, which I named the Denial, Weak Acceptance and Strong Acceptance
views. Weak Acceptance has been the main focus for this chapter (Section
4.2). In Section 4.3, I have identified the two core assumptions that under-
lie Weak Acceptance, and explained why the combination of Non-deducibility
and Propositionality makes for a prima facie attractive solution to the prob-
lem of de se beliefs. Section 4.4 was then devoted to a detailed discussion of
the framework proposed by Stalnaker to model de se beliefs, and raised some
objections to this framework. Next, in Section 4.6 I raised a more general objec-
tion to Weak Acceptance, that is only presupposed on the tension between its
two core assumptions. I showed that there is no way for Weak Acceptance to
resolve the tension without either generating an inconsistency between Non-
deducibility and Propositionality, or running into the problem that no item of
belief can function as the required link between de se and ordinary proposi-
tional beliefs in all contexts.
Based on the issues discussed in this chapter, I believe that despite the initial
attractions Weak Acceptance is not a tenable position and does not offer an
adequate solution to the problem of de se beliefs. For this reason, Strong Ac-
ceptance emerges as the best way to account for de se beliefs.
5
C E N T R E D P R O B A B I L I T Y
In previous chapters, I have introduced centred worlds as a framework to rep-
resent de se or self-locating beliefs. This chapter reviews how probabilities can
be defined on centred worlds to model uncertain de se beliefs, and then consid-
ers which interpretations of probability are available when we consider event
spaces defined over centred worlds. Intuitively, one might expect that the sub-
jective interpretation of probability would provide the most natural interpreta-
tion for probabilities defined over sets of centred worlds. However, as we will
see, all the main interpretations of probability currently available in the litera-
ture admit an extension to centred probabilities. Moreover, somewhat surpris-
ingly, centred probabilities pose a serious issue to the diachronic aspect of the
subjective interpretation.
As we have seen in previous chapters, centred worlds may be used to capture
self-locating uncertainty in different contexts, as the following two examples
illustrate:
Example 1. Disturbing bell The town where Ann lives has a bell that sounds
twice every morning at 3am and at 4am. Every time it sounds, Ann hears it and
just goes back to sleep, forgetting all about it.
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When Ann wakes up, knowing that the bell sounds twice and that she always
forgets about hearing it after going back to sleep, what should her beliefs be
regarding what time it is?
Example 2. Map Tom is lost in a new town and can’t find his exact position
on the map. His surroundings appear to be compatible with two possible loca-
tions. What should Tom’s beliefs be with respect to his current location?
Both examples present cases where an agent knows the relevant objective prop-
erties of the world (represented by the awareness of the bell setup in 1 and by
the map in 2), but there are different possible locations (in time or in space) at
which they might take themselves to be located. In previous chapters, I have
defended the view that self-locating uncertainty is not reducible to non-self-
locating uncertainty, and argued that centred worlds are the right framework
to model it. Now, I will proceed to define probabilities over centred worlds.
5.1 F O R M A L B A C K G R O U N D
This section briefly introduces the formal background to which I will refer in
the following sections. I will first outline the axioms of probability given by
Kolmogorov (1933), which constitute the standard mathematical treatment of
probability. I will then introduce the notion of centred and uncentred events.
Given a non-empty set Ω, which can be taken to represent all relevant possi-
bilities, an algebra S on Ω is a set of subsets of Ω, which contains Ω and is
closed under complementation and union. For example, if Ω = {x, y , z}, then
S = {{x}, {y , z}, {x, y , z},;} is an algebra onΩ.
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Kolmogorov defines probability as a function p from S to the real numbers,
which obeys three axioms:
Axiom 1 (Non-negativity). For all A ∈ S, p(A)≥ 0.
Axiom 2 (Normalisation). p(Ω)= 1.
Axiom 3 (Additivity). For all A, B ∈ S such that A∩B =;, p(A∪B)= p(A)+p(B).
In addition to Non-negativity, Normalisation and Additivity, Kolmogorov gives
the following definition of the conditional probability of an event B , given an-
other event A:
Definition 5 (Conditional probability). For all B , A ∈ S, p(B |A) = p(B∩A)p(A) (as-
suming p(A)> 0).
This definition of conditional probability, also known as the Ratio formula for
conditional probability, is considered standard and will be assumed in this
chapter.30 Importantly, the ratio formula for conditional probability is not ap-
plicable when p(A)= 0, in which case the conditional probability of any event
given A is left undefined.
In applications of probability theory, the set of possibilities can be identified
with different objects depending on the context. In the case of ‘ordinary’ possi-
ble worlds, this coincides with the set W of all possible worlds. An event E ⊆W
is defined as a set of possible worlds. Since the set of all events S forms an al-
gebra on W in the sense explained above, a probability function obeying the
three probability axioms can be defined on S.
30 Some authors have been critical of this definition of conditional probability, arguing instead
that conditional probability should be taken as a primitive binary function. (See Popper, 1959a;
Hájek, 2003).
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Centred worlds represent an extension of ordinary possible worlds in the fol-
lowing sense. In addition to encoding information about the world, a centred
world picks out a specific location within that world. Given the set of possible
worlds W and a set of all possible centres C , a centred world (w ,c) is defined
as an ordered pair of a possible world w ∈W and a centre c ∈C . Based on this
definition, the set of all possible centred worlds, which will be denoted Ω, is a
subset of the Cartesian product W ×C .31
A centred event E∗ is defined as a set of centred worlds and S∗ is the set of all
centred events. Since S∗ forms an algebra on Ω, a probability function can be
defined on S∗, analogously to the previous case.
In what follows, we will be interested in the relationship between probabili-
ties defined on centred and uncentred (or ‘ordinary’) possible worlds. Centred
events represent more fine-grained possibilities than events defined on ordi-
nary possible worlds, which are not able to capture information about specific
locations within a world or set of worlds. The following condition expresses an
important relationship between centred and ordinary events (that is, events
defined on the set W of ordinary possible worlds):
Definition 6 (Correspondence). For any ordinary event E ⊆W , we can define
the corresponding centred event E∗ = E×C , which is equal to the set of centred
worlds (w ,c) ∈Ω such that w ∈ E and c ∈C .
Correspondence ensures that for every ordinary event E ∈ W , there exists a
centred event E∗ ∈ Ω that has the property that it contains all the centred
worlds which coincide on w , for all w ∈ E . When this is the case, we’ll say
that E∗ corresponds to E . The converse does not hold, as there may be several
centred events that do not correspond to any uncentred event.
31 Note that since not all centres may be present within each possible world, this definition does
not require that all possible combinations of a world and a centre belong toΩ.
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Building on definition 6, we can now also define the class of uncentred events
defined on the finer-grained setΩ:
Definition 7 (Uncentred event). E∗ ∈Ω is uncentred if and only if there is E ∈
W such that E∗ corresponds to E .
In other words, according to definition 7, an uncentred event is just a centred
event (that is, an event defined onΩ) that corresponds (in the sense set out by
definition 2) to an ordinary event. Another type of centred events that will be
of interest to us is what I will call an indexical event:
Definition 8 (Indexical event). E∗ ∈Ω is indexical if for all w , w ′ ∈W and for
all c ∈C such that (w ,c), (w ′,c) ∈Ω, (w ,c) ∈ E∗ if and only if (w ′,c) ∈ E∗.
Whereas an uncentred event represents a condition of maximal uncertainty
with respect to c, an indexical event corresponds to a condition of maximal
uncertainty with respect to w .
5.2 I N T E R P R E TAT I O N S O F P R O B A B I L I T Y
Imagine a coin that is just about to be tossed. Intuitively, we may think that
the probability that the coin will come up Heads is 1/2. But what exactly does
this statement mean? In other words, what is a probability and how can it be
assigned to specific events? Different interpretations of probability offer differ-
ent answers to these basic questions. This section gives a survey of the main in-
terpretations that have been put forward in the literature, which fall into three
main types: logical, objective, and subjective. But before introducing them, it
will be useful to state some criteria that can be used to evaluate their adequacy.
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5.2.1 Criteria of adequacy
Following Hájek (2012), we can identify three broad criteria of adequacy for an
interpretation of probability.
The first criterion is Admissibility. According to this criterion any proposed in-
terpretation of probability should be compatible with the mathematical treat-
ment of probability, which was reviewed in the last section. If a proposed inter-
pretation of probability is not compatible with the three Kolmogorov axioms
of probability, we will say that it is inadmissible.
The second criterion is Ascertainability. This requires that an interpretation
should admit that we could, at least in principle, find out what the correct prob-
abilities are. Hájek points out that specifying what ‘in principle’ means could
be quite tricky; we will set this issue aside for the moment.
Finally, Applicability is the requirement that an interpretation of probability
should be useful to explain our intuitive concept of probability in different ar-
eas where it seems appropriate to apply it. Firstly, it should make sense of
the intuition that some events have intermediate probability values. Secondly,
probabilities are used in a wide variety of contexts: among other things, they
can be used to describe the likelihood of precipitation in London tomorrow
afternoon, the chance of drawing an Ace from a deck of 54 cards, the even-
tuality that an uranium atom will decay within a certain time, how likely it is
that Jones will catch a cold after walking in the rain all afternoon, the statistical
incidence of car accidents on weekends, and so on.
All these examples pick out seemingly very different phenomena. An adequate
interpretation of probability should explain how probabilities relate to each
of these. For Hájek, this idea could be formulated as a cluster of sub-criteria:
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applicability to frequencies (it should inform our understanding of the rela-
tionship between probabilities and frequencies); applicability to rational belief
(it should say something about the relationship between probabilities and ra-
tional beliefs); applicability to ampliative inference (it should explain the role
played by probabilities in evidential support relationships); and applicability
to science (it should explain how probabilities figure in scientific theories).
5.2.2 Logical probability
Logical interpretations view probabilities as proportions within a possibility
space. Probabilities can be assigned to events in the absence of empirical in-
formation, as they basically encode logical or evidential support relationships
that exist between events within a given space of possibilities. Each basic pos-
sibility wi is assigned a mass of value m(wi ), such that m(wi ) > 0 for at least
some wi ∈W . The function m will be called a probability mass function.
A probability mass function only assigns a weight to the basic possibilities, so
to get a fully fledged probability function we need to extend it to all the possible
events. To achieve this, note that m induces a function m∗ on the set of all
events E ⊆ W which, according to the logical interpretation, represents the
probability of E . To be more precise, the probability p(E) of an event E ⊆W ,
which is equal to m∗(E), is given by the proportion between the sum total of
m-weighted elements of E and the sum total of m-weighted elements of W .32
Formally:
32 In this chapter, I am restricting the discussion to finite possibility spaces, i.e. where the set W is
finite. However, it should be noted that summation does not work when W is uncountably infi-
nite. In that case, we need to integrate rather than add the basic possibilities, or use measures
in general.
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w j∈W m(w j )
.
So defined, m∗ satisfies all three axioms of probability and provides an admis-
sible interpretation of probability.
In the absence of external constraints, there are in principle an infinite number
of possible specifications of the weight function m. The two main Logical in-
terpretations of probability differ in the way they specify how to pick a specific
m.
According to what is known as the Classical interpretation,33 if all the elements
wi of W appear equally possible, or in other words if we don’t have any reason
to discriminate between them, they should receive an equal weight.34 In par-
ticular, it seems natural to stipulate that each element w of W has a weight of
1. The value of the weighted sums in Definition 5 then becomes equivalent to
the cardinalities of E and W . Definition 6 can therefore be simplified for the
Classical interpretation as follows:
Definition 10 (Classical probability).
m∗(E)= |E ||W | .
We can illustrate how the Classical interpretation works with our simple coin
toss example. Here, there seem to be two possible cases: either the coin toss
33 The name derives from the fact that it was historically the first to be proposed. A formulation of
this interpretation of probability can be found in the work of Laplace.
34 In the case of a finite W , this idea is expressed by what is known as the Principle of Indifference
(PI), which tells us that when we have no external reasons to discriminate between all the ele-
ments of W , we should assign equal probabilities to each of them. The same idea is generalised
to the case where W is countably infinite by the Principle of Maximum Entropy.
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comes up Heads, or it comes up Tails. Since both cases are possible and there is
no apparent reason to discriminate between them, the Classical interpretation
of probability tells us that they should receive an equal weight. By applying the
definition of Classical probability, we then get m∗(Head s)= |{Head s}||{Head s,Tai l s}| = 12 .
The Classical interpretation seems to work well in our simple coin toss exam-
ple, where it delivers the intuitively right result. However, in some situations
it is not possible, or at least intuitively plausible, to assign equal weights to all
the basic possibilities. To illustrate this point, we can go back to our coin toss
example, but consider now the additional possibility that the coin toss lands
on the edge and amend our model by defining W as containing three elements,
namely Head s, Tai l s and E d g e. Since these are clearly distinct possibilities, a
quick application of the Classical interpretation would assign an equal weight
to each. However, at least if we assume that the coin is tossed under normal
conditions, it clearly seems that E d g e is extremely unlikely to occur, so we
wouldn’t be justified in treating it as equal to Head s and Tai l s.
This simple example highlights a problem for the Classical interpretation of
probability: whenever an equal assignment of weights to the elements of W
does not appear to be justified, the Classical interpretation cannot be reason-
ably applied. More generally, the probabilities assigned by the Classical inter-
pretation will not be invariant under redescriptions of the underlying basic
cases.35
This problem of applicability is solved by what I will call Generalised Logical
interpretations of probability,36 which allow the weight function m to assign
unequal weights to the elements of W .
35 For simplicity, the discussion of this chapter is limited to the case where W is finite. However,
the points made remain valid when the space of possibilities is infinite. When W is not finite, ad-
ditional problems of underdetermination for the Logical interpretation arise, as demonstrated
by the well-known ‘Bertrand paradox’ cases.
36 This is usually called the Logical interpretation. I add the qualifier ‘Generalised’ to distinguish
it from the class of interpretations under which it falls.
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As noted above, there are still an infinite number of candidates for m and each
specification of m gives rise to a different Generalised Logical interpretation.
Any choice of m ought to be justified on the basis of some principle, which sets
out an a priori method to determine m(wi ) for all the elements of W . Carnap
(1950), the main proponent of this type of interpretation of probability, gives
some principles of regularity based on the symmetries that can be traced in the
linguistic descriptions of the elements of W . This strategy, however, gives rise
to some worries. In particular, the resulting probability assignments will vary
depending on the particular choice of language used to formulate the descrip-
tions, limiting the applicability of this type of interpretations. If the principles
and the language chosen to formulate the descriptions are not independently
justified, the risk is that any choice of a particular m would be arbitrary.
In conclusion, according to Logical interpretations, probabilities can be deter-
mined a priori from the structure of the set of all possibilities W . The proba-
bility of an event E ⊆W is given by a weighted proportion between the cases
included in E and the total cases in W , as specified by Definition 9. How do
Logical interpretations fare with respect to the criteria of adequacy outlined
in §5.2.1? Both the Classical and the Generalised Logical interpretations are
admissible and ascertainable, as long as the set W is given and m is correctly
specified. However, they appear to raise some issues with respect to the crite-
rion of applicability. In the case of the Classical interpretation, the problems
arise with the fact that it is not always reasonable to assign equal weights to
the elements of W , and that probability assignments given by this interpreta-
tion are not invariant under redescriptions of the basic cases. In the case of
the Generalised Logical interpretations, the main problem seems to be the ar-
bitrariness in the specification of m.
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5.2.3 Objective probability
According to Objective interpretations of probability, the probability of an event
E is just the objective chance that E will happen. Objective chances, in turn,
are facts about the world that are fixed independently of anyone believing
them and the language used to model a specific situation. This characteristic
conceptually sets Objective probabilities apart from the Subjective and Logical
interpretations.
Formally, we can represent objective chances as a function ch that assigns to
each event E ⊆W a real number. Objective interpretations make the claim that
the probability of an event E will just be equal to its objective chance; formally:
Definition 11 (Objective probability).
p(E)= ch(E).
The above definition places no constraint on the specification of ch and is
therefore not very informative until something more is said about what ch is
and how it can be determined. Different types of Objective interpretations dif-
fer in the way that they handle this task.
The Frequentist interpretation of probability identifies the objective chance
of an event E with the relative frequency with which E occurs within a suitable
reference class. To illustrate how this works, we can again go back to our simple
coin toss example, and imagine that we are about to perform a toss. What
is the chance that it will come up Heads? This chance experiment involves
two possible outcomes, so we can model it using the set of possible worlds
W = {Head s,Tai l s}. According to the Frequency interpretation, ch(Head s)
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should be determined relative to a reference class. A natural way to identify
the appropriate reference class in this case is to take a series of runs of the
same type of experiment, that is a sequence of coin tosses.37
At this point, there are two ways in which a frequentist could go. A first pos-
sibility is to take as the reference class an actual sequence of observed coin
tosses (see Venn, 1876). This strategy has the advantage of being admissible
and empirically ascertainable, but it generates some problematic results. One
problem is that actual frequencies can only be defined for event types (that is,
events that could be multiply realised over time: in our example, the type of
coin toss experiments), but often times we want to give chances to singular –
or token – events (in our example, we might be interested in the chance that
a particular coin toss will result in heads). This is known as the ‘problem of
the single case’. Another problem is that even if we are only dealing with type
events, the probability of a type event that will only start happening in the fu-
ture is undefined. For example, we might want to give the chance that coin
tosses performed with a coin that will be minted tomorrow will result in heads.
We cannot presently give any chance to this event type, because no instances
have been recorded yet.
Another possibility for the frequentist is to take the limiting frequency of an
event within a hypothetical reference class. On this approach, the objective
chance of Heads is identified with the limiting frequency of its occurrence if
the coin was tossed infinitely many times. Since the reference class in this case
is fixed independently of the observed coin tosses, this approach appears to
solve the problem of the single case (see Reichenbach, 1949; von Mises, 1957).
37 Strictly speaking, possible worlds would have to represent complete histories, which are se-
quences of coin tosses in our simple example. In order to identify possible worlds with out-
comes of individual coin tosses, I am making an important simplification here, treating each
repetition of the coin-tossing experiment as a complete ‘history’. The collection of all these
individual histories constitutes the reference class for the probability of the coin toss landing
Heads.
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However, hypothetical limiting frequencies also raise issues on other levels.
Probably the most relevant one is what is known as the ‘problem of the initial
sequence’. When working with hypothetical frequencies, the reference class is
an infinite series of coin tosses. But this seems to place too little constraints on
actual observations of repeated coin tosses: assuming that the coin is not com-
pletely biased against Heads or Tails (so that both outcomes have a positive
chance of occurring, of whatever value), then any observed sequence of out-
comes is compatible with any assignment of probability to Heads. Suppose
that we tossed the coin one hundred times, and it landed Heads exactly 53
times. This observation would in principle be consistent with the coin hav-
ing an objective chance ch(Head s)= .5 of landing Heads, but it would also be
consistent with ch(Head s)= .6, or even ch(Head s)= .1.
To see this, consider that the hypothetical reference class includes infinite coin
tosses. If there is a positive probability that the coin lands Heads on some of
the trials, then there will be an infinite number of trials on which it lands Heads
within that reference class. When a subset of the infinite reference class is ob-
served, it could in principle come from any section of the infinite hypotheti-
cal sequence. Since we should expect any possible combination of Heads and
Tails to occur at some point within the infinite hypothetical sequence, the ob-
servation would not place any constraint on the limiting relative frequency of
Heads versus Tails. In other words, the ‘initial sequence’ that is observed is
compatible with any assignment of probabilities to Heads and Tails; empirical
observations do not place any constraints on the hypothetical limiting frequen-
cies. On the hypothetical frequency approach, therefore, the objective chance
of an event seems to be independent of what might intuitively be seen as rele-
vant empirical observations.
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Hypothetical frequencies pass the test of applicability and admissibility.38 Due
to the problem of the initial sequence, hypothetical frequencies are not ascer-
tainable, because on this approach empirical observations almost never con-
strain objective chances.
For the reasons I have mentioned, it seems problematic to identify objective
chances with frequencies (either finite or limiting). However, this is not to say
that frequencies bear no relationship to probabilities and objective chances
in particular. Even if we accepted that relative frequencies do not constitute
objective probabilities, they could still be taken to indicate them.
Another explanation of the nature of objective chance is given by what is called
the Propensity interpretation of probability (Popper, 1959b). According to this
interpretation, ch expresses the intrinsic tendency (or propensity) of a given
situation or physical setup to give rise to a certain outcome. In the coin toss
example, ch(Head s) equals the tendency of the specific coin, tossed under
normal conditions, to land on Heads.
The Propensity interpretation seems to give a meaningful answer to the ques-
tion of what is objective chance, but the worry is that it is doing so by positing
a metaphysically mysterious property. The main problem with the Propensity
interpretation is that it is unclear just what propensities are and how they can
be determined, which seems to limit the applicability of this interpretation. If
propensities are a type of physical property, they should be measurable, but it
is unclear what sort of instrument could be used to accomplish this task. This
is problematic with respect to the ascertainability criterion.
At this point, the strengths and weaknesses of the Frequency and the Propen-
sity interpretations may appear to be in some sense complementary. The Propen-
38 To be precise, since hypothetical limiting frequencies are defined on infinite reference classes,
in order to pass the test for admissibility Axiom 3 (Additivity) needs to be reformulated to com-
prise countable additivity.
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sity interpretation gives some content to objective chances, but it doesn’t pro-
vide a clear indication of how to determine them in practice. Relative frequen-
cies, on the other hand, don’t seem to be a good candidates to be identified
with objective chances, but they do seem to be a manifestation of them and
could therefore be taken to indicate or estimate the underlying objective chances.
A third type of Objective interpretation of probability, the so-called Best-system
interpretation, to some extent combines these insights.
According to the Best-system interpretation, objective chances are determined
by the laws of nature. In other words, ch(E) is the probability assigned to E by
the laws of nature, which in turn are the theorems of the best scientific theory
available to us. With this in mind, a proponent of the Best-system interpreta-
tion may adopt a functionalist view about objective chance. On this view, there
are some properties that characterise objective chance; a probability function
p therefore counts as objective chance just in case it satisfies those properties.
List and Pivato (2015), building on Shaffer (2007) and Glynn (2010), offer a list
of six properties that characterise objective chance and show that these are sat-
isfiable within a framework where probabilities are assigned to ordinary possi-
ble worlds.39 These six properties concern the relationship between objective
chance and other key properties, linking it to precise notions of possibility, con-
tingency, belief, time, causation, the laws of nature and the intrinsic properties
of a given context.
This functionalist approach makes objective chance both admissible and ap-
plicable. There is some controversy about how to determine what scientific
theory is the best, which seems to pose an issue with respect to the criterion
of ascertainability. But setting this problem aside, the Best-system interpreta-
tion, with the functionalist approach, appears successful in solving the prob-
39 In their framework, possible worlds are equivalent to complete histories.
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lems that affect the frequency and propensity interpretations, while retaining
their main features. In particular, it makes sense of the relationship between
relative frequencies and chances, and can be used to explain the link between
Objective and Subjective probabilities.
5.2.4 Subjective probability
While the Logical and Objective interpretations view probabilities as proper-
ties of events, the subjective interpretation is concerned with the degrees of
belief that agents assign to propositions corresponding to different events. On
a Subjective interpretation, the probability of an event E is the degree of belief
or credence cr (E) that an agent i has in the possibility that E occurs. Formally:
Definition 12 (Subjective probability).
p(E)= cri (E).
As in the case of ch in the context of Objective interpretations, Definition 8
is relatively broad and needs to be supplemented with an account of cr that
specifies its properties and how it can be determined. In particular, we will
need to specify the agent who holds the beliefs and the characteristics of those
beliefs. There are different analyses of Subjective probability that vary accord-
ing to how they specify both points.
One approach is to take the beliefs of an actual agent. On this unconstrained
subjectivist approach, the probability of an event E , for an actual agent i should
be understood as the actual degree of belief that i assigns to E . There are vari-
ous ways in which one could try to implement this approach: for example, one
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might identify an agent’s degree of belief on a proposition p with the odds that
they would be prepared to take for a bet on p.
A first problem with the unconstrained subjectivist view is that there is no guar-
antee that cr will be admissible. In fact, most of the time actual agents hold be-
liefs that could not be mathematically represented by a probability function,
because they violate the axioms of probability (see Staffel, 2015). Moreover,
even assuming that the credences of actual agents were somehow ascertain-
able and admissible, this approach does not seem to offer much in terms of
applicability: probability assignments will always be descriptive claims that
are relative to actual agents, with no criterion to asses their applicability to
other domains.
A second approach solves this problem by taking the beliefs of a rational agent.
According to the B ayesi an version of subjective probability, this means two
things in particular: that the agent’s credences should conform to the prob-
ability calculus; and that they should be updated in accordance to a specific
rule over time as new information is learned.
The first thesis places a synchronic constraint on cr , and it is known as proba-
bilism. Since probabilism does not seem to be a descriptively accurate thesis,
the arguments usually given by Bayesians to justify it point to its normative im-
port.40 Pragmatic arguments establish that if cr does not conform to the prob-
ability calculus, the agent is liable to behave irrationally. In particular, Dutch
Book arguments show that if an agent has non-probabilistic credences, he will
be disposed to accept as fair a set of bets that guarantees him a sure loss (see de
Finetti, 1937; Hájek, 2008). Moreover, representation theorems show that if an
agent exhibits coherent preferences between actions that have uncertain con-
40 See (Titelbaum, 2016a) for a discussion of justifications of probabilism.
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sequences, his credences can be represented by a probability function (Savage
(1954); Ramsey (1931); Jeffrey (1983)).
In addition to the pragmatic arguments, probabilism has also been defended
on purely epistemic grounds using accuracy arguments. The aim of credences
seems to be to approximate as closely as possible the truth; if we measure their
accuracy using a class of particularly appealing rules, called ‘proper’ scoring
rules, Joyce (1998) has shown that only credences that obey the probability
calculus maximise accuracy.
The second Bayesian thesis places a diachronic constraint on how cr changes
over time, and the rule that is generally advocated is known as conditionalisa-
tion. This rule states that the agent’s degree of belief in event E at time t2, after
learning a proposition X , should be equal to her conditional degree of belief
in E given X at t1 (provided that at t1 the agent’s degree of belief in E is not 0).
Formally:
Definition 13 (Conditionalisation).
cri ,t2 (E)= cri ,t1 (E |X ).
The arguments offered to justify conditionalisation are similar in spirit to the
ones for probabilism. ‘Dutch Strategy’ arguments show that, if an agent does
not update his beliefs via conditionalisation, he is vulnerable to accepting a
series of individual bets which he will judge as fair in succession, but which
will guarantee him a sure loss on the whole (see Lewis, 1999).41
‘Orthodox’ Bayesians place no further constrains on cr apart from probabilism
and conditionalisation. This means that agents who share the same evidence
41 An epistemic argument for conditionalisation based on accuracy is also given by Greaves and
Wallace (2006).
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about the world could in principle have different credence functions. As long
as each has probabilistic credences and updates them via conditionalisation,
they all represent valid interpretations of probability.
So-called ‘objective’ Bayesians, however, have pointed out that epistemically
rational beliefs should intuitively satisfy some additional desiderata. In partic-
ular, they should match objective chances, if they exist. Lewis (1980) argues
that for any event E ∈ W , cr (E) should match ch(E), whenever the latter is
known and not trumped by what he calls ‘inadmissible’ evidence (that is ev-
idence that is relevant to E but does not bear on its objective chance). This
constraint is captured by the following:
Definition 14 (Principal Principle). cr (E |ch(E)= x)= x.
Does the subjective interpretation of probability pass the three criteria of ade-
quacy? The unconstrained subjective version, as we have seen, does not pass
either the admissibility or the applicability criterion. The Bayesian versions, on
the other hand, are admissible (because they accept probabilism) and at least
in principle ascertainable, as cr could be derived from choice behaviour (via
representation theorems) or through introspection. They also generally meet
the applicability criterion, as evidenced by the fruitful ways in which Bayesian-
ism has been applied to many different fields, from statistics to decision theory.
5.3 I N T E R P R E TAT I O N S O F C E N T R E D P R O B A B I L I T Y
In the previous section, I have given an overview of the interpretations of prob-
ability that are generally discussed in the literature. These interpretations were
designed to work within a possible worlds framework, that is whenΩ is identi-
fied with the set W of all possible worlds. However, as explained in section 1,
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this framework could be enriched by considering not only possible worlds, but
also centres within them. In this case,Ω should be identified with the set of all
possible centred worlds, defined as ordered couples of a possible world and a
centre within it.
In the cases presented in examples 1 and 2 in the opening of this chapter, an
agent has full knowledge of the relevant properties of the world (represented
by the awareness of the bell setup in example 1 and the map in example 2),
but there are two possible locations (in time or in space) at which the agent
might be. Let W = {w} be the set of possible worlds and C = {3am,4am} the
set of possible centres. In example 1, the set of centred possibilitiesΩ contains
the two centred worlds (w ,3am) and (w ,4am) (where w represents the known
facts about the bell and Ann’s propensity to wake up and forget). In example 2,
let W = {w} and C = {x, y}. In this case, Ω also contains two centred possibil-
ities (w , x) and (w , y) (where w represents all the information recorded in the
map). On this representation, the uncertainty faced by Ann and Tom in exam-
ples 1 and 2 only concerns their own location (temporal or spatial) within the
world, but not what the world is like. In other words, Ann’s and Tom’s situations
cannot be captured by uncentred events as set out in definition 3.
Uncertainty of location can sometimes be mixed with uncertainty about the
world, as illustrated by the following (which modify examples 1 and 2):
Example 3. Uncertain bell The town where Ann lives has a bell that sounds
once or twice every morning, depending on the toss of a fair coin. If the coin
lands Heads, the bell only sounds once at 3am. If the coin lands Tails, the bell
sounds twice, at 3am and at 4am. Every time the bell sounds, Ann hears it and
just goes back to sleep, forgetting all about it.42
42 This example is tructurally similar to the Sleeping Beauty case, which I discuss in detail in Chap-
ter 7.
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Example 4. Uncertain map Tom is lost in a new town. He has two maps that
cover different areas, but he is not sure which one represents the town he’s in.
His surroundings appear to correspond to a specific location on one map, but
are compatible with two distinct locations on the other map.
In examples 3 and 4, Ann and Tom, in addition to being uncertain about their
location within a world, are also uncertain about what the actual world is. Ann
doesn’t know whether it is 3am or 4am and, in addition, she is uncertain whether
the bell is set to sound once or twice today. We can represent this by expand-
ing the set of possibilities. NowΩ= {(wT ,3am), (wT ,4am), (wH ,3am)} (where
wT and wH correspond to the possible worlds where the coin toss is Tails or
Heads).
In example 4, Tom doesn’t know which map is the correct one and is also un-
certain of his own position. Analogously with example 3, we can represent the
new set of centred possibilities as Ω= {(w1, z), (w2, x), (w2, y)}, where x, y and
z are the possible locations and w1 and w2 correspond to the two maps.
5.3.1 Criteria of adequacy
From a technical point of view, a probability function satisfying the Kolmogorov
axioms can be defined on centred worlds in much the same way as illustrated
in §5.1. This ensures that the admissibility criterion can still be satisfied by
probabilities defined on centred worlds. The other two criteria of ascertain-
ability and applicability also carry over from the previous discussion.
However, I will also introduce a fourth criterion of adequacy for interpreta-
tions of probability meant to be applied to centred worlds, which I will call
Compatibility. The compatibility criterion is meant to provide a link between
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the probabilities of centred and uncentred events. Intuitively, what it says is
that the probability assigned to an uncentred event by a probability function p
defined over centred worlds should always match the probability assigned to
the ‘same’ event by the coarser probability function p ′ defined over standard
possible worlds. Using the definition of correspondence (definition 6 in §5.1),
we can formally state the compatibility requirement. Let p∗ be the probabil-
ity function on the finer-grained (centred) algebra S∗ and p be the probability
function on the coarser-grained (ordinary) algebra S. Then:
Definition 15 (Compatibility). For every E ∈ S and E∗ ∈ S∗, p(E) = p∗(E∗),
whenever E∗ corresponds to E .
Compatibility places an intuitively plausible formal constraint on probabilities
defined over centred worlds. If centred worlds represent an extension (finer-
grained) of possible worlds, we would expect the probabilities to harmonise.
If an interpretation of probability can be applied to centred worlds, then it
should deliver the same assignment to the corresponding uncentred events
when applied at the two levels.
5.4 L O G I C A L I N T E R P R E TAT I O N
Starting from this section, I will now go through each of the interpretations of
probability that I have outlined in the previous sections, and consider whether
it can be meaningfully extended to probabilities defined over centred events.
The Logical interpretation of probability is designed to assign probabilities to
events in the absence of empirical information. As explained in section 5.2.2,
the main tenet of the Logical interpretation is the principle of insufficient rea-
son. When two possibilities are indistinguishable from the point of view of
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all relevant properties, they should receive an equal probability. The Classical
interpretation is a special case.
The Classical interpretation seems applicable to centred worlds. Take example
1, for instance. Here, Ω contains two distinct centred possibilities, (w ,3am)
and (w ,4am), which appear equally plausible. Following the Classical inter-
pretation, we could therefore assign an equal probability of 1/2 to each, which
also seems the natural solution. Analogously, in example 2 we could assign an
equal probability of 1/2 to the two centred possibilities (w , x) and (w , y) that
represent the alternative locations at which Tom might be. In both of these
examples, an application of the Classical interpretation seems intuitively plau-
sible.
As discussed in section 5.2.2 regarding the Logical interpretation for possible
worlds, the Logical interpretation passes the test for the admissibility and as-
certainability criteria, but has some problems with the applicability criterion,
which will carry over when it is applied to centred worlds. With respect to the
new compatibility criterion, however, it does not fare very well, as we will see
in a moment.
Consider the representation of example 4 and the probabilities that the Classi-
cal interpretation might assign to the three centred possibilities (w1, x), (w1, y),
(w2, z). At a first blush, all three appear to be equally plausible; the Classical
interpretation might therefore assign an equal probability of 1/3 to each of
them. Under this description the two uncentred events E1 = {(w1, x), (w1, y)}
(corresponding to the first map being the right one) and E2 = {(w2, z)} (corre-
sponding to the second map being right) receive different probabilities, with
p(E1) = 2/3 and p(E2) = 1/3. In other words, applying the Classical interpre-
tation to the centred worlds representation of example 4 entails that map 1 is
twice as likely to be the correct map as map 2.
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According to the compatibility criterion, the probability p of an uncentred
event within a centred world representation should match the probability p∗
of the same event within the coarser possible-worlds representation. As the
number of possible worlds in example 4 is two, corresponding to w1 and w2,
this means that p(E1) should be equal to p∗({w1}) and p(E2) should be equal
to p∗({w2}). However, applying the Classical interpretation to Ω∗ = {w1, w2}
yields p∗({w1}) = p∗({w2}) = 1/2. The application of the Classical interpreta-
tion to the centred-world level of description is therefore not compatible with
its application at the possible-worlds level of description.
Two replies could be offered to meet this problem. Firstly, one may try to argue
that the problem only arises for the Classical interpretation, but can success-
fully be dealt with by different specifications of the Logical interpretation. Sec-
ondly, one may also argue against the compatibility criterion, on the grounds
that there is no good reason to expect that probabilities defined on different
levels of description would match in any relevant way. I’ll consider each of
these two strategies in turn.
5.4.1 The generalised Logical interpretation and compatibility
To pass the compatibility criterion, a Logical interpretation should ensure that
the probabilities assigned to uncentred events match the probabilities assigned
to the corresponding possible worlds in the coarser representation. To get
this result, a generalised Logical interpretation could simply postulate that the
probability assigned to each centred possibility (wi ,c j ) should be inversely
proportional to the total number of centred possibilities that share the same
wi . In the case of example 4, this strategy would yield the following assign-
ment: p∗((w1, x))= p∗((w2, y))= 1/4, p∗((w2, z))= 1/2. Given this assignment,
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the probabilities of the two uncentred events E∗1 and E
∗
2 come out equal, and
they match the probabilities that are assigned to the corresponding possible
worlds.
Unfortunately, this strategy runs a risk of circularity: the only reason to im-
pose this requirement seems to be that it gets the desired result. Moreover,
one could note that at the finer level of description, one could also place a cor-
responding requirement that the probability assigned to a centred world be
inversely proportional to the total number of centred worlds that coincide on
c j . In other words, we could require that probabilities be equally distributed
across the partition induced by the indexical events. In the context of example
4, these are E∗3 = {(w1, x)}, E∗4 = {(w2, y)} and E∗4 = {(w2, z)}. From the perspec-
tive of the finer-grained set of centred possibilities Ω∗, this second criterion
would seem to be at least as justified as the one introduced before.
However, the second criterion does not satisfy the compatibility requirement.
To see this, consider that following the second criterion in the case of exam-
ple 4 would yield a probability assignment that is equivalent with the Clas-
sical interpretation, that is p∗((w1, x)) = p∗((w2, y)) = p∗((w2, z)) = 1/3. But
we have seen that this probability assignment violates the compatibility cri-
terion. Moreover, the two criteria are in general both mutually incompatible
and incompatible with the Classical interpretation, as can be illustrated using
Example 3. In that example, Ann faces three centred possibilities, (wT ,3am),
(wT ,4am) and (wH ,3am), two of which coincide on the centre (in this case,
the time point of 4am). Following the second criterion, a generalised Logi-
cal interpretation might assign the following probabilities: p∗((wT ,3am)) =
p∗((wH ,3am))= 1/4, p∗((wT ,4am))= 1/2. In contrast, following the first crite-
rion would have yielded p∗((wT ,3am))= p∗((wT ,4am))= 1/4, p∗((wH ,3am))=
1/2.
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5.4.2 Objections to the compatibility requirement
What reason is there to expect that the probabilities assigned to events under
different levels of description would match? After all, the Logical interpretation
of probability is designed to work with a specified language. When the descrip-
tion of the relevant space of possibilities is altered, this makes it impossible to
draw meaningful links between the probability assignments that would arise
in each case.
This objection to the compatibility criterion deserves to be taken seriously, but
there are still strong pragmatical reasons to think that the compatibility crite-
rion should be kept. It would be very impractical for any application of prob-
ability if we could not assume that an interpretation of probability would de-
liver the same results when applied at different levels of description, when the
finer level of description does not add any new information. Centred events,
defined at the finer grained level of description corresponding to the set of
centred possibilities Ω, in general convey more information than the events
defined at the coarser grained level of descriptionΩ∗, because they contain in-
formation about the location within a possible world that is not expressible at
the level ofΩ∗. However, the uncentred events at the level ofΩ are by construc-
tion equivalent to the coarser grained events at the level of Ω∗, so the former
should be taken to be informationally equivalent to the latter.
5.5 O B J E C T I V E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N
According to Objective interpretations, probabilities are physical facts deter-
mined by the laws of nature. On a first blush, it would therefore seem impos-
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sible to give an objective interpretation for probabilities defined over centred
events: in what sense do facts about the world determine the chances with
which centred events can occur? This is evident in particular when we con-
sider centred events that are purely indexical, as in examples 1 and 2. In these
cases, the only type of uncertainty present seems to be relative to the agent’s
own location and not to any external features of the world.
A closer look at the examples will, however, reveal that it may be possible to
formulate an objective interpretation of probability for centred events. This
section explores two approaches that an objective interpretation could follow.
Firstly, I will look at how the notion of a relative frequency could be opera-
tionalised in the context of centred events. Secondly, I will turn to a functional
characterisation of objective chance (in line with a propensity or a best-system
interpretation of probability) and examine whether and how it could be trans-
lated in the context of centred events.
5.5.1 Centred relative frequencies
According to the frequency interpretation, the probability of an event E is the
relative frequency of its occurrence within a suitable reference class. The first
thing to do, therefore, in order to operationalise a frequency interpretation of
probability for centred events, is to identify the relevant reference class and a
method for ‘counting’ the sequence of occurrences of E .
To see how we might go about this task, let us go back to example 1. In that
example, Ann knows that she is going to be woken up twice in the early hours
of the morning by the town bell; she also knows in advance that she will go back
to sleep immediately after hearing the sound and forget about it. Supposing
that Ann just woke up hearing the sound of the bell, what is the probability
5.5 O B J E C T I V E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N 145
that it is 3am? In other words, we want to know the probability of the centred
event E∗3am = {(w ,3am)}, given that an awakening takes place: in this case,
the relevant reference class is the class of all the possible awakenings. This
class contains two possibilities, (w ,3am) and (w ,4am), corresponding to the
two time points at which Ann could wake up according to the story. Having
identified the appropriate reference class is still not enough to determine the
objective probability of the centred event E∗3am in which we are interested. For
this, we also need to have additional information about the relative frequency
with which E∗3am is produced. In other words, we need to know the proportion
of E∗3am-occurrences within the reference class.
We could think of empirical ways to gather this data. Supposing that the exper-
iment is conducted many times (in the story, the town bell follows the same
pattern every day), we could record each time that Ann wakes up, noting next
to each awakening the time at which it happens. Comparing the number of
3am awakenings to that of 4am awakenings, we would see that they are almost
exactly equal.43 This provides the second ingredient to identify the objective
probability of E4am as its relative frequency. Since E∗3am occurs (almost exactly)
half of the times within the relevant reference class, the objective probability
assigned to E∗3am by the frequency interpretation is 1/2.
Example 1 only contains indexical uncertainty. When only uncentred uncer-
tainty is present, the centred frequentist reduces to the ‘ordinary’ case. To see
how it would deal with a mix of uncentred and indexical uncertainty, we can
use example 3. Here Ann is uncertain both about the time, and whether the
bell rings once or twice. Using the same method to register the occurrences,
every time that Ann is woken up by the sound we can note down the awak-
ening, accompanied by the time and heads/tails. If the experiment were re-
43 The qualification ‘almost exactly’ is necessary to account for the fact that the number of occur-
rences would not be equal if the total number of awakenings that have been registered is odd.
5.5 O B J E C T I V E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N 146
peated many times, we can expect the total number of 3am awakenings to be
twice that of 4am awakenings. Moreover, the total number of Tails awakenings
would also be double that of Heads awakenings. On average, therefore, when-
ever Ann wakes up the frequency interpretation assigns a probability of 1/3 to
it being 4am, and equally a probability of 1/3 to Heads.44
The arguments just offered are based on an identification of relative frequen-
cies with actual sequences of occurrence of a certain event. As discussed in
section 3, this may be problematic when E is a one-off event that has never
taken place or been observed before. For instance, we could imagine that the
town Bell is only due to ring in the specified pattern on a particular day and
we want to determine the objective probability of it being 4am, or of the coin
toss coming up heads, when Ann will wake up. If this is the case, then actual
frequencies seem to be a poor guide to determine objective chances.
As in the case of ‘ordinary’ relative frequencies, the problem can be solved by
using hypothetical limiting frequencies instead of actual ones. Examples 1 and
3 involve centred uncertainty between different points in time. A feature of
time is that it is linearly ordered. It is this feature of time that enables us to
appeal to hypothetical frequencies to make a definite prediction.45
Other dimensions over which centred uncertainty could be present, however,
do not have the same structure. Space, for instance, does not typically have a
linear order. If the centred uncertainty involves spatial locations, the fact that
an uncentred event occurs does not imply that any particular location within
it is reached, or that it can be reached only once. We can illustrate this point
using example 2. In that example, Tom is uncertain about which of two points
44 Note that ‘heads’ in this context may not be counted as an uncentred event. By the definition,
an event E is uncentred if, for all ci ,c j ∈ C whenever (w ,ci ) ∈ E , (w ,c j ) ∈ E . But the event
‘heads’ does not contain all the possible centres; in particular, it does not contain the centre
corresponding to the 4am time point.
45 See also Chapter 6, §6.4.3 and Chapter 7, in particular §7.2, §7.3.1 and §7.4.
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on the map, x or y , corresponds to his actual position, and we want to assign
a probability to the centred possibility that he is at x (that is, the centred event
E∗x = {(w , x)}). The relevant reference class in this case is that of all instances
where Tom’s position could be either x or y .
As for example 1, we can imagine to record Tom’s position whenever he is in
the relevant circumstances, repeating the experiment many times. Unlike ex-
ample 1, however, here there could be no prior expectation that the recorded
occurrences would follow a specific pattern. In the absence of additional in-
formation about how Tom could reach either location, neither is guaranteed
to ever be reached or to be reached a certain number of times. The value of
the probability assigned to E∗x by the frequency interpretation would therefore
vary in accordance with the actual sequence of occurrences of E∗x that would
be recorded. In the case of example 1, the linear order of time ensured that
each location within the actual possible world would be reached exactly once.
This gives us specific information regarding the process that generates the se-
quence of occurrences of the relevant centred event, using which is possible
(in principle, if it exists) to determine the relative frequency of the event. But
in example 2 there is no specified process that generates the sequence of occur-
rences of spatial locations. Because this information is lacking, we can’t define
a limiting frequency for the centred event in this case.
As this discussion shows, the frequentist interpretation of probability is in prin-
ciple applicable to centred worlds. With respect to the criteria of adequacy for
interpretations of probability given in §5.2.1, the centred frequency interpreta-
tion inherits the issues of the ordinary version. A special issue arises when the
set of possible locations does not possess a certain structure (for example, if
they are not linearly ordered). When this is the case, the hypothetical relative
frequency of a centred event appears to be underdetermined.
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5.5.2 Functional characterisation of centred objective chance
Other versions of the Objective interpretation of probability identify objective
chance with the propensity of a certain physical object or setup to produce
a given outcome. But the propensity interpretation of probability seems ill-
suited to capture the particular nature of uncertainty involved in centred pos-
sibilities. The main worry here is that the kind of uncertainty related to centred
possibilities generally is, by definition, not (or not just) uncertainty about the
world; but it is only the latter that may be legitimately viewed as objective. This
worry builds on the intuition that objective chance should be viewed specifi-
cally as a property of physical systems, and that the latter may not involve cen-
tred possibilities. I will call this the ‘metaphysical’ view, because it essentially
views objective chance as a property that pertains to some specified objects.
On what I have called the functionalist view, however, objective chances are
characterised by the functional role that they play. On the functionalist view,
we can be more liberal about what kind of objects could bear objective chances.
In principle, any probability function can count as an objective chance func-
tion just in case it satisfies the appropriate conditions. Building on Shaffer
(2007) and Glynn (2010), List and Pivato (2015) put forward six characteris-
tic properties for objective chance. In their paper, they present a framework
where probabilities are defined over ordinary possible worlds, but that formu-
lation can be extended to centred worlds. To do this, I will need to introduce a
new notion, that of a context, which will enable us to translate List and Pivato’s
framework for the purposes of this chapter.
A context k1, ...,kn ∈K represents the specific standpoint from which the prob-
ability of a centred event E∗ is evaluated.46 This standpoint will include, for in-
46 For simplicity, I consider a finite K , but the discussion could be extended to the case where K is
infinite.
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stance, the evidence that is available to the agent or a description of the state
of the world. Formally, each ki is defined as the smallest centred event that
contains all the centred worlds that are not currently ruled out by the evidence.
The set K of all contexts is therefore a subset of the algebra of centred events
S∗.47
I can now state the six properties of objective chance. The wording of the defi-
nitions that I am going to present is closely adapted from List and Pivato. Prop-
erties 5 to 9 were originally brought up and discussed by Shaffer (2007), while
property 10 is originally due to Glynn (2010).
The first characteristic property of objective chance is a version of Lewis’ Prin-
cipal Principle (see §5.2.4, def. 14). It serves to establish a link between objec-
tive chances and subjective probabilities:
Property 5 (Chance-credence). If an agent, in context k, were to receive the
information that the objective chance of some centred event E∗ ⊆Ω∗ is ch, he
or she would assign a degree of belief of cr = ch to E∗, no matter what other
admissible information he or she has.48
Property 5 only requires that the agent sets their subjective credence func-
tion equal to the chances when the latter are known to her. This hypothetical
47 List and Pivato (2015) present a framework that models a system evolving over time. Time is
represented by a set of linearly ordered points t ∈ T and a state of the system is represented by
s ∈ S, where S is the set of all the possible states of the system. A history h is a function that,
for each time point t ∈ T , specifies a state s in which the system is at time t . In that framework,
histories correspond to ordinary or centred possible worlds, and events E correspond to a col-
lection of histories. A truncated history ht is a complete history h up to time t . If the system is
indeterministic, ht may have more than one possible continuation, and ht corresponds to the
event containing all the complete histories that coincide up to ht . For present purposes, the
contexts k ∈ K correspond to a truncated histories in List and Pivato’s framework. Specifically,
the truncated history ht corresponds to the context k defined as the set of all nomologically
possible continuations of history h at time t .
48 Admissible information is just information which bears directly on the objective chance of E∗.
Inadmissible information, instead, is information that does not bear on the objective chance,
but which could nevertheless influence the beliefs of the agent: for example, information about
the future provided by an oracle, intuition, etc. See Lewis (1980).
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requirement seems in principle applicable to examples 1-4 that I have used
to motivate the recourse to centred worlds, as it is not immediately obvious
whether objective chance is present or known to the agent.
The second and third conditions specify when a centred event E∗ can have a
non-degenerate objective chance.
The Chance-possibility property says that only centred events that are ‘live pos-
sibilities’ within the given context can have a positive chance.
Property 6 (Chance-possibility). A necessary condition for a centred event
E∗ ⊆ Ω∗ to have non-zero objective chance in a given context k is that E∗ is
possible in k.
Formally, the notion of possibility that I will adopt here is the following:
Definition 16 (Possibility). An event E∗ is possible in context k if and only if
E∗∩k 6= ;.
In the context of example 3, for instance, both ‘3am’ and ‘4am’ are possible
events. In example 4, ‘map 1’ and ‘map 2’ are possible events according to
definition 16.
The third property, which I will call Chance-contingency, asserts that only cen-
tred events that are contingent in a given context (or, in other words, that are
not yet ‘settled’ in that context) can have non-degenerate objective chance
(that is, an objective chance that is strictly between 0 and 1):
Property 7 (Chance-contingency). A necessary condition for a centred event
E∗ ⊆Ω to have non-degenerate objective chance in context k is that E∗ is con-
tingent in k.
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To make this condition precise, more needs to be said about what it means
for an event to be contingent with respect to a context. Intuitively, an event is
contingent when both it and its complement are possible. The definition of
contingency that I will adopt here to capture this idea is the following:
Definition 17 (Contingency). An event E∗ is contingent in context k if and only
if E∗∩k is a proper subset of k.
Note that a subset B of another set A is proper whenever B 6= ; and A/B 6= ; (in
other words, B is neither empty nor coincides with A). For contingent events,
this implies that both E∗ and its complement overlap with the context k. The
definition of contingency just given entails that Chance-contingency is a con-
sequence of the Chance-possibility property, as can be easily checked. In ex-
ample 3, the centred event corresponding to ‘waking up’ is not contingent, be-
cause it coincides with the context. The centred event corresponding to ‘3am’
is contingent, because there is another distinct centred event (‘4am’) that is
also possible in that context.
The next property, Chance-intrinsicness, expresses a regularity requirement
for objective chances:
Property 8 (Chance-intrinsicness). For any contexts k, k ′ and any centred
events E ,E ′ ⊆Ω∗, if the pair (E ,k) is an “intrinsic duplicate” of the pair (E ′,k ′),
the objective chance of E in k is the same as that of E ′ in k ′.
While the basic idea is intuitive, to make this condition precise, again it will be
necessary to say more about the notion of an ‘intrinsic duplicate’. In example
1, when Ann wakes up hearing the town bell there are two centred possibilities
that taken together constitute the context, namely k = {(w ,3am), (w ,4am)}.
We can imagine that the same scenario is repeated many times, as the town
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bell and Ann’s consequent brief awakenings take place every morning (as we
envisaged in §5.2.3, discussing the frequentist interpretation). Every day sees
a repetition of the same scenario; each successive repetition is obviously dis-
tinct, and yet they all intuitively share the same essential features or intrinsic
properties. To capture this intuition, I will say that each successive repetition
of the same scenario is an intrinsic duplicate of all the others. The Chance-
intrinsicness condition therefore requires that if ch(E)= x in some repetition,
then ch(E) should also equal x in all other repetitions.
The next property, Chance-lawfulness, requires that the objective chances of
centred event should be derivable from a set of laws that regulates the be-
haviour of the set of all centred possibilitiesΩ∗:
Property 9 (Chance-lawfulness). There is a set of laws at the level of Ω∗ that
determines the chance structure onΩ∗.
The Chance-lawfulness property expresses the basic idea that for something
to count as objective, it should be possible to understand it in terms of laws.
While this property can be formulated for centred possibilities, it directly com-
mits us to the existence of a set of laws at the level ofΩ∗. However, it is not very
clear what these laws would be.
Finally, the last property of objective chance discussed by List and Pivato links
objective chance with causal relevance:
Property 10 (Chance-causation). If, in context k, some centred event C is pos-
itively causally relevant to another centred event E , then (except in a case of
redundant causation) the chance of E , conditional on C , is greater than the
unconditional chance of E .
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Defining the notion of causal relevance is difficult, and it is is not immediately
clear to me how this might be done for centred events. However, it should
be noted that the Chance-causation property expresses a conditional require-
ment, which would be vacuously satisfied if the notion of causal relevance did
not apply to centred events at all.
If properties 5-10 can be satisfied at the level of centred worlds, the objective
interpretation of probability (in the functionalist version of the Best-system in-
terpretation) would be applicable to centred events. In light of this discussion,
I see no particular reason why a centred probability function could not in prin-
ciple satisfy the six properties identified by List and Pivato (2015), and thereby
play the functional role of an objective chance function. Of course, establish-
ing this would require some more work, as some of the properties discussed –
specifically, Chance-lawfulness (9) and Chance-causation (10) – would require
more justification. However, as will become clearer in the next two chapters,
I will not pursue this line of research further in this thesis. Instead, I will turn
to focus primarily on the issues that centred worlds bring up for the subjective
interpretation of probability.
Importantly, this version of the objective interpretation would satisfy the ad-
missibility, ascertainability and applicability criteria of adequacy,49 and the
discussion in this section shows that the objective interpretation of centred
probabilities would be formally viable. Interpretationally, however, this raises
an interesting philosophical point. In what I have said so far, it is implicit that a
context is an epistemic construct, while a truncated history ht – at least, in the
interpretation of List and Pivato’s framework – is a ontic notion. So, the upshot
of this discussion is that if the account of centred chance that I have outlined
49 In order to prove that it would also satisfy the compatibility criterion, one would need to show
that, supposing that there are (i) a chance function at the level of ordinary possible worlds that
satisfies the six properties, and (ii) a chance function at the level of centred worlds that also sat-
isfies the six properties, then the two chance functions must stand in the relationship required
by definition 15.
5.6 S U B J E C T I V E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N 154
in this section is successful, it will give rise to a notion of objective chance as
relative to an epistemic standpoint.
5.6 S U B J E C T I V E I N T E R P R E TAT I O N
The subjective interpretations of probability identifies the probability of a cen-
tred event E with the degree of belief cri (E) that agent i assigns to E . In Section
5.2.4, we have seen that the subjective interpretation has different versions, de-
pending on whether cr is taken to represent the beliefs of an actual agent, or
whether some further rationality constraints are imposed. In this section, I am
going to focus specifically on the Bayesian version of the subjective interpreta-
tions of probability, setting the unconstrained subjectivist version aside.
The two core theses of Bayesianism are probabilism and conditionalisation
(see §5.2.4). While probabilism represents a synchronic requirement on cr ,
conditionalisation sets a dynamic constraint on how cr may change over time
as new information is learned by the agent. In this section, I consider how the
Bayesian interpretation of probability can be formulated and defended in the
context of centred worlds.
5.6.1 Probabilism and centred events
As long as the set of possible centred events S∗ forms an algebra onΩ∗, it is pos-
sible to define a probability function p that assigns a probability value to every
event in S∗ (see §5.1). The formal machinery that is needed to define proba-
bility functions in the case of centred worlds is exactly the same as in the case
of ordinary possible worlds. Therefore probabilism, which is the thesis that an
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agent’s rational credences cr should conform to the probability calculus, can
be formulated in the case of centred worlds.
As a descriptive thesis, probabilism is implausible: we have seen in §5.2.4 that
the credences entertained by actual agents often do not conform to the axioms
of probability. However, the justifications for probabilism offered by Bayesians
generally focus on the normative aspects.
Dutch Book arguments and accuracy arguments are used to show that if an
agent does not distribute her credences among the possible events in accor-
dance with the probability calculus, she will be liable to behave irrationally
and her credences will be less accurate. Representation theorems also show
that, whenever an agent has consistent preferences (a mark of practical ratio-
nality), her beliefs and desires can be represented by a pair of a probability and
a utility function.
All these arguments do not depend on the specific content of the setΩ of basic
possibilities, but only on the formal structure of cr and the role it plays for
the practical rationality of the agent. Therefore, they carry over to Ω∗. For
the remainder of this section, I will assume that probabilism (the synchronic
thesis) holds, and will instead concentrate on the updating rule (the diachronic
thesis of the Bayesian interpretation).
5.6.2 Centred conditionalisation
The rule for updating credences that is generally advocated by Bayesians is con-
ditionalisation. As we saw in §5.2.4, this provides a diachronic constraint on
cr , specifying how credences should change over time as new information is
learned by the agent. The arguments for conditionalisation reviewed in §5.2.4
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assume that the content of credences are ordinary events, that is sets of possi-
ble worlds. I now turn to consider whether conditionalisation is also justifiable
as a rule for updating credences over centred events.
A first thing to note is that the arguments used to justify conditionalisation in
the ordinary case should also be automatically applicable to centred events,
when we restrict the possibilities to the class of uncentred events (see defini-
tion 7). This is because, by Correspondence (definition 6), these events cor-
respond to ordinary events. But when the set of possibilities is not restricted
to uncentred events, conditionalisation seems harder to justify and the argu-
ments used in the ordinary case give problematic results. To illustrate, let us
go back to our two motivating examples. In example 1, before going to sleep
Ann anticipates that she will be woken up twice by the town bell, at 3am and
at 4am. Let t1 denote the time before going to sleep, and t2 the time when
Ann first wakes up during the night. At t1, Ann is certain that it is not 3am,
so she assigns a credence crt1 ((w ,3am))= 0. Upon waking up at t2, Ann does
not know what time it is, but her credence that it is 3am is now greater than
zero, as she now entertains this as a live possibility, so crt2 ((w ,3am)) > 0. In
example 2, analogously, before going out on his walk, at time t1, Tom assigns
credence crt1 ((w , x))= 0 to the possibility that he is at location x. As he checks
the map at t2, however, his credence that he is at (w , x) is greater than 0. The
change in Ann’s and Tom’s credences could not have been brought about by
conditionalising on any new piece of evidence. According to definition 9, con-
ditionalisation is not applicable if the prior degree of belief in an event is zero
(see §5.2.4).
It is important to note that even in the case of centred possibilities, conditional-
isation can go through when the centre remains fixed. However, the examples
above serve to show that, as a diachronic rule for updating beliefs, condition-
alisation is systematically violated when applied to centred possibilities in all
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those cases where the centre is not fixed, but shifts as the agent engages in be-
lief revision. While the diagnosis of the problem is relatively uncontroversial,
the solutions that have been offered in the literature on centred conditional-
isation vary greatly and no clear consensus seems to emerge relative to what
would be the best strategy to address the issue. On the one hand, it could be
argued that conditionalisation should be rejected entirely. This line also re-
ceives support by some arguments to the extent that conditionalisation could
be problematic even in the ordinary case (see Titelbaum (2016a). I will have
more to say on this point in Chapter 6).
On the other hand, some may see it as simply a problem for Bayesians to
find an alternative rule that should apply when the centre is subject to shift.
Many different rules have been proposed in the literature, such as ‘compart-
mentalised’, ‘generalised’ and ‘restricted’ conditionalisation. Most of these pro-
posed rules tend to isolate the cases where ordinary conditionalisation seems
to go through, and propose ways of extending the rule to the other cases on a
more or less ad-hoc basis (Titelbaum, 2016b). I will examine some of these pro-
posals in more detail in the next chapter, and propose a solution to the puzzle.
In conclusion, the problems posed by centred conditionalisation raise serious
issues with respect to the applicability of the Bayesian version of the subjective
interpretation to centred events, when the centre is not fixed but subject to
change as the agent engages in belief revision.
5.7 D I S C U S S I O N
This chapter has considered which interpretations of probability are available
for centred events. In §5.2, I have reviewed the main interpretations of prob-
ability that have been put forward in the literature for ordinary events, which
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are grouped into three main categories: Logical, Objective and Subjective. In
section 5.3, I have formulated the same interpretations of probability for cen-
tred events. As emerged from the discussion, some version of each of the three
main categories of interpretation is applicable to centred events.
It is interesting, in particular, that an objective interpretation of probability can
be formulated for centred events. Since they were introduced by David Lewis,
centred worlds have been used in the context of subjective probabilities and
this seems natural, since they are taken to represent a type of uncertainty that
is linked to the position of an agent or subject. However, the discussion in §5.5
shows that it is possible, under some circumstances, to identify the relative
frequency of centred events, when the mechanism by which they are generated
is known. Even if one does not accept the frequentist interpretation and does
not identify probabilities with frequencies, a definite relative frequency can
still be taken to indicate the underlying objective chance of an event.
The functionalist characterisation of objective chance can also be applied to
centred events, as outlined in §5.5. This means that objective chances could be
identified in the context of centred events, although some interpretational is-
sues remain open: in particular, it would be useful to find a working definition
of causal relevance in the context of centred events. Moreover, the functional
account of objective chance commits us to the existence of laws at the level of
centred worlds, but it is unclear what this new set of laws would be like.
For what concerns the subjective interpretation of probability, the main issue
that emerged relates with its application to centred events is conditionalisa-
tion. The two central theses of Bayesianism, probabilism and conditionalisa-
tion, can both be formulated for centred events, as discussed in §5.6. However,
only probabilism seems to transfer straightforwardly from the ordinary case.
The problem with formulating conditionalisation in the centred context is that
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this rule for updating credences seems to break down when applied to certain
types of centred content. As discussed in section §5.6.2, in the finer-grained
context of centred worlds conditionalisation only seems applicable to uncen-
tred events or whenever the centre remains fixed as the agent receives infor-
mation and engages in belief revision. In all other cases, this updating rule
does not appear to be justifiable as it does not capture how credences ought
to change with respect to a shifting centre. Bayesians have responded to this
difficulty by devising new and different diachronic rules, but there is currently
little consensus as to what is the best strategy in this context. Self-locating
uncertainty therefore appears to raise a puzzle for Bayesian accounts of prob-
ability, which will be the focus of discussion in the next chapter.
6
A D I A C H R O N I C P U Z Z L E
Self-locating or centred credences are generally taken to cause problems for
the diachronic Bayesian principle of conditionalisation. Two responses are
available to Bayesians: revise conditionalisation, formulating a different up-
dating rule that can account for self-locating credences; or give an account of
self-locating credences within a framework that is compatible with condition-
alisation. Numerous proposals in the literature have advocated different ver-
sions of the former response (see Titelbaum, 2016b). To the contrary, I argue
for the latter, by showing how self-locating credences can be expressed within
a framework that is compatible with standard Bayesian updating. I contrast my
account with the one put forward by Moss (2012), arguing that Moss’s account
can be derived as a special case within my framework.
6.1 B AY E S I A N U P D AT I N G A N D S E L F - L O C AT I N G U N C E R TA I N T Y
In previous chapters, I argued that centred worlds can be used to represent
self-locating uncertainty, and that it is possible to define probabilities over cen-
tred events. Moreover, I argued in chapter 5 that probabilities defined on cen-
160
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tred events are compatible with any of the main interpretations of probability,
including logical, objective, and subjective interpretations. In discussing the
subjective (or Bayesian) interpretation, I focused only on the synchronic com-
ponent of this interpretation, namely the thesis known as probabilism. Accord-
ing to probabilism, the graded beliefs or credences of a rational agent should
always conform to the probability calculus. Standard arguments in favour of
probabilism include Dutch Books and expected accuracy arguments, which, as
we saw, carry over naturally to the case of credences defined on centred events.
While the classic presentation only presuppose probabilism as a basic commit-
ment for the subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability (see de Finetti
(1937); Savage (1954); Ramsey (1931)), more recently this has come to be sup-
plemented by a diachronic constraint – conditionalisation – relating the cre-
dence functions that represent a rational agent’s beliefs at different points in
time. It works like this: suppose that crt0 is a credence function representing
your beliefs at time t0, and at a later time t1 you learn a new piece of evidence
E (and nothing more). Then, for any event A, your credence in A at t1 should
be equal to your credence in A at t0, conditional on E . In other words, your
credences satisfy conditionalisation if they change over time according to the
following rule (see Chapter 5, §5.2.4):
Definition 13 (Conditionalisation). crt1 (A) = crt0 (A|E) (where E is the total
evidence that is learned between t0 and t1).
Conditionalisation is supported by diachronic versions of Dutch Book argu-
ments (see Lewis (2010); Skyrms (2009)) and expected accuracy (see Greaves
and Wallace (2006); Easwaran (2013)). These results all tend to show that if an
agent updates their beliefs over time in a way that violates conditionalisation,
they will be prone to accept sequences of bets that guarantee them a sure loss
(in the case of Dutch Books) or that is guaranteed to make their beliefs less ac-
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curate. Williams (2012) examines the relationship between Dutch Book and ac-
curacy arguments in a more general setting, investigating accuracy-domination
arguments for conditionalisation that can be generalised to non-classical logi-
cal backgrounds.
While the results I have mentioned offer powerful arguments in favour of con-
ditionalisation, it is generally agreed that self-location causes trouble for this
principle (see Titelbaum (2016b)). To see why, consider how an agent’s cre-
dences in self-locating propositions such as ‘It is now Monday’ or ‘I am in Lon-
don’ are subject to change over time. Right at this moment, for example, I am
certain of the self-locating proposition that it is Monday (A), and I am also
certain of the self-locating proposition that it is not Sunday (not B). However,
yesterday I was certain of the centred proposition B , that it was Sunday. So,
I could not have arrived at my present beliefs via conditionalisation, because
updating via this rule preserves certainties (so, if I was certain of B yesterday, I
cannot be uncertain of this same proposition today), and makes it impossible
to become certain of propositions to which one previously assigned 0 credence
(so, if I assigned 0 credence to A yesterday, I cannot become certain of it today).
This creates a puzzle for Bayesians. On the one hand, conditionalisation is a
widely accepted principle for updating credences, supported by powerful argu-
ments. On the other hand, it does not seem to apply to the case of self-locating
or centred propositions. So, Bayesians appear to face a difficult choice: either
abandon conditionalisation, perhaps in favour of some other updating prin-
ciple; or try to fit self-locating uncertainty in a framework that is compatible
with conditionalisation. Titelbaum (2016b) surveys a number of attempts in
the literature that take up the former option, giving rise to a varied family of
proposals for centred updating schemes. The second option is the one that I
will be arguing for in this chapter.
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6.2 C E N T R E D U P D AT I N G S C H E M E S
As Michael Titelbaum notes in a recent survey article on the topic,
[t]he current consensus in the self-locating credence literature is
that obtaining a general updating scheme for degrees of belief in
both centered and uncentered propositions requires us to alter (or
at least supplement) conditionalisation in some way (Titelbaum,
2016b, p. 667).
This default position has given rise to an extensive literature on the topic of
centred updating rules (Titelbaum himself notes that this has become almost
a ‘cottage industry’), which Titelbaum categorises into three families: ‘shifting
schemes’, ‘stable base schemes’, and ‘demonstrative schemes’. Shifting schemes
work by providing a diachronic rule that links an agent’s self-locating credences
in indexical propositions – such as ‘Today is Monday’ and ‘Yesterday was Sun-
day’ – at different times. Stable base schemes, on the other hand, focus on the
uncentred propositions that are part of an agent’s beliefs at any point in time.
These propositions form a ‘stable base’, in the sense that – contrary to the cen-
tred propositions an agent believes – they can be updated via conditionalisa-
tion, while the centred propositions that an agent’s believes change according
to different rules, which complement conditionalisation for genuinely de se
beliefs. Finally, demonstrative schemes are built around the idea, defended
by Robert Stalnaker, that ‘belief about where one is in the world is always also
belief about what world one is in’ (Stalnaker, 2008, p. 55).50 Proponents of
demonstrative schemes seek to establish an equivalence between self-locating
and non-self-locating propositions. Since non-self-locating propositions can
50 See also my discussion of Stalnaker’s position in chapter 4.
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be updated via conditionalisation, this allows demonstrative schemes to de-
fine a natural extension of conditionalisation to self-locating propositions.
As I mentioned above, a Bayesian can respond in two ways to the problem that
self-locating uncertainty poses for the standard account of conditionalisation.
Shifting schemes and stable base schemes have in common that they both con-
stitute instances of the first type of response to this problem, as they both de-
vise essentially new updating scheme to deal with self-locating propositions.
Demonstrative schemes, on the other hand, can be seen as attempts to take
the second option – trying to fit self-locating uncertainty in a framework that
makes it compatible with conditionalisation. This feature makes demonstra-
tive schemes especially relevant to my discussion, as I will also be advocating
taking this second option.
Updating schemes from each of the three families, Titelbaum argues, suffer
from different blind spots, making them inapplicable across a significant range
of situations. Shifting schemes break down when an agent is uncertain about
what is the present time, so that they cannot be used to assign probabilities to
indexical claims such as ‘It rained yesterday’, if the agent is uncertain about the
current day. Stable base schemes (including those put forward by Titelbaum
(2008) and Briggs (2010)) have a different blind spot: in Titelbaum’s words,
they ‘try to cash out an agent’s credences entirely in uncentered terms, which
are straightforwardly manipulable by conditionalisation. But when an agent
has no qualitative way of identifying a day (or a place, or a person) [. . . ] such
schemes fall short’ (Titelbaum, 2016b, p. 675). Finally, demonstrative schemes,
in particular the one put forward by Stalnaker (2008), use demonstrative refer-
ence to establish a correspondence between centred and uncentred proposi-
tions. However, Titelbaum argues that they are also not successful in handling
cases where the set of epistemic possibilities increases, for example as a result
of becoming uncertain about the present time. When this happens, condition-
6.3 D E M O N S T R AT I V E S C H E M E S 165
alisation alone does not determine the credences that one should assign to the
uncentred propositions that only become available at the later time, as we will
see in a moment.
As Titelbaum points out, the respective blind spots limit the applicability of the
updating schemes in each of the three families. A particular problem, known
in the literature as the Sleeping Beauty problem, is especially interesting in
this regard, as it appears to lie within the blind spots for each of the updating
schemes identified by Titelbaum. This explains the interest that the problem
has generated in the literature. I will discuss this problem in detail in the next
chapter.
6.3 D E M O N S T R AT I V E S C H E M E S
As we saw in the last section, Titelbaum concludes his review of centred up-
dating schemes by noting that any centred updating scheme in the literature
suffers from a blind spot, which makes the schemes from all the three families
he identifies inapplicable across a significant range of situations. The blind
spot he identifies for demonstrative schemes is a result of the reliance of such
schemes on direct reference. To illustrate the kind of difficulty that this poses
to demonstrative schemes, he considers the following example:
Roger Foretold: On July 4th Roger knows that he’s about to begin an
extended period of sleepings and awakenings [. . . ]. This process
begins, and some number of days later Roger finds himself awake,
uncertain which awakening it is or how long he’s been asleep. On
this awakening Roger looks out the window, sees clouds, and be-
comes 0.7 confident it will rain. With which of Roger’s July 4th
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credences is this 0.7 credence coordinated? (Titelbaum, 2016b, p.
676)
Titelbaum argues that the example of Roger Foretold raises a problem for the
demonstrative scheme put forward by Stalnaker (2008). To see this, let us try to
apply Stalnaker’s account to this case. When Roger wakes up uncertain about
which awakening it is or how long he’s been asleep, his uncertainty about the
current time corresponds to uncentred uncertainty about what the world is
like. The object that he can now demonstratively refer to as this moment, the
present moment, occurs at different points in time in different possible worlds,
but could occur only once in each possible world (this is implied by Stalnaker’s
propositionality condition, which I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). So, Stal-
naker concludes that Roger’s uncertainty about the time when he wakes up is
really uncentred uncertainty about what the world is like – namely, whether
the actual world is one in which this awakening takes place at time t . This
indicates that Roger’s credences when he wakes up uncertain about the time
are distributed across a set S of possibilities, each corresponding to a possi-
ble world where this particular awakening takes place at a different time. The
problem, however, is that the set S corresponding to the possible worlds that
are epistemic possibilities for Roger when he wakes up is not a subset of the set
of possible worlds (call it S−) that were epistemic possibilities for Roger on July
4th, before going to sleep and losing track of time. This is because on July 4th,
Roger knows exactly which sequence of awakenings he is going to experience.
What changes between the two times (July 4th, and the moment he wakes up)
is that, upon waking up, he gains the ability to refer demonstratively to an ob-
ject (‘this moment’) to which he did not have direct referential access before.51
So, the set of epistemic probabilities S− available to Roger on July 4th is smaller
than the set of epistemic possibilities S that are available to him at the time he
51 See also Weber (2015) for a related discussion.
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wakes up, some days later. However, this change could not be captured by con-
ditionalisation, which can only work to narrow down a set of possibilities – not
expand it.
Note that the example of Roger Foretold poses a problem for Stalnaker’s demon-
strative scheme, for, as Stalnaker (2011) himself acknowledges, it will require
more than conditionalisation to account for rational updating in cases like that
of Roger Foretold, where agents lose track of their identity, time or spatial loca-
tion. Since memory loss appears to be involved in this example (by some point,
Roger forgets the number of awakenings he has already been through), one
may ask whether this really poses a specific problem for Stalnaker’s scheme, as
opposed to presenting a case where we would naturally expect conditionalisa-
tion to break down. As I recalled in the first section of this chapter, conditional-
isation relates the credence functions of an agent at two different times, under
the assumption that between those times the agent does not lose information.
This is something that appears to happen to Roger Foretold: between the 4th
of July and the awakening under consideration, he has lost the memory of the
number of his previous awakenings.
Even if the break down of conditionalisation is to be expected (due to memory
loss) and is not specific to Stalnaker’s framework, we might still think that it
is a problem. After all, having a perfect memory may not be a requirement of
rationality, but conditionalisation does not say how agents should rationally re-
spond to evidence loss. Moreover, in one important respect this example does
not presuppose memory loss, because the time when Roger wakes up may be
the first awakening in the sequence, and so no awakenings need have been for-
gotten for Roger to become uncertain about the current time. It is important
to note this, because conditionalisation can only apply to cases where no in-
formation is lost between a time ti and a time t j > ti . So, if the example only
hinged on this kind of cognitive mishap, it would not represent a genuine coun-
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terexample to demonstrative schemes; it would merely exhibit a case where
conditionalisation predictably breaks down.
A recent proposal, put forward by Sarah Moss (2012), outlines an updating
scheme for centred propositions which she calls ‘black box updating’. Titel-
baum classes this updating scheme in the same family as Stalnaker’s demon-
strative scheme, with which Moss’s black box updating has many features in
common. However, Titelbaum also briefly notes that Moss’s scheme is not be
vulnerable to the same counterexample as Stalnaker’s scheme. This is because
Moss’s demonstrative scheme is not identical with conditionalisation, and it
can account for cases where – like in the example of Roger Foretold – the set of
possible worlds that constitute epistemic possibilities increases between two
successive times t j and ti . In the remainder of this section, I will outline the
details of Moss’s proposal, before moving on to present my own proposal in
the next section.
6.3.1 Moss: Updating as communication
For Moss, updating de se beliefs is just like receiving information from your ear-
lier self, and adjusting your present beliefs in accordance to that information.
In other words, assuming that you should always trust your earlier self, the in-
formation that you receive from them constrains what it is rational for you to
believe at present. What type of information gets communicated in this way?
According to Moss, this could not be the de se propositions that your earlier
self used to believe. This is because these de se propositions are not, generally,
propositions that your current self can also believe: for example, if my earlier
self used to believe that it was 4pm, and some time has passed since then, my
present self cannot have the same de se belief. Instead, according to Moss, the
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information that is communicated from the earlier self to the later self are de
dicto propositions. This, on Moss’s account, is made possible by the following
principle:
[PROXY] Given a de se proposition, there is a de dicto proposition
such that for any centered world compatible with what you be-
lieve, that centered world is in the former proposition just in case
it is in the latter. (Moss, 2012, p. 226)
So, on this account, the content that is communicated by the earlier self to
the present self are the de dicto (that is, uncentred) propositions equivalent
with what the earlier self used to believe de se. These de dicto propositions can
be communicated and believed by both your earlier and your present self. In
this way, Moss argues that updating can be viewed as a particular instance of
communication – not between different agents, but between different stages
of the same agent at different times.
Before moving on to consider Moss’s proposal in more detail, however, it is
worth noting that Moss’s analogy between communication and updating might
not quite work as she claims (see also Pagin, 2016, pp. 286-290). To see this, let
q be a de se proposition that the speaker, X , wants to communicate to a hearer,
Y . By PROXY, q is equivalent to some other de dicto proposition p, given what
X believes with certainty (a ‘background certainty’ proposition r ). In other
words, by PROXY, q is equivalent to p∧r , where r is a background proposition
that X believes with certainty. Since p is a de dicto proposition, X can commu-
nicate p to Y , and Y can come to believe p (if he trusts the speaker). Now, it is
easy to check that the background proposition r must be de se, because other-
wise the conjunction of p and r would have to be a de dicto proposition.52 But
if so, then X cannot successfully communicate a de dicto proposition that is
52 The conjunction of two de dicto propositions is a de dicto proposition.
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equivalent to q , unless she can also contextually communicate what the back-
ground belief r is. But this is not possible on Moss’s account, since de se propo-
sitions cannot be directly communicated.
To illustrate, suppose that Ann is on the phone with Bob, and believes the de se
proposition that she is hungry (q). On Moss’s account, Ann cannot communi-
cate q directly to Bob, but she can communicate some de dicto proposition p
that is equivalent to q , given what she also believes with certainty – for example
that she herself is Ann (this is her background de se proposition r ). So, if Ann
says over the phone, ‘I am hungry’, the content of what she communicates to
Bob is the de dicto proposition that Ann is hungry. However, the problem with
this account is that Bob might not know that he is speaking to Ann – maybe
he is confused about the identity of the speaker, or he just doesn’t know her,
or some other reason. The point is that he might not come to believe p, un-
less he also has access to the background information that the speaker is Ann.
So, Ann cannot successfully communicate the de dicto proposition p to Bob,
unless she can also communicate the content of her background de se belief r .
But this takes us back to the starting point: by Moss’s own lights, since r is a de
se proposition, Ann cannot communicate it directly to Bob.
This discussion highlights a serious problem for Moss’s account of communi-
cation. However, the same issue might not arise in the case of updating, which
I will describe more in detail below. Even so, this casts doubt on Moss’s claim
that since PROXY enables (among other things) an elegant model of commu-
nication, its ‘theoretical fruits [. . . ] may be substantial enough to justify our
acceptance of the claim itself’ (Moss, 2012, p. 236).
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6.3.2 Black Box Updating
Moss (2012), following Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker (2008), uses sets of centred
worlds to represent an agent’s belief state. Unlike Lewis, but in accordance
with Stalnaker, she further accepts that agents’ beliefs sets always satisfy propo-
sitionality (see definition 1, and Chapter 4, §4.3.2). Let Bel(a,t ) be the belief
set of an agent a at time t , containing all the centred worlds that constitute
epistemic possibilities for a at t . Bel(a,t ) satisfies propositionality if it has the
following property:
Definition 1 (Propositionality). For any pair of centred worlds (w ,c), (w ,c ′)
that coincide on the uncentred component w and such that c 6= c ′, if (w ,c)
belongs to Bel(a,t ), then (w ,c ′) does not belong to Bel(a,t ).
Propositionality rules out that an agent could be uncertain about self-locating
or centred information without also being uncertain about some uncentred
information. In other words, Bel(a,t ) can contain at most one centred world
for each possible world w . Moss uses this assumption to build an updating
scheme that works in two steps. On the first step, some uncentred information
is communicated from an earlier to a later self, and used to derive a ‘black box
updated’ belief set Bel(a,t+). Then, Bel(a,t+) is updated by conditionalising on
any uncentred information that is learned by the later self. In Moss’s words:
Genuine rational updating happens in two steps. First you update
as if you were in a black box. Then you conditionalize your result-
ing credences on what you genuinely learn. (Moss, 2012)
The general idea underlying Moss’s proposal is the following. At any point in
time, an agent’s belief set is characterised by two components, that I will call
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the centred and the uncentred components. The centred component is the set
S of centred propositions that are compatible with the agent’s beliefs. Similarly,
the uncentred component is the set P of all the uncentred propositions that
the agent believes. On a first reading of Moss’s proposal, the uncentred com-
ponent of an agent’s belief set can be updated via conditionalisation, while the
centred component is revised via a different rule. As the former (updating the
uncentred component of the belief set) amounts just to standard conditional-
isation, it is the latter step (revising the centred component of the belief set)
that sets Moss’s account apart from other updating schemes. Here is how she
describes the working of black box updating:
In hypothetical black box updating, you form beliefs on the basis
of information you get from your previous self. [. . . ] Each de se
proposition you used to believe is equivalent with some de dicto
proposition, given what you used to believe with certainty. This
sort of de dicto proposition is something you can currently believe.
Furthermore, you currently have some de se beliefs about your re-
lation to your previous self. So you can also currently believe some
de se propositions: the consequences of your current de se beliefs
and your old de dicto information. (Moss, 2012)
Based on what Moss says, we can break down black box updating into the fol-
lowing smaller sub steps:
1. Identify the uncentred component of your earlier self’s beliefs;
2. Identify the centred component of your later self’s beliefs;
3. Combining 1 and 2, construct a hypothetical belief set for your later self.
6.3 D E M O N S T R AT I V E S C H E M E S 173
If some new information is learned by the later self, which was not initially
available to the earlier self (and thus is not reflected in the earlier self’s belief
set), the resulting hypothetical belief set that is constructed via steps 1-3 can
then be updated via standard conditionalisation.
To better evaluate Moss’s proposal, I will need to say something more about
how the new hypothetical belief set can be constructed in step 3 of black box
updating. In many cases, this will just involve shifting the centred component
of each centred world that is in your earlier belief set. For example, suppose
that you go to sleep just after looking at the clock at 11pm on Sunday, and wake
up hearing the alarm at 6am the following day, after an undisturbed sleep. At
both points (on Sunday before sleeping, and on Monday upon waking) you are
certain of the current time, and the uncentred information that is available to
you has not changed between these times. So, your later belief set is in the
following relation to your earlier one: for every centred world that is in your
earlier belief set, the w components stays constant, but the c component is
revised, to reflect that your current time location is 6am on Monday.
If that was all there was to the story, however, black box updating would be in-
applicable to cases – like the example of Roger Foretold – where an agent pre-
dictably becomes uncertain of his or her won location. In Titelbaum’s example
that I presented earlier, Roger is initially certain that it is the 4th of July and that
he will be going through a certain series of awakenings, and as we have seen
this entails that the uncentred component of his belief set cannot be updated
via conditionalisation to result in a larger set of uncentred possibilities upon
waking up. Moss’s treatment of this kind of cases defines an important aspect
of her account of black box updating. Here is what she proposes:
In black box updating, your credences are entirely determined by
two elements: your previous credences in de dicto propositions,
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and your current conditional credences about your relation to your
previous self. First your previous credences determine how much
credence you give to any de dicto proposition. Then your condi-
tional credences determine how you distribute that credence among
all de se propositions entailing that de dicto proposition. (Moss,
2012)
In other words, we need to supplement the first reading of Moss’s account
in this respect: the uncentred component of an agent’s belief set can, under
some circumstances, be updated via something different than conditionalisa-
tion. The idea is the following: when the set of epistemic possibility increases
between two times t and t ′, because – as in the case of Roger Foretold – the
agent becomes uncertain about some self-locating information at t ′, the new
hypothetical belief set for the agent at t ′ is obtained via the following steps:
1. Identify the uncentred component of your earlier self’s beliefs;
2. Identify the centred component of your later self’s beliefs;
3. If any uncentred proposition p that is in the uncentred component of
your earlier self’s beliefs is now compatible with more than one cen-
tred proposition s in your later self’s beliefs, ‘split’ p into as many finer
grained uncentred propositions p1, p2, ..., pn as needed;
4. Combining 1, 2, and 3, construct a finer-grained hypothetical belief set
for your later self.
This four step-procedure is a fuller account of Moss’s updating scheme, as it
complements the previous three step account and it ensures that the resulting
belief set always satisfies propositionality, and it is able to accommodate cases
like Roger Foretold’s where an agent becomes uncertain of some self-locating
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information as a later time. A consequence of this account is that – as Moss ac-
knowledges in a footnote to her paper – over time, an agent’s uncentred beliefs
are defined relative to an increasingly fine grained set of possibilities (Moss,
2012, p. 16). Moreover, in order to distribute credences across the new finer
grained possibilities, the agent is credited with possessing a conditional proba-
bility distribution that assigns a credence to any new centred proposition com-
patible with the later self’s beliefs, conditional on each uncentred proposition
believed by the earlier self. Moss does not say much about these two conse-
quences of her account. In particular, she does not say how the conditional
probability distribution that is needed to derive the later self’s hypothetical be-
lief set in black box updating is defined.
6.4 C O N D I T I O N A L I S AT I O N R E D U X
As we saw in the first section of this chapter, self-locating credences give rise to
a puzzle for Bayesians, as they seem to conflict with a standard diachronic prin-
ciple for updating beliefs, conditionalisation. Two possible responses are avail-
able to Bayesians: either drop conditionalisation, and formulate some other
diachronic principle to guide rational belief change in its stead; or keep condi-
tionalisation, but explain how centred credences can be updated in a way that
is consistent with it. Most current proposals in the literature on self-locating
credences adopt the first strategy, proposing a variety of alternative updating
schemes that are intended to replace or complement conditionalisation for
self-locating credences. Demonstrative schemes – notably those put forward
by Stalnaker and Moss – promise initially to take the second strategy, but as we
have seen in the previous section they also need to complement conditionali-
sation with some other principle, in order to account for belief changes in cases
where the set of epistemic possibilities is expanded (like in Roger Foretold’s
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case). As Titelbaum shows, the great majority of centred updating schemes in
the literature have some blind spot, making them inapplicable across a range
of situations. Only Moss’s black box updating appears to be the notable excep-
tion, since, as we have seen, it is applicable to the cases that represent a blind
spot for other demonstrative schemes. Based on the discussion so far, there-
fore, Moss’s black box updating scheme emerges as a contender to replace
conditionalisation even though, as we have seen, it relies on a mysterious ac-
count of conditional probabilities that are only accessible under some special
circumstances.
In the rest of this chapter, I now turn to explore the second option that is
open to Bayesians confronted with the puzzle of self-locating credences. My
main aim will be to show that it is possible to represent self-locating credences
within a standard Bayesian framework, and that when correctly represented
they are consistent with conditionalisation. Before we move on, I will need to
say something more about what I take to be the correct understanding of the
key terms in the debate on self-locating uncertainty.
6.4.1 Diachronic coherence
First of all, let us recall our initial definition of conditionalisation from §6.1:
Definition 13 (Conditionalisation). crt1 (A) = crt0 (A|E) (where E is the total
evidence that is learned between t0 and t1).
As we saw in §6.1, conditionalisation is a diachronic principle, which relates
an agent’s credence functions at different (successive) times. Along with the
synchronic principle of probabilism, conditionalisation is generally taken to
be a rationality principle and is supported – as recalled in §6.1 – by diachronic
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Dutch Book arguments. But just what does it mean for something to be a ra-
tionality principle? There may be different ways to interpret this question and,
as I will argue in this section, this makes a difference to how we should under-
stand conditionalisation.
Let’s consider the case of probabilism first, as this principle is generally consid-
ered less controversial. Probabilism says that an agent’s credence function, if
rational, should conform to the probability calculus. This could intuitively be
interpreted in two ways. On the first reading, probabilism expresses a condi-
tion that is necessarily satisfied by a rational credence function. On the second
reading, it expresses a requirement: if you want to be rational, your credences
should conform the probability calculus. In other words, on the first reading,
probabilism expresses a standard of rationality for credence functions, while
on the second reading it is interpreted as a normative statement. Each reading
may be appropriate to different settings, but I think it is important to notice
the differences. In particular, the first reading seems the most appropriate if
we want to evaluate the rationality of an agent, based on the credence func-
tion that she has at given time t . For example, suppose that your friend Ann
considers it is .2 likely that Sweden will win the world football championship in
2018, and also considers that it is .85 likely that one team between either Italy
or England will win the championship. Ann’s credences concerning the likeli-
hood that each team will win the championship sum to a number greater than
1, and so do not conform to the probability calculus. Based on the first reading
of probabilism, therefore, Ann’s credence function is not rational, because it
does not conform to the probability calculus.
Your other friend Jack, on the other hand, considers that it is .3 likely that Eng-
land will win the championship, .1 likely that Italy will win, and .6 likely that
one out of all the other contender teams will. Jack’s credences sum to 1, and
are consistent with the probability calculus. So, based on the first reading of
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probabilism, you can conclude that Jack’s credences (at least for what concerns
football matches) are rational. Importantly, you can evaluate Jack’s credence
function, and say that it is rational, even if Jack himself is not aware that his
credences conform to the probability calculus. Rationality is a property of his
credence function, which does not require self-awareness on the part of the
agent who is the subject of evaluation.
Similarly, in the case of conditionalisation, there are two salient readings of
this principle. For example, suppose that at time t0 Mary thinks it is .6 likely
that England will win the world championship, if Germany is eliminated in
the second round. Then, at time t1, it so happens that Germany is eliminated
and she comes to learn this and nothing else. Based on one reading of the
principle of conditionalisation, her credence in England winning the champi-
onship should be .6 at t1, if she wants to be diachronically rational. Based on
a different reading, on the other hand, we can simply say that Mary’s credence
functions at t0 and t1 are diachronically rational if her credence in the possi-
bility that England wins the championship at t1 is equal to .6 (i.e. if it is equal
to the conditional probability she used to assign to this possibility at t0, condi-
tional on the information that Germany is eliminated, which she has learned
by t1). As in the case of probabilism, this second reading of the principle of
conditionalisation is more appropriate whenever our aim is that of evaluating
the rationality of Mary’s updating behaviour, and it does not presuppose that
Mary herself should be aware of updating her credences in accordance with
the principle of conditionalisation.
Much of the literature on self-locating credences appears to take the first, nor-
mative reading of conditionalisation for granted. As Titelbaum writes:
The role of an updating scheme is to coordinate credences assigned
at different times. Conditionalisation, for instance, requires an agent
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to line up her unconditional credences at a later time with particu-
lar conditional credences assigned earlier on. (Titelbaum, 2016b,
p. 668, emphasis added)
This interpretive choice puts the focus on explaining how agents can identify
and coordinate the content of their own credences at different times. Moss’s
black box updating, for example, approaches this issue by treating updating as
a form of communication, where your earlier self passes on some information
to your later self.
In what follows, I will adopt the second reading of the principle of condition-
alisation. I think there are several good reasons to adopt this interpretation of
the principle – not least, this interpretive choice also sidesteps some issues that
arise if we interpret conditionalisation as a positive normative requirement.53
A consequence of adopting this interpretation of the principle of conditional-
isation, is that it eliminates the issue of explaining how an agent should coor-
dinate credences at different times. So, the problem I am considering is not:
how should I coordinate my present credences to my past and future ones?
But rather: given an agent’s credence functions at different times, under what
conditions can we say that the agent is diachronically coherent/rational?
6.4.2 Evidence
As recalled in the opening section of this chapter, self-locating credences are
generally taken to present a problem for conditionalisation. To see why, as
Titelbaum writes:
53 Timothy Williamson defends an interpretation of the principle of conditionalisation that is sim-
ilar to the one I have outlined. See especially Williamson (2000), Chapter 10.
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[. . . ] suppose we have an agent who is currently certain that it is
Tuesday. Intuitively, it is apparent there are some things that agent
could learn as time goes on that would make it rational for her to
decrease her certainty in that proposition. (Titelbaum, 2016b, p.
667)
While the literature on self-locating propositions often focuses on temporally
centred propositions (like ‘it is Tuesday’ in the quote from Titelbaum’s review
article), the problem is actually much more general. Suppose that you are cer-
tain that it is raining, and that this is some coffee. Intuitively, there are things
you could learn that would make these certainties, too, decrease. For instance,
you could look out of the window and notice that it isn’t raining anymore. You
could finish your cup of coffee, or put it down and focus on writing – and then
you may become certain that this in front of you is a computer screen.
The two examples I just gave indicate a more general pattern. Everything that
you perceive around you, all the data you constantly process from your envi-
ronment, appear to have this fleeting character: this object, this moment, this
place, your own perception of yourself are constantly changing. Clearly, you do
not get these data via conditionalisation: they simply appear to you in a certain
way, and these appearances are not fixed, they change as you move between
different places and different times. If conditionalisation breaks down in all
these cases, then it looks like this should be a big problem for Bayesian reason-
ing, as it will make it impossible to apply the standard rationality principles
even to the most familiar cases.
The extent of the problem also indicates where a possible solution lies. To see
how, take a standard textbook example, repeated tosses of a fair coin. Each
time the coin is tossed, you are allowed to observe the outcome (‘this is a
Heads’ – or ‘this is a Tails’). As we saw, this observation is something that you
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get from your environment. You become certain of ‘this is a Heads’ by observ-
ing a toss of the coin, and may lose the certainty that ‘this is a Heads’ – for
example, you may observe another toss and come to be certain that ‘this is a
Tails’. The information that you can extract from each observation, however,
can be represented and stored in different forms, e.g. as the result of a certain
toss (say, the first you observe) being a Heads. You can attach an index to each
observation, so the information that you get is something that you can become
certain of even after your circumstances change. In other words, by assigning
an index to each observation, it becomes part of your evidence.
This way of distinguishing between observations (that have a fleeting nature,
and can be expressed using indexical or demonstrative sentences such as ‘this
is a Heads’ or ‘now it is raining’) and evidence, or informational content, seems
very natural in the case of the coin tossing experiment. I will now argue that
this can be generalised to encompass the kind of cases that have been con-
sidered problematic in the literature on self-locating credences. Then, in the
next chapter, I will apply this view to the Sleeping Beauty problem, which has
long been considered a test case for any account of self-locating credences,
and show that my view leads to a natural resolution of that problem.
6.4.3 A unified proposal
We now have all the elements to present a unified framework for centred and
uncentred uncertainty. Let (Ω,F ,P ) be a probability space, whereΩ is the set
of all centred worlds, F is a σ-algebra on Ω, and P is a probability function
defined onF . We do not need to impose any requirement onF at this stage,
so we can leave it open which algebra we take the probability function P to
be defined over. For example, F could be the finest σ-algebra defined on Ω,
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which includes all the centred propositions that are subsets ofΩ. But this is not
necessarily required, and depending on the application it may be more natural
to take F to be a coarser σ-algebra on Ω. For example, if we are exclusively
interested in reasoning about uncentred propositions, we might takeF to be
the σ-algebra generated by the uncentred propositions that are subsets of Ω
(see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion).
Assuming that probabilism is satisfied, an agent’s credences in the proposi-
tions inF correspond to a probability function defined onF . In addition, we
can represent an agent’s current evidence as a set of centred worlds Bel , that
is measurable with respect to F , and which contains all the centred worlds
that are live possibilities for the agent. Note that unless we impose some fur-
ther constraints, Bel does not need to satisfy Propositionality, but may contain
pairs of centred worlds that coincide on the uncentred component, while they
differ with respect to the centre. In the special case whereF is the algebra of
uncentred propositions, in particular, Bel will not in general satisfy proposi-
tionality, since it will coincide with the strongest uncentred proposition that is
believed by the agent – and uncentred propositions, as we have seen, contain
all the centred worlds that coincide with respect to some uncentred compo-
nents.
The belief set Bel changes over time, as the agent gains (or, sometimes, loses)
evidence, and as it comes to occupy a different centre. The way in which these
things happen is determined by external parameters, that lie outside the scope
of the framework. For example, suppose that we are considering the probabil-
ity that a coin toss will land Heads. The framework allows us to model the pos-
sibilities that different outcomes will occur. However, which outcome actually
occurs, and is observed (becoming part of the evidence) is not determined by
the framework, but by the world. Similarly, suppose that at some point in time
it is Wednesday, and at some other point it is Thursday, and at neither point I
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am uncertain about my current time location. The evidence that I have at the
two points in time (that it is Wednesday, or that it is Thursday) is determined
by the world, and not by the framework. In other words, the belief state Bel
corresponding to the agent’s evidential state is exogenously determined by the
world, but our framework allows us to model how a rational agent distributes
his credences among the live possibilities relative to the belief state that he is
in.
Let Beli and Bel j be two distinct belief states, corresponding to two – possi-
bly consecutive – evidential states of the agent relative to a given algebra F .
Since they are both subsets of Ω, Beli and Bel j will be in one of the follow-
ing relations between each other: either Beli and Bel j are disjoint (that is
Beli ∩Bel j = ;), or they have some nonempty intersection. If the latter is
the case we can distinguish two special further cases: i) Beli ⊆ Bel j , and ii)
Bel j ⊆ Beli . As it is usually defined (see definition 13 in §6.1), conditionalisa-
tion only applies to the circumstances corresponding to case ii) when the two
belief states that we are comparing are not disjoint, and the later belief set is
a subset of the earlier one. This is because conditionalisation is a conditional
claim that relates the credence functions of an agent at successive points in
time, conditional on the fact that some new evidence is learned (and none lost
or revised) between those times. In all other cases except ii), this condition
is not met: whenever Bel j is not a subset of Beli , there must be at least one
centred world that is not contained in Beli (because it is ruled out by that evi-
dential state), but which is contained in Bel j (that is, it is considered as a live
possibility in that state).
The discussion so far indicates that the applicability of conditionalisation, as
it is ordinarily understood, is severely limited when the probability space is
defined on the set of centred worlds, as the successive belief states of an agent
often correspond to disjoint sets of centred worlds. This appears to be an issue,
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especially if one adopts the normative reading of the principle of conditional-
isation that I considered in §6.4.1. If the aim is to give a normative principle
that an agent could explicitly follow to update his credence function over time,
then conditionalisation would remain silent in all the cases where the evidence
available to the agent changes in a way that is not compatible with the condi-
tion that the later belief set be a subset of the earlier one. The issue is not con-
fined to centred uncertainty (uncentred evidence can also change in ways that
do not satisfy the condition for the applicability of conditionalisation), but the
violations appear to be much more widespread. Moreover, while in the case
of uncentred uncertainty the changes that are incompatible with conditional-
isation can be described as straightforward cases of evidence loss – and thus
dismissed as involving a form of irrationality – it is much more difficult to dis-
miss the changes in centred belief sets as irrational. The fact that an agent can
occupy different centres at different times seems just a fact of the world, and
is much more difficult to dismiss as a simple failure of rationality. This is at
least one reason motivating the recent interest in the literature on self-locating
uncertainty.
As I explained in the introduction to this chapter, mostly the attempts in the
literature have focused on finding some extension of the principle of condi-
tionalisation that may be applicable to the cases that are not covered by the
original principle. However, drawing on the alternative reading of the princi-
ple of conditionalisation that I described in §6.4.1, I would like to propose a
different solution to the puzzle, that I think vindicates the intuitive appeal of
the principle.
First, let us recall the standard formulation of conditionalisation and consider
more closely the cases in which it is applicable. Here is the definition again:
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Definition 13 (Conditionalisation). crt1 (A) = crt0 (A|E) (where E is the total
evidence that is learned between t0 and t1).
As we have seen, the condition that the only difference between the agent’s
belief sets at t0 and t1 is that the evidence E (and nothing more) is learned
by time t1 is not always satisfied in practice. In all these cases, the change in
the agent’s credence function between times t0 and t1 does not respect condi-
tionalisation, and so – based on the reading of the principle that I defended in
§6.4.1 – the agent’s credence functions are not diachronically rational. This ver-
dict, however, may seem a bit harsh. After all, as we have seen, especially when
an agent’s evidential states correspond to sets of centred worlds, there seems
to be nothing especially irrational to the way the agent’s evidence changes, as
this is determined by processes that are not under the agent’s control. As long
as the agent responds in a coherent way to different pieces of evidence, we
should not judge his credence function as irrational. The issue is, relative to
what standard can we assess diachronic coherence?
While the evidence that is available at any time changes in a way that is exter-
nally determined, there is a feature of the agent’s credal state that appears to
remain constant. This is the probability space (Ω,F ,P ) that we introduced to
model the agent’s beliefs, where P corresponds to the unconditional probabil-
ity that the agent assigns to the events in the algebraF , before any evidence is
factored in. In other words, P corresponds the prior credence function of the
agent, relative to Ω. Since – by definition – all the possible belief sets are sub-
sets of the sample spaceΩ, this ensures that the condition for the applicability
of conditionalisation is always satisfied when we take crt0 to be equal to the
unconditional probability function P . So, as long as the agent’s prior uncon-
ditional probability function remains constant, we can always take P to play
the role of crt0 , and use the principle of conditionalisation to evaluate whether
6.4 C O N D I T I O N A L I S AT I O N R E D U X 186
the agent’s credence function crt1 , relative to the evidence available at t1, is
diachronically coherent.
We can use the case of Roger Foretold to illustrate how this proposal will work
in practice. In that example, Roger knows that he will undergo a given series of
awakenings over a few days. While he knows all of this exactly prior to being
put to sleep, upon waking up he is uncertain about which day it is. To keep
things simple, we can model Roger’s case as involving only self-locating un-
certainty. Suppose that the day he is initially awake is Sunday, and then the
sequence of awakenings that he knows he will undergo will take place on Mon-
day and on Tuesday. We can represent Roger’s centred possibilities by setting
the sample spaceΩ= {(w , s), (w ,m), (w , t )},F as the finest algebra onΩ, and P
as Roger’s prior unconditional probability function onF . On Sunday, Roger’s
belief set is Beli = {(w , s)}, while upon waking up (not knowing what day it is)
his belief set is a different Bel j = {(w ,m), (w , t )}. Since Beli and Bel j are dis-
joint, conditionalisation does not directly apply. But both Beli and Bel j can be
evaluated relative to P . This means that if he is diachronically rational in the
sense we have discussed, Roger’s credence in the centred proposition {(w ,m)}
upon waking up will be equal to the prior probability of {(w ,m)}, conditional
on Bel j , or cr j ({(w ,m)})= P ({(w ,m)}|{(w ,m), (w , t )}).
Roger’s case illustrates a more general feature of my account. The key point
here is that we can evaluate the diachronic rationality of an individual agent,
provided that the agent has a prior probability function P , that is defined for
the whole of Ω, and which does not change between different points in time.
If the agent is rational, then the probability function that corresponds to her
credences at any given point will be fixed by the prior probability function P
together with the current evidence available to the agent.
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6.4.4 Possible extensions
As we have seen, conditionalisation is applicable whenever the agent’s belief
set at t1 is a subset of his belief set at t0. Importantly, this does not require that
the agent’s belief sets satisfy Stalnaker’s condition of Propositionality. This is
I think a good feature of my account, as it makes it applicable without modi-
fications to centred and uncentred propositions. As we saw in chapter 4, un-
centred propositions partition the set of centred worlds Ω into indifference
classes of centred worlds that coincide with respect to the uncentred compo-
nent. Therefore, by definition, belief sets that contain uncentred propositions
will not in general satisfy propositionality.
Even for belief sets that do satisfy propositionality, my account is not guaran-
teed to deliver the same results as Moss’s black box updating, as this will de-
pend on the particular probability function P that is taken to correspond to the
agent’s prior credence function. Considering which features of P would be nec-
essary to deliver Moss’s black box updating highlights an interesting possible
extension of the framework. We can recover Moss’s black box updating as a spe-
cial case within the framework I have outlined, by imposing two constraints: i)
that all belief sets satisfy propositionality; and ii) that P assigns equal proba-
bilities to any two centred worlds (w ,c) and (w ,c ′) that coincide with respect
to the uncentred component w . Thus, this is an interesting consequence of
my proposal, as it both generalises the intuitions that may be behind Moss’s
account, and it explicitly accounts for the technical assumptions that were left
implicit in Moss’s discussion (concerning the agent’s underlying conditional
probability distribution over centred possibilities).
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6.5 C O N C L U S I O N
In this chapter, I have considered a puzzle that self-locating uncertainty cre-
ates for Bayesian accounts of rational credences. Self-locating uncertainty has
been taken to challenge the Bayesian principle of conditionalisation. As a re-
sult, different diachronic principles have been proposed in the literature, ei-
ther to supplement or to replace conditionalisation. A particularly interesting
proposal is that put forward by Moss (2012), which I analysed in this chapter.
Moss’s account of black box updating is built on the assumption of the Stal-
nakerian account of de se beliefs that I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The
unified framework that I have presented, on the other hand, is consistent with
the Lewisian account of de se beliefs discussed in Chapter 3, and as such it is
able to provide the conceptual tools to model both modes of reasoning about
de se beliefs that I identified in that chapter, namely the cartographer mode
and the pathfinder mode.
I have argued that my account has several theoretical advantages over the com-
peting accounts: it does not require a revision the standard Bayesian princi-
ples of rationality (under the interpretation that I have defended), it clarifies
the conditions under which an agent’s credence functions at different times
may be considered as diachronically rational, and it gives a unified treatment
to updating on both centred and uncentred evidence. In the next chapter, I
will apply the framework described in this chapter to what has been taken to
be a test case for any theory of self-locating uncertainty, the Sleeping Beauty
problem, and show that it leads to a natural resolution of that problem.
7
B AY E S I A N B E AU T Y
The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the litera-
ture as a paradigmatic example of how self-locating uncertainty ‘creates havoc’
for standard Bayesian principles of Conditionalisation and Reflection. Further-
more, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book argu-
ments (see Titelbaum, 2016b, 2013). I show that, contrary to the consensus
view, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard
Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly represented, the solution
satisfies all the standard Bayesian principles, including Conditionalisation and
Reflection, and is immune from Dutch Book arguments. Moreover, the solu-
tion does not make any appeal to the Restricted Principle of Indifference that
is generally accepted in the literature on self-locating uncertainty, which, I ar-
gue, is incompatible with the principles of Bayesian reasoning.
7.1 T H E P R O B L E M
Adam Elga (2000) introduced to the philosophical literature what has come to
be known as the Sleeping Beauty problem:
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Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two
days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either
once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once;
Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you to back to sleep
with a drug that makes you forget that waking. When you are first
awakened, to what degree ought you believe that the outcome of
the coin toss is Heads? (Elga, 2000, p. 143).
Elga’s description of the problem grants the following natural assumptions:
1. The experiment lasts two full days, from the moment the experimental
subject (Beauty) is put to sleep at the end of day 0, to the moment when
she is woken up and dismissed at the beginning of day 3.
2. There are two possible outcomes to the experiment: either the coin toss
comes up Heads, and Beauty is woken up on day 1, but left to sleep on
day 2; or the coin toss comes up Tails, and Beauty is woken up both on
day 1 and on day 2. Each outcome has a prior probability that is equal to
1
2 .
3. When she wakes up during the experiment, Beauty does not know which
day it is.
From Beauty’s standpoint, the task is to determine the probability of Heads, af-
ter she wakes up during the experiment. I will assume that Beauty is a Bayesian.
On each day, Beauty could be in either of two states: she is either awake or she
is asleep. Representing an awakening by w and a sleep-through by s, we know
from the outset that day 1 involves an awakening, while day 2 may involve
either an awakening or a sleep-through, depending on the result of the coin
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toss. A first characterisation of the sample space for the whole experiment is
therefore:
Ω= {ws,ww}
Let H = {ws} be the event that the coin toss comes up Heads and T = {ww} be
the event that the coin toss comes up Tails. By assumption 2, the prior proba-
bility of H is the same as the prior probability of T , that is, P (H)= P (T )= 12 . In
the context of the experiment undergone by Sleeping Beauty, the probabilities
of the events H and T are given as priors, as they are fixed by the experimental
setup.
During the course of the experiment, Beauty is allowed to make some observa-
tions that potentially provide her with side information about the outcome of
the experiment. Each observation consists in waking up on a given day, and
noting that ‘Beauty wakes up on day i ’, where i ∈ {1,2} stands for the current
day. (Recall that, by assumption 3, Beauty does not know which day it is when
she wakes up, and that by assumption 1 each outcome spans over two days.)
How does this observation affect the probability of H? In order to answer this
question, we need to represent the observation that ‘Beauty wakes up on day i ’
as an event within the same sample space as the event H . Let W be the event
that Beauty wakes up on day i . A quick glance at Ω reveals that without some
further elaborations, that space is not sufficiently rich to express the event W .
This is because, if the outcome of the experiment is ws (if, that is, the result of
the coin toss is Heads), it is indeterminate whether Beauty wakes up on day i .
To see this, consider how the outcome ws consists of an awakening followed
by a sleep-through, so if i = 1, Beauty wakes up, but if i = 2, Beauty does not
wake up.
7.1 T H E P R O B L E M 192
The difficulty with modelling the event W that Beauty wakes up on day i is due
to the fact – expressed by assumption 3 – that Beauty does not know which
day it is when she wakes up. To represent her uncertainty, we need to refine
the outcome space, taking into account that the experiment spans over two
days (assumption 1), and that, before any specific observation is made, it could
be either day 1 or day 2, since the experiment lasts two days regardless of the
result of the coin toss. The resulting refined sample space is:
Ω′ = {ws1,ws2,ww1,ww2}
In the sample space Ω′, the event corresponding to a Heads result of the coin
toss is H = {ws1,ws2}, while a Tails result corresponds to T = {ww1,ww2}.
Moreover, ws1 corresponds to the outcome where the result of the coin toss
is Heads, and it is day 1; ws2 corresponds to Heads and day 2; ww1 corre-
sponds to Tails and day 1; and, finally, ww2 corresponds to Tails and day 2.
As can be easily checked, the refined sample space Ω′ allows us to consider
a richer class of events than Ω. We can express what day is today, which en-
ables us to represent Beauty’s uncertainty regarding this bit of information. Let
D1 = {ws1,ww1} be the event that it is day 1, and D2 = {ws2,ww2} be the event
that it is day 2. Finally, we can express the event that Beauty wakes up on day
i ∈ {1,2} as W = {ws1,ww1,ww2}.
The same prior constraints set by the experimental setup should apply to the
refined sample spaceΩ′, as they did to the more coarse-grained version of the
sample space Ω. In particular, by assumption 2, the probabilities assigned to
H and T relative toΩ′ should be equal. Table 2 summarises the refined sample
space and the probabilities associated to each outcome, subject to the con-
straint that P (H)= P (T )= 12 .
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Outcomes
(Heads) (Tails)
ws1 ws2 ww1 ww2
Probabilities 12α
1
2 (1−α) 12β 12 (1−β)
Table 2: The Sleeping Beauty experiment
The parameters α and β in table 2 both take values in the [0,1] interval and
represent the conditional probability that day 1 is sampled, given that the re-
sult of the coin toss is either Heads or Tails; more precisely, P (D1|H) = α and
P (D1|T )=β. These conditional probabilities are not fixed by the experimental
setup, so the description of the problem leaves us free, in principle, to set them
however seems best. Moreover, the statement of the Sleeping Beauty problem
does not explicitly include the constraint that α and β be equal. It might be
that Beauty should regard it as more likely that a certain day is sampled given
that, for instance, the result of the coin toss is Heads than it would if the re-
sult was Tails. The description of the experimental setup does not give explicit
information regarding how Beauty should apportion these probabilities, and
therefore we should, at this stage of representing the problem, leave open how
she sets the values of bothα and β. A discussion of which are the correct or the
more plausible values of α and β is left until later (see §7.2 below).
We are now in a position to formally state the problem (which we originally
formulated as: What probability should Beauty assign to Heads, given that she
wakes up today?) in terms of computing the posterior probability of H , given
that W is observed, or P (H |W ). As I assumed that Beauty is a Bayesian, we
immediately have:
P (H |W )= P (W |H)P (H)
P (W )
Since H and T partition the outcome space Ω′, by the law of total probability
we have that:
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P (W )= P (W |H)P (H)+P (W |T )P (T )
Moreover, we know that P (H)= P (T )= 12 , P (W |T )= 1 (since Beauty wakes up
every day if T ) and P (W |H) = α (since the probability that Beauty wakes up,
given that the coin toss comes up Heads, is equal to the probability that it is
day 1 given H). The previous equation simplifies to:
P (W )= 1+α
2
(1)
The solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem is therefore given by the equation:
P (H |W )= α
1+α (2)
Answering Sleeping Beauty’s original question therefore depends solely on the
value that we assign to parameter α.
7.1.1 Further Questions
The original Sleeping Beauty problem involves computing the value of H given
that W is observed. But once this is done, there are many questions we can
still ask. For example, what credence should Beauty assign to the coin toss
having come up Heads, if after waking up she were informed that it is day 1?
Or, similarly, what would her credence in Heads be if the experimenters told
her, after waking her up, that today is the last time she wakes up during the
experiment?
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Another advantage of the refined sample spaceΩ′ is it allows us to model these
further questions. The first question (What is the probability of Heads, if today
is day 1?) can be answered by computing the posterior probability of H , given
D1:
P (H |D1)= α
α+β (3)
Let L = {ws1,ww2} be the event that Sleeping Beauty wakes up for the last time
on day i ∈ {1,2}. To answer the second question (what is the probability of H,
if today is the last time you wake up?), we just need to compute the probability
of H , given the information that L is the case, which is:
P (H |L)= α
1+α−β (4)
Another question that will be interesting to consider might be posed to Beauty
before the experiment actually begins: Suppose that it is either day 1 or day
2. What is the probability that you wake up today? In order to answer this
question, Beauty should effectively state what is the prior probability of W ,
given that today is either the first or the second day (that is, given D1 ∪D2).
Since D1∪D2 =Ω′, the conditional probability of W given D1∪D2 is equal to
its unconditional probability:
P (W |D1∪D2)= P (W ) (5)
Things are a bit different if the question specifies which particular day is sam-
pled: Suppose it is day 1 (day 2). What is the probability of W ? In this case,
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since we know that P (D1) = α+β2 and P (D2) =
2−α−β
2 , by a simple calculation
we have:
P (W |D1)= 1 P (W |D2)= 1−β
2−α−β (6)
Equation 6 states an interesting result. The probability that Beauty wakes up,
given that it is day 1, is equal to 1 – just as we would expect, since the exper-
imental setup specifies that Beauty always wakes up on day 1. However, the
probability that Beauty wakes up on day 2 does not necessarily equal 12 , as this
depends on what values α and β take.
7.2 S O L U T I O N
As we’ve seen in the previous section, the solution to the Sleeping Beauty prob-
lem comes down to computing the value of P (H |W ) in equation 2. To do this,
we need to specify what is the value of α, which is not explicitly fixed by the
description of the experimental setup. Is there a correct or most plausible as-
signment of value toα? Moreover, does the value assigned toαmatch the value
assigned to β, or do they differ? (Although the value of β does not matter to the
solution of the original Sleeping Beauty problem, it affects the solution to the
further questions I described in the previous section.)
There are, I think, two possible ways to go from here. One possibility would be
to say that we simply cannot assign any value to α and β, since these are left
unspecified by the description of the experimental setup. This would leave us
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unable to compute the posterior probability of Heads given that Beauty wakes
up. Although theoretically coherent, this solution is not very attractive.
A second way to go is to proceed and assign a value to α (and to β, if we have
any interest in answering the further questions that Sleeping Beauty might con-
sider, described in §7.1.1). If we take this route, it remains to decide which
values are the most appropriate. The most natural assignment – in my view –
is α = 12 and β = 12 . The rationale for this assignment is the following. Since
Beauty is uncertain about what day it is, we should conceptualise the day i
that she observes as if it had been sampled through some sort of randomising
mechanism. We don’t need to be very specific about the nature of the sam-
pling mechanism that we imagine. The point is simply that, in order to rep-
resent Beauty’s uncertainty about what day it is, the way in which we model
the problem must respect the intuition that both day 1 and day 2 are the pos-
sible objects of an observation. The parameter α (respectively, β) represents
the prior probability that a day randomly sampled though this hypothetical
mechanism is day 1, given that the result of the coin toss is Heads (respectively,
Tails). In other words, α= P (D1|H) and β= P (D1|T ).
Since the experiment is expected to run over two days, regardless of the result
of the coin toss, it makes sense to assume a uniform prior distribution over the
two days in both scenarios (whether the coin toss comes up Heads or Tails). On
this view, when considering what values to set forα and β, Beauty employs the
Principle of Indifference: since she has no reason to believe, assuming that the
result of the coin toss is Heads (respectively, Tails) and prior to any day being se-
lected, that any one of the two experimental days is more likely to be sampled
than the other, she should assign them an equal probability, and therefore set
α= 12 (respectively, β= 12 ).
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I will discuss the Principle of Indifference in more detail in §7.3.1, but it is im-
portant to note here that my application of the Principle of Indifference differs
from a related line of reasoning that is often applied to the Sleeping Beauty
problem, which is known in the literature as the Restricted Principle of Indif-
ference (RPI, for short). Although the Principle of Indifference entails RPI in
the specific circumstances of the Sleeping Beauty problem, there is a profound
conceptual difference between the two, which I will explain in more detail in
§7.3.1 below. In a nutshell, RPI tells us that events that are – in a special sense,
which I will explain later – subjectively indistinguishable given some evidence
E , should receive equal posterior probability after learning that E . In contrast,
the Principle of Indifference – as I have employed it – gives us a way to set the
prior probabilities, in the absence of relevant evidence E .
7.2.1 Answers
To represent Beauty’s uncertainty about which day it is when she wakes up
within a probabilistic framework (on the assumption that Beauty reasons as a
Bayesian agent) we have expanded the simple outcome space Ω, and then we
employed the Principle of Indifference to generate Beauty’s prior probabilities
for the events that we defined relative to the refined sample spaceΩ′.
If we now plug in the chosen values for α and β to equations 1 and 2 from §7.2,
we are finally able to compute the desired probabilities:
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And moreover, answering the further questions in §7.1.1:
P (H |D1)= 1
2
(9)
P (H |L)= 1
2
(10)
P (W |D1)= 1 P (W |D2)= 1
2
(11)
None of the above answers seems particularly surprising. If Beauty is told that
it is day 1, she intuitively is in the same situation as someone who doesn’t (yet)
know the result of a fair coin toss, and this explains why we have a strong in-
tuition that she should assign a probability of 12 to Heads. Similarly, if Beauty
learns that this is the last time she wakes up, but does not know if it is day 1 or
day 2, she knows that it is Heads if and only if it is day 1, and Tails if and only if
it is day 2. This means that P (H |L)= P (D1|L), and it is very plausible that both
should equal 12 . Finally, the probabilities in equation 11 are simply in line with
the description of the experimental setup.
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7.2.2 Tweaking the parameters
Although the motivations I gave to support it in §7.2 are different, my numer-
ical solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem agrees with the one put forward
by Elga (2000), and which is known in the literature as the ‘thirder’ solution.
However, Elga’s original paper did not settle the answer to the Sleeping Beauty
problem, as attested by a growing literature around it to this day. In this section,
I review two prominent alternative solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I
show how both can be derived within the formal model of the Sleeping Beauty
case that I gave in §1, and then critically examine the rationales that can be
given for both.
Halfing
An early reply to Elga by David Lewis (2001) advocated a different solution to
the original problem, which has come to be known as ‘halfing’. According to
Lewis, Beauty’s credence in Heads should not change between the time before
she is put to sleep and when she wakes up on day 1, but should stay equal to 12 .
In other words, for Lewis, both P (H)= 12 and P (H |W )= 12 . The rationale given
by Lewis to defend this ‘halfer’ solution is that, upon waking up, Beauty does
not learn anything new. She was aware all along that she would wake up at least
once during the experiment, and therefore an awakening does not give her
additional clues about the outcome of the coin toss. Given this consideration,
halfers argue that Beauty should not update her credence in Heads from what
it already was before the experiment. Since she knows the coin to be fair, she
should maintain a credence of 12 in Heads.
Lewis, like Elga, accepts that the sample space we should use to model the
Sleeping Beauty problem is analogous to the the refined sample space Ω′ that
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I have given in §1 (see table 2). This is because both Lewis and Elga agree
that we need to model Beauty’s uncertainty regarding what day it is, since this
information is relevant to the probability of Heads. They also agree (as, to the
best of my knowledge, everyone in the literature) that, if the coin lands Tails,
Beauty is equally likely to wake up on day 1 as she is on day 2, that is β = 12 .
However, in order to get Lewis’s solution, the conditional probability of day 1
given Heads should be set equal to 1, that is,α= 1. When we set the parameters
in this way, the probability of waking up on day i is:
P (W )= 1+1
2
= 1 (12)
And the resulting numerical solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem is there-
fore:





The halfer solution is known to generate some counterintuitive answers when
it comes to the further questions I formulated in §7.1.1. These can all be easily
derived in the formal model I have given in §1. One problem for the Lewisian
halfers is that the probability that Beauty assigns to Heads appears to increase
if, upon awakening, she is informed that it is day 1, as (by equation 3):




This result is clearly puzzling, since Beauty’s awakening on day 1 happens in-
dependently of the result of the coin toss. Lewis himself acknowledged the
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puzzling nature of this result, arguing that it constitutes an interesting case of
getting evidence ‘about the future’ (Lewis, 2001, p. 175).
In spite of the puzzling answer it generates, Lewisian halfing remains a rela-
tively popular solution. This is because it makes a basic appeal to an intuition
that is shared by many people, regarding what is the content of Beauty’s evi-
dence upon waking up. The idea behind Lewisian halfing is the following: if
Heads, Beauty can only wake up on day 1. Moreover, Beauty only observes a
day if she gets to wake up on that day. Therefore, if Heads, day 1 is sampled with
certainty. There is no possible scenario in which Beauty gets to observe day 2,
if Heads, and so the prior probability assigned to day 2 given Heads should be
0.
Although it appears intuitive, this motivation for the halfer solution may rest
on a misunderstanding of what is the observable event W in the Sleeping Beauty
experiment. As I explained in §1, W contains all the outcomes of the refined
sample space Ω′ in which Beauty is awake on day i ∈ {1,2}. When she is put
to sleep, Beauty considers it possible that she will not wake up on every day
during the experiment. This is because she knows that it is possible that she
will sleep through day 2, if the result of the coin toss is Heads. So, even though
she knows that she will not be consciously aware of it if and when it happens,
day 2 given Heads is a live possibility at the outset, to which she intuitively
should assign a positive prior probability. If the halfer solution were correct,
however, then Beauty would be certain, even before the beginning of the ex-
periment, that the prior probability of W is equal to 1, since (plugging in α= 1
in equation 1) P (W )= 1+12 = 1. Moreover, puzzlingly, she would also be certain
to wake up, conditional on it being day 2, as we can see by solving equation 6:




= 1. In other words, according to Lewisian halfing, Beauty
would be antecedently certain that she wakes up on every day during the ex-
periment – even though this clearly is contrary to the description of the exper-
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imental setup, which specifies that the prior probability that she wakes up on
day 2 is equal to the probability that the coin toss comes up Tails – which, the
coin being fair, is in turn equal to 12 .
Another reason to believe that the halfer solution rests on a misunderstanding
is that halfers assign a value ofβ= 12 , on the basis of the same Restricted Princi-
ple of Indifference advocated by Elga (but which is not necessary to derive the
thirder solution, as I have shown). This means that (at least in the case where
the coin toss comes up Tails) halfers allow for the possibility that we should
think of the day Beauty observes as if it were randomly sampled from the set
of possible days within a Tails run. But why should this same reasoning not
apply to the Heads run, as well? After all, the indifference should reflect the
ignorance of which day it is according to Beauty’s priors, and not be taken as a
way to set her posterior probabilities.
Double halfing
As we have seen, the Lewisian halfing solution to the Sleeping Beauty prob-
lem proceeds from an intuitively plausible assumption about the content of
Beauty’s evidence when she wakes up (that is: Beauty doesn’t learn anything
new, because she knew all along that she would wake up at least once), but
leads to some implausible conclusions. In particular, what has been consid-
ered especially puzzling about Lewisian halfing is that it predicts that Beauty’s
credence in Heads, when she is informed that it is day 1, is equal to 23 . In order
to obviate this counterintuitive result, another solution has been proposed in
the literature, which is known as ‘double halfing’ (Cozic, 2011).
According to a double halfer, Beauty’s credence in Heads upon waking up is
equal to 12 (just as for Lewis). However, upon learning that it is day 1, Beauty’s
credence in Heads should also stay equal to 12 , in other words learning D1 is
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not relevant to the probability of H . The rationale behind this solution is quite
evident, as it appears to reconcile two powerful intuitions: on the one hand,
Beauty does not learn anything new relevant to Heads upon waking up; on the
other hand, learning that it is day 1 is again not relevant to Heads.
A double halfer solution can be derived in my formal model of the Sleeping
Beauty problem by setting the values ofα andβ both equal to 1.54 Settingα= 1
ensures that double halfers get the same answer as Lewis to the orginal prob-
lem, P (H |W )= 1 (as the conditional probability of H given W is just a function
of α, by equation 2). Moreover, by setting β = 1 we also get – via equation 3 –
that P (H |D1)= 11+1 = 12 , as desired.
There’s an obvious reason why setting α = β = 1 recovers the double halfer
solution. The double halfer solution cashes in on the fact that Beauty is certain
to wake up on day 1, regardless of the result of the coin toss. This chimes both
with the intuition that waking up should be uninformative (because Beauty
is certain to wake up on day 1 anyway), and that learning that it is day 1 is
uninformative (because Beauty is certain she observes day 1, learning it does
not give her any information about the coin toss).
Besides giving the intuitively correct answer for P (H |D1), double halfing does
not involve an application of the Restricted Principle of Indifference, and thus
avoids the objection I raised against halfing that it represents the current day
as if it was randomly sampled if Tails, but not if Heads. However, double halfing
generates some very puzzling conclusions of its own. For instance, by equation
4, the conditional probability of H given that this is Beauty’s last awakening (L)
is:
P (H |L)= 1
1+1−1 = 1
54 Note that my claim here is just that it is possible to derive a double halfer solution within a
standard Bayesian framework. Double halfers may, in fact, object to this way of representing
their solution if they disagree with the representation of the problem I have given in §7.1-7.2.
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That is, if the experimenters tell Beauty that today is the last time she is awake
during the experiment, Beauty becomes certain that the result of the coin toss
is Heads – which is clearly a very puzzling conclusion. And, even more trou-
blingly, when bothα and β are set to 1 and, consequently, the prior probability
of day 2 is 0 (as P (D2)= 12 (2−α−β)= 0). The conditional probability of Heads,
given that it is day 2, is undefined, as the denominator in the following equa-
tion is 0:
P (H |D2)= P (D2|H)P (H)
P (D2)
But, clearly, if Beauty learns that it is day 2 the probability that she assigns to
Heads is not undefined. Instead, it should simply go to 0, since the fact that
she is awake on day 2 indicates to Beauty that the result of the coin toss is Tails.
7.3 M AT T E R S O F P R I N C I P L E
In this section, I examine how the proposed representation and solution tally
with three principles. The first principle (RPI) aims to establish a link between
the subjective indistinguishability of some outcomes and their posterior prob-
abilities. The second and the third principles (respectively, Conditionalisation
and Reflection) concern instead the relationship between a rational agent’s cre-
dences at different times. The solution I have proposed rejects RPI, but up-
holds both Conditionalisation and Reflection, when appropriately construed.
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7.3.1 Indifference, good and bad
As noted in the discussion in §7.2, the solution I propose to the Sleeping Beauty
problem involves the application of the Principle of Indifference to obtain the
prior probability that one experimental day is sampled, given that the result
of the coin toss is respectively either Heads or Tails. The Principle of Indiffer-
ence is known to generate ‘paradoxes’55 when it is used to fix prior probabili-
ties on uncountable domains, but I argued in §7.2 that these concerns should
not worry us here, since the outcome space that we are considering in the case
of Sleeping Beauty is only finite. Moreover, the Principle of Indifference is of-
ten criticised for being an ‘un-objective’ or arbitrary way of fixing priors, ef-
fectively allowing us to somehow extract precise probability values out of ig-
norance. This criticism must presuppose either that an ‘objective’ or correct
way to fix priors exists, and so we should conform to it instead of appealing to
indifference, or that there is no such way to fix our priors, and we should just
limit ourselves to not having precise priors in this case. In other words, on this
second line of thinking, if we have no access to objective probabilities, then we
do not have precise probabilities at all.
In both instances, I think that this criticism is misguided. If we had access to a
better approximation of objective probabilities, then of course we should use it
in fixing the priors for the Sleeping Beauty experiment. However, the problem
is precisely that we do not have access to anything of the sort, and we therefore
must use other means to give a probabilistic representation of the problem. If
we shouldn’t assign probabilities to the events in the refined sample space Ω′
on the basis that they are not fixed by the objective description of the prob-
lem, then we would simply be unable to give a numerical answer to the Sleep-
55 Such as, for instance, Bertrand’s ‘paradox’, although it would perhaps be more accurate to view
these cases as interesting, but not paradoxical (see Gyenis and Rédei, 2015).
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ing Beauty problem – at least unless we are given some other ways of deriving
posterior probabilities, when potentially relevant evidence is learned, but this
evidence cannot be represented within our model.56 The solution I have ar-
gued for, in contrast, requires no departure from standard Bayesian reasoning.
For this reason, it should be preferred – at least, under the assumption that we
want to model Beauty as a Bayesian reasoner.
The application of Indifference to fixing the value of parameter β, described in
§7.2.1, implies that the conditional probability of day 1, given that Tails is the
case, is equal to 12 . This conclusion agrees with a claim that is shared virtually
across the board57 in the literature on the Sleeping Beauty problem, which is
that Beauty should equally divide her credences in D1 and D2, after learning
that T . This is not surprising: based on the description of the experimental
setup, Beauty knows that if Tails, she wakes up on both days. So, learning that
Tails is the case does not intuitively favour either day.58 This widely accepted
claim is enshrined in a principle, which (Elga, 2000, following) is called the
(Highly) Restricted Principle of Indifference (RPI, for short). The statement of
RPI requires the introduction of some additional terminology.
56 We can express this technically when the evidence that is received is non-measurable with re-
spect to the σ-algebra in our probabilistic model of the problem (Halpern, 2004, see). For ex-
ample, this happens if we stick with Ω as the relevant sample space for the Sleeping Beauty
problem and takeF = {{ws}, {ww},Ω,;} as the relevant σ-algebra. As explained in §7.1, the ev-
idence W cannot be expressed within this representation, as it is not measurable with respect
to F . Halpern explores some technical possibilities to model this kind of scenario, but I think
that a basic problem with this approach is that it makes it unclear what evidence is. In stan-
dard Bayesian reasoning, a piece of evidence is conceptualised as an observable event. Non-
measurable evidence, however, is not technically an event, since it is not an element of the
σ-algebra.
57 To the best of my knowledge, no proposal explicitly denies this claim.
58 Double halfers, however, are in a puzzling predicament with respect to this widely accepted
claim. If Beauty is a double halfer, learning that Tails is irrelevant to what day it is, since she
is already convinced that it is day 1. Double halfers cannot reconcile the claim that Beauty
assigns an equal probability to D1 and D2, after learning T , with the assignment of α = β =
1 that is needed to derive their solution, unless they are willing to argue that Beauty’s priors
somehow change (in typically non-Bayesian fashion) between waking up and learning that W ,
and subsequently learning that T .
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First of all, we need to introduce a distinction between what we will call un-
centred and centred events, relative to a set of centred possible worlds (where a
possible world corresponds to an outcome in the sample space that is used to
represent the problem). Intuitively, (as I have explained in Chapter 2) a centred
possible world is a complete description of the world which, in addition to all
the objective features of the world, also specifies the time, spatial coordinate
and identity of the agent that is at the ‘centre’ of that world. The sample space
Ω′, which we have used to represent the Sleeping Beauty experiment, is a set
of centred worlds in this sense, as each of its elements specifies whether Sleep-
ing Beauty wakes up on day 1 and on day 2 (which are objective features of the
world) and, moreover, also specifies whether day 1 or day 2 is sampled, that
is at which time Sleeping Beauty is located (the centred component). Some of
the sample points (the centred worlds) within Ω′ coincide with respect to the
centre, as they place Beauty on the same day (for example, ws1 and ww1 both
place Beauty on day 1). Some sample points, instead, coincide with respect to
the objective component. For example, ww1 and ww2 both agree that Beauty
wakes up on day 1 and day 2, although they place at a different time coordinate.
A set of outcomes A is an uncentred event if, and only if, for any two centred
worldsω,ω′ that agree on the objective component (but not necessarily on the
centred component) A contains ω if and only if it contains ω′. For example,
T = {ww1,ww1} is an uncentred event, since it contains all the elements ofΩ′
that coincide on the objective component associated with a Heads run of the
Sleeping Beauty experiment. By contrast, D1 = {ws1,ww1} is a centred event,
since it does not contain all the elements of Ω′ that agree with the objective
component of each of its elements.
With this terminology in place, we can now state the Restricted Principle of
Indifference: Let A = {ω} and B = {ω′} be two disjoint centred events, each
containing a single centred world, such that their respective elements ω and
ω′ coincide with respect to their objective component, and let E ⊆ {ω,ω′} be
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the evidence available to an agent a. The Restricted Principle of Indifference
says that if A and B are subjectively indistinguishable for a (in a sense that I
will explain in a moment), then a should assign them equal probabilities. In
other words, if A and B are indistinguishable and both P (A|E) and P (B |E) are
positive, then P (A|E)= P (B |E).
To illustrate what it means for two centred worlds to be ‘subjectively indistin-
guishable’, think of Beauty’s predicament after she wakes up during the sleep-
ing experiment. As we have seen, the outcomes in Ω′ correspond to possible
centred worlds and, by the definition of centred events that I have given, the
evidence W that Beauty learns upon waking up is a centred event. Some el-
ements of W , however, have the same objective component: namely, ww1
(corresponding to Tails and the first day is sampled, or T ∩D1) and ww2 (cor-
responding to Tails and the second day is sampled, or T ∩D2). Intuitively,
Beauty cannot subjectively distinguish between these two outcomes, because
in each case she feels as if this is the first time she wakes up (either because
this is indeed the case, or because she forgot the previous awakening). As the
two events {ww1} and {ww2} are both compatible with her evidence W , they
have the same objective component, and are subjectively indistinguishable for
Beauty, RPI tells us that P ({ww1}|W )= P ({ww2}|W ).59
Perhaps due to the notorious controversy that surrounds the regular Principle
of Indifference, on the one hand, and the intuitive appeal of the claim that day
1 and day 2 are equally probable given Tails, on the other, virtually all literature
on the Sleeping Beauty problem (and related problems) accepts the validity
of RPI, which is often explicitly described as a fairly uncontroversial assump-
59 This is how Elga (2000) (p.145) puts it: ‘If (upon first awakening) you were to learn that the
toss outcome is Tails, that would amount to your learning that you are in either [day 1] or [day
2]. Since being in [day 1] is subjectively just like being in [day 2], and since exactly the same
propositions are true whether you are in [day 1] or [day 2], even a highly restricted principle of
indifference yields that you ought then to have equal credence in each.’
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tion.60 I think that this state of affairs should be questioned. As I see it, the
problem with RPI is not that it generates wrong or implausible claims – which,
in most cases (including Sleeping Beauty) doesn’t seem to be true. But the logic
it employs is flawed, particularly when RPI is meant to be a tool for Bayesian
reasoning.
A fundamental idea for Bayesian reasoning is that we learn from experience.
What this means is that the probabilities that we assign to events that we con-
sider possible should reflect the relevant evidence that we have been able to
collect up to now. The way in which evidence is incorporated into our overall
probability assignment is by conditionalising – more on this in the next section.
But this is only possible if we start with a probabilistic model, which assigns
some prior probabilities to all the events and evidence that we expect might
come our way. Notoriously, priors are not set in stone and revealed to us by
some omniscient demon, so it is on this level that a Bayesian is to some extent
open to guess work. Typically, as in the case of the Sleeping Beauty experiment,
there are some constraints to how it is reasonable to set the priors: in the case
of Sleeping Beauty, these constraints are given by the features of the experi-
mental setup, which specifies that the coin is fair, and the precise sequence of
awakenings and sleepy days corresponding to each outcome of the coin toss.
But these constraints do not completely determine the prior probabilities of
all the events of interest. In order to apply Bayesian reasoning, when the prior
probability of some relevant evidence that we might get is not given as an ex-
ternal constraint, we then need to agree on fixing a prior. One possibility for
doing this, as I have argued, is applying the Principle of Indifference. This is
a legitimate application of Indifference: it just lets us formulate a prior, when
other considerations do not help to settle the matter.
60 For a standard defense of RPI, see Elga (2004).
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RPI, on the other hand, is not a principle to set prior probabilities, when other
considerations fail. Instead, it places a constraint on the posterior probabili-
ties associated to some particular pairs of outcomes – namely, outcomes that
are both subjectively indistinguishable and coincide with respect to their ob-
jective components. This essentially reverses the logic of Bayesian reasoning:
if we accept RPI, we accept that at least in some cases we do not just learn
from experience; the conclusions we arrive to (the posterior probabilities) are
not left open, but constrained by an external principle. To see this, consider
two events A and B satisfying the conditions for RPI, and a piece of evidence
E , consistent with both A and B . Suppose that you learn E : irrespective of any
consideration about your priors, RPI now tells you that the posterior probabil-
ity of (A|E) is equal to that of (B |E). In other words, the posterior probabilities
of A and of B , given E , are constrained by RPI, and not left to be determined by
your priors and the evidence E that you learn. While the numerical probabili-
ties that we get by applying RPI might agree with what we would get by apply-
ing the Principle of Indifference, the logic behind the former is not sound and
contradicts a fundamental aspect of Bayesian reasoning.
7.3.2 Conditionalisation
The Sleeping Beauty problem is generally taken to present a challenge to the
principle of Conditionalisation.61 Conditionalisation is the way in which Bayesian
reasoners are expected to update their credences over time, upon learning new
pieces of information. It works like this: suppose that at time t1, you learn a
new piece of evidence E (and nothing else). For any event A, the probability
that you assign to A at t1 after learning that E should be equal to the condi-
61 See (Titelbaum, 2016b, p. 667): ‘The current consensus in the self-locating credence literature is
that obtaining a general updating scheme for degrees of belief in both centered and uncentered
propositions requires us to alter (or at least supplement) conditionalization in some way.’
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tional probability you used to assign to (A|E) at the time t0 just before learn-
ing E . More formally, denoting by Pt0 and Pt1 your credences at t0 and t1, re-
spectively, Conditionalisation places the following constraint on how your cre-
dences should change between t0 and t1, when the only thing that you learn in
the interval between these two times is E :
Definition 13 (Conditionalisation). Pt1 (A)= Pt1 (A|E)= Pt0 (A|E)
The question now is: Does Beauty update her credences via Conditionalisation
upon waking up on day 1? It is often argued that if Beauty is a thirder, then
the way her credence in Heads is updated when she wakes up on day 1 is not
compatible with Conditionalisation. Elga himself makes this point:
Before being put to sleep, your credence in H was 1/2. [. . . ] when
you are awakened on [day 1], that credence ought to change to 1/3.
This belief change is unusual. It is not the result of your receiv-
ing new information – you were already certain that you would be
awakened on [day 1]. (Elga, 2000, p. 146)
The upshot, for Elga, is that Conditionalisation does not always apply. In cases
where an agent receives only centred evidence, his or her credences may change
in ways that conflict with Conditionalisation.
In light of the analysis I have offered in §7.1, we can see how Elga’s argument
here cannot be right. To say that the change in Beauty’s credence in Heads ‘is
not a result of [her] receiving new information’ implies that Beauty is certain
that she will receive evidence W , or – more precisely – it implies that the prior
probability P (W ) equals 1. But, as we have seen, relative to the assignment of
values to α and β consistent with the thirder solution, this is not true, because
for α= 12 we have that P (W )= 34 6= 1. In other words, if she is a thirder, Beauty
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is not certain that she will learn W . Moreover, as I argued in §7.2, learning W
is relevant to the probability of H .
The last sentence from Elga’s quote indicates where the problem lies. When
Elga says that Beauty does not receive new information, that is because she
is certain of waking up on day 1. This explains why, intuitively, on day 0 she is
certain that she will receive evidence W at least once in the future – namely, on
day 1. Conditional on her being awake and it being day 1, Beauty’s credence in
Heads should indeed remain unchanged (as I also argued in §7.2), since P (H)
is independent of P (W ∩D1) – that is, P (H |W ∩D1)= 12 = P (H). However, upon
waking up, Beauty does not learn that W ∩D1. Instead, her evidence is just W ,
and since P (H) is not independent of P (W ), this is relevant information upon
which she should update her credences via conditionalisation. My solution
allows this, and thus vindicates Conditionalisation.
Lewis’s halfer solution – contrary to Elga’s – does not entail a violation of Con-
ditionalisation. Lewis simply starts from the assumption that the evidence W
is irrelevant to H , and as we have seen this can be achieved within the repre-
sentation I have given by setting α = 1 and β = 12 . Given this setting, the prior
probability P (W ) = 1, and so Beauty is indeed certain that she will receive ev-
idence W , which then gives us P (H |W ) = 12 = P (H), without any violations
of Conditionalisation. Similarly, the double halfer solution with α = β = 1 is
consistent with Conditionalisation – at least, unless Beauty is informed that it
is day 2, in which case (as we have seen in §7.2.2) her posterior credence in
Heads is simply undefined.
Based on this discussion, we can now see that the key difference between the
halfer and thirder solutions is the characterisation of the event W . For halfers,
W is certain, and so learning W does not affect the probability of Heads. For
thirders, on the contrary, W is not certain, and therefore learning it affects the
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probability of Heads, via conditionalisation. Given these results, we can see
that once the problem is correctly represented, the solution to the Sleeping
Beauty problem does not challenge the validity of Conditionalisation as a prin-
ciple for updating one’s credences in the face of newly acquired evidence.
7.3.3 Reflection
Another rationality principle that appears to be violated in the Sleeping Beauty
case is van Fraassen’s Reflection principle (Van Fraassen, 1984). Suppose that
you are a rational Bayesian agent, that you always plan to update your cre-
dences via Conditionalisation, and you do not expect to suffer any cognitive
mishap that would lose you some of your previous evidence. Then let, as be-
fore, Pti denote your credences at a time ti , and Pt j denote your credences at
some later time t j>i . If you know, at ti , that your later credence Pt j (A) in some
event A will be equal to some real number 0≤ p ≤ 1, then, intuitively, your cre-
dence at Pt0 (A) should match that same value. That is, stated somewhat more
formally (see Schervish et al. (2004)):
Definition 18 (Reflection). Pti (A|Pt j (A) = p) = p. (Assuming Conditionalisa-
tion and no evidence loss).
Clearly, you do not typically know what probability you will assign to an uncer-
tain event in the future. This is because you do not generally know in advance
which possible pieces of evidence you will learn in the future, and so you do
not know what posterior probability you will assign to A by the time t j . How-
ever, if you were certain that you will receive a particular piece of evidence E
(and nothing more) by t j , which would lead you to update your credence in A
(via Conditionalisation) to Pt j (A) = Pt j (A|E) = Pti (A|E) = p, then it seems rea-
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sonable to suppose that you should already have the same credence Pti (A)= p
at the earlier time ti . This is indeed confirmed by the probability calculus: to
be certain, at ti , that you will receive evidence E just means that Pti (E)= 1, and
so naturally Pti (A)= Pti (A|E)= p.
Despite this natural reading, the principle of Reflection has come under con-
siderable critical scrutiny (Mahtani, 2016). The Sleeping Beauty problem, in
particular, provides one instance when the principle of Reflection appears to
be violated. If Beauty is a thirder, and assigns a probability of 13 to Heads upon
waking up on day 1, it seems that her prior credences on day 0, before the ex-
periment begins, violate Reflection. This is because she knows, at t0 = day 0,
that she will receive the evidence W at t1 = day 1. By Reflection, then, it seems
that her earlier credence in H at t0 should be Pt0 (H |Pt1 (H) = 13 ) = 13 . Beauty’s
credence in Heads on day 0, however, is not equal to 13 but to
1
2 , in accordance
with what she knows about the experimental setup, which explicitly sets the
prior P (H) = 12 . So, it seems that either the initial probability of Heads is not
1
2 , or Beauty’s credences do not satisfy Reflection. Both alternatives seem very
bad: the former flatly contradicts the setup of the problem, while the latter is
inconsistent with the probability calculus, under the assumption that Beauty
is a rational agent who updates her credences via conditionalisation. What can
possibly have gone wrong?
The puzzle, I think, derives from the rather informal statement of Reflection,
which has led us to a subtle mis-interpretation (see Mahtani, 2016; Briggs, 2009;
Schervish et al., 2004). The ‘event’ upon which we are conditionalising in defi-
nition 18 is not, strictly speaking, an event with respect to the sample spaceΩ′
that we have used to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem. In other words, to
say that ‘P (H)= r ’ is an event which Beauty can conditionalise upon is techni-
cally incorrect, because ‘P (H)= r ’ is not a subset of Ω′. However, there might
be some other technically legitimate way to recover the initial intuition that
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Beauty is in some sense ‘certain’ that she will assign probability 13 to Heads in
the future, because she believes that she will receive evidence W at a particular
time in the future. To find the solution to the puzzle, we need only look more
closely into the conditions under which Beauty expects to learn W .
Given what she knows about the experimental setup, Beauty expects to receive
evidence W on day 1, since she is certain that the experimenters wake her up
on day 1 irrespective of the coin toss. This consideration is reflected in the
prior probability P (W |D1) = 1, as can be easily verified (see §7.2). So, when
we say that Beauty is certain to learn W (and, as a consequence, to update the
probability of Heads to P (H |W ) = 13 ), what we really mean is that Beauty is
certain to experience an awakening on day 1. If at t1 she was in a position to
conditionalise on learning W ∩D1, then indeed Reflection would be satisfied,
as expected: Pt0 (H |W ∩D1) = Pt1 (H |W ∩D1) = 12 . However, Beauty does not
learn W ∩D1 at t1, but only W . This explains why her credence at t0 does
not reflect her credence at t1: that is not because she is irrational, or violates
Conditionalisation in the way she updates her credences between these two
times, but because at t0 she can only be certain that she learns W given D1,
but the latter event is not part of her evidence at t1. It would be incorrect to say
that Pt0 (W )= 1, since Pt0 (W )= 34 . Therefore, Beauty is not certain of W at the
earlier time, and she can’t reflect on it.
7.4 B E T S A N D O D D S
It has been argued that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, fair betting odds and
credences can ‘come apart’ (Bradley and Leitgeb, 2006; Briggs, 2010). If true,
this would be a problem for Bayesians, who are committed to probabilism –
namely, the thesis that rational credences always conform to the probability
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calculus. On the one hand, if rational credences do not correspond to fair odds
in betting scenarios, this undercuts a standard argument for probabilism (de
Finetti, 1937). On the other hand, if fair betting odds are not based on rational
credences, what are they and how can they be reliably computed? Appealing
to additional evidence or side information that could be used to fix the betting
odds will not solve the problem for the Bayesian, since any such evidence, if
available, should also be reflected by the credence function.
As I showed in the previous sections, both the thirder and the halfer solutions
can be represented within a Bayesian framework, in a way that is compatible
with the principle of Conditionalisation. A well known result by Lewis (2010)
(and generalised by Skyrms, 2009) shows that a Bayesian agent who plans to
update her credences via conditionalisation cannot fall victim to what is called
a diachronic Dutch Book, that is she does not expect now to accept some bets
in the future that, by her own lights, guarantee a sure loss. For illustration,
imagine that Betty is a Bayesian who plans to update her credences via condi-
tionalisation. Before a fair die is rolled, we can assume that she might accept
a bet X that pays £5 if the die shows a 3, and loses £1 otherwise. The expected
value of this bet for Betty now is 0, as she expects to lose £1 with a probability
of 56 , and win £5 with a probability of
1
6 . She also currently estimates that the
probability that she wins the bet, conditional on the die showing an odd num-
ber, is equal to 13 , which is higher than her current unconditional probability
of winning. So, Betty would also be prepared now to accept a conditional bet
Y that pays £9 if the die shows a 3, and loses £3 otherwise, all conditional on
the die showing an odd number (that is, the bet is void if the die shows an even
number, but gives 1:2 odds on 3, conditional on an odd number). Suppose
that later, the die is rolled and Betty receives the information that it shows an
odd number. At that point, given that she plans to update her credences via
conditionalisation, she will be prepared to accept an unconditional bet Z on
the die showing a 3, at the same odds as the conditional bet Y . The expected
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value of Z , later, is the same for Betty as the expected value of Y now – so, if the
expected value of Y is non-negative, the same must be true for Z .
Regardless of whether she is a halfer or a thirder, on the solution I have given
in §7.2 Beauty does not violate conditionalisation. So, by Lewis’s result, she
will not be dutch bookable, just as Betty would not be in the example I just
gave. This is confirmed by checking the expected value she would assign to
different bets on H , before and after waking up (that is, before and after W
is observed). For instance, let us assume that Beauty is a halfer. Before the
experiment begins, the unconditional probability that she assigns to W , as we
have seen, is 1. So, the bets that she is prepared to accept now, are the same
as those that she would be prepared to accept later, after W is observed. In
particular, if she is willing now to accept bets at even odds for H vs T , she
will also be prepared to accept the same bets later. On the other hand, if we
assume that Beauty is a thirder, then observing W is relevant to H , since the
unconditional probability that she assigns to W is 34 . Before the experiment
begins, Beauty is prepared to accept unconditional bets at even odds for H ,
but conditional on W she would only accept bets that give 1:2 odds for H (see
the answer to question 2 in §7.2.1). These are also the same odds that she
would accept for an unconditional bet on H , after she wakes up during the
experiment.
Contrary to what I just said, Bradley and Leitgeb (2006) argue that if Beauty is a
halfer, the expected value of an unconditional bet at even odds for H , after she
wakes up, is not 0 but a negative value. The reasoning behind this is that if H
occurs, then Beauty is in a position to accept an unconditional bet on H (hav-
ing observed W ) only once, whereas if T occurs she is in a position to accept
the same unconditional bet on H twice. So the idea is that, over the course of
the experiment, she may accept a losing bet on H twice, and a winning bet on
H only once. Consequently, the odds at which Beauty is prepared to accept a
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bet on H should be 1:2, to reflect what is intuitively the statistical likelihood of
being offered a winning bet.
Note that the motivation for betting at thirder odds that Bradley and Leitgeb
give is based on statistical considerations that are entirely consistent with the
thirder solution that I have advocated in §7.2.1. However, to square these
considerations with the halfer solution that they favour, Bradley and Leitgeb
must implicitly assume that the expected value of a bet is not equal to the
probability-weighted sum of its value in all possible outcomes (which is the
standard definition, implicit in all I have said so far. See Bovens and Rabinow-
icz, 2011; Briggs, 2010; Draper and Pust, 2008). As a result, their argument can-
not be taken as a counterexample to the results of Lewis (2010) and Skyrms
(2009), which are based on the standard definition of the expected value of a
bet. In addition, their argument does not undermine the standard arguments
for probabilism, since the reason they cite in favour of betting at thirder odds
naturally supports the thirder solution that I have advocated, which is compat-
ible with all the standard Bayesian principles.
7.5 C O N C L U S I O N
The Sleeping Beauty problem has generated a great deal of controversy, as all
the main attempts to solve it in the literature appear to violate some or other
rationality constraint (Titelbaum, 2016b). The thirder solution originally put
forward by Elga (2000) violates the principles of Conditionalisation and Reflec-
tion, while halfer solutions seemed vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch Book. A
Restricted Principle of Indifference, generally accepted in the literature and
designed to guide the updating of centred credences, goes against the spirit of
Bayesian reasoning.
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I have shown that it is possible to model a range of possible solutions to the
Sleeping Beauty problem in a Bayesian framework. The thirder solution that I
argued for is not dependent on the dubious RPI, and has the advantage of re-
specting both Conditionalisation and Reflection, in addition to being diachron-
ically coherent.
I take the main lessons that can be learned from my discussion to be the fol-
lowing:
1. Bayesian reasoning can be naturally applied to self-locating uncertainty.
We don’t have to reform probability theory, or design new updating schemes
to deal with this sort of cases.
2. In order to avoid puzzling conclusions, it is important to model evidence
correctly. In particular we should be careful to model what is the prior
probability of receiving different pieces of evidence.
3. Self-locating uncertainty does not cause a rift between fair betting odds
and credences, and the case of Sleeping Beauty does not undermine
Dutch Book arguments for probabilism and conditionalisation.
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